000 The Hoover Institute Studies began with the RADIR (Revolution and Development of International Relations) project to evaluate certain of the major trends of social change throughout the world in the past six decades. One series focuses attention on the significant elite groups of various countries in recent times. The study of *Satellite Generals* continues this series.

Who are these generals? How do they relate to the established elites of their society? What kind of training and education do they have? These are the kinds of questions to which Dr. Pool addresses himself in this study. Dr. Pool has served as Assistant Director of Research for the RADIR project and as author or collaborator in the following volumes: *The Comparative Study of Symbols; The "Prestige Papers": A Survey of Their Editorials; Symbols of Internationalism; Symbols of Democracy; The Nazi Elite;* and *Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites.*

[before p. i]

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HOOVER INSTITUTE STUDIES

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SATELLITE GENERALS

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A Study of Military Elites in the Soviet Sphere

by Ithiel de Sola Pool

with the collaboration of

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The Hoover Institute and Library
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[p. i]

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THE HOOVER INSTITUTE STUDIES

000 This series of studies undertakes to describe the world revolution of our time and its consequences for world politics and national policy. These studies were conducted by the Hoover Institute and Library on War, Revolution, and Peace as part of its research project on Revolution and the Development of International Relations (RADIR Project). Daniel Lerner served as director of research and Ithiel de Sola Pool served as assistant director of research for the project.

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Harold H. Fisher, *Chairman of the Hoover Institute*

C. Easton Rothwell, *Director of the Hoover Institute*

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PREFACE

In the academic year 1952-53 a group of scholars at the Hoover Library strove to learn something about the social structure of modern military institutions by applying the technique of elite analysis to the leadership of a number of armies. Few institutions of comparable influence have been as little studied by social scientists as have armed forces. The present volume is a report on a particularly little known group of armies, those of the satellites. It is an analysis of biographical data on their general officers. 121

A year ago the manuscript of this monograph was sent away. 000 Now reading proof, I realize with some pain how swift-moving is the revolution of our times. It poses to this author an immediate dilemma: to correct statements about it which are now out of date and gain the advantages of hindsight, or to leave some embarrassing evidences of his fallibility, reporting only what the research showed at the time it was done. In general I have followed the latter policy. Since I cannot now undertake a new analysis of the 1955 generals of the satellite armies, it seems better not to doctor the conclusions which flowed from the analysis of the 1951-52 generals so as to make the findings conform better to what has actually happened since. Except in the chapter on China, no changes in the text have been made since its completion shortly after the fall of Beria. In the Chinese chapter we have simply cut some illustrative material which derived much of its interest from the fact that it gave current information on who held what posts. With a major reorganization of the Chinese government in the fall of 1954, that became passé. The conclusions, however, have been left in full view.

When the manuscript was written, Malenkov was the ruler of Russia and the "new course" in the satellites was just getting under way. However, the data had been analyzed and the conclusions drawn well before then. Our conclusion was that a vigorous militarization was going on in the satellites. During the new course, with its emphasis on coexistence and consumers' goods, one could have doubted this conclusion. The fall of Malenkov, and with it the restoration of an emphasis in the satellites on military production and military preparation, has justified the thesis (p. 27) that the new course was a temporary deviation, the thesis which led us to stick to the conclusions deriving from our 1951-52 data.

As I look over the monograph, what I might change now are not so much specific statements as emphases. We mention the gradual softening of the pattern of purges, yet perhaps in our prognoses the pattern of 1938 still weighs a little too heavily. A number of generals who had been purged when we wrote have reappeared in minor or symbolic posts, notably General Svoboda in Czechoslovakia. Perhaps future purges will be more gradual and less conspicuous than now, though they will not cease. Army officers in particular may be has-

000 dled more gingerly now that the army has gained considerable independent power in Russia. The rise of the power of the army within the Russian Politburo is a trend of which we showed no awareness and which may have implications for the satellites.

There have, of course, been a number of changes of detail such as the appointment of General Jelen as Interior Minister in Slovakia and the appearance of General Wagrowski as Polish representative in Korea. Such developments, however, do not change the conclusions and it is general findings, not biographical particulars, with which we are concerned.

The most rapid changes have been in China. The situation of two years ago led us to speculate about the possibilities of internal regional conflicts within the Communist movement. Peking, however, was even more aware than we of this possibility and has acted on it strenuously. The trend toward centralization has been marked. Without fresh research I cannot speculate on how much regionalism remains. The external threat in Korea and Formosa may have helped push the centralizing tendency. Similarly it may have been responsible for much of the modernization of the Chinese armies in the past couple of years. Severe external dangers might lead to internal breakdowns, but mild external threats such as those now faced by the Chinese may have had the opposite effect.

The present study was a co-operative endeavor. The senior author is not a specialist on Eastern Europe nor China. He has been able to do this job because he had the help of his fellow authors who wrote reports on countries with which they were closely familiar. The authors of these reports have had no opportunity to review or to judge the ways in which the senior author has used their documents. They have no responsibility for the conclusions drawn nor for errors here published, but the study would have been impossible without their conscientious work and extensive knowledge.

The author has also drawn on the wisdom, experience, and knowledge of a number of other scholars who have helped guide him through unfamiliar ground. I am particularly grateful to Mrs. Adele Bergman and Mrs. Gladys Bolloten, Messrs. K. C. Chao, Constantin A. Dimitropoulos, Joseph Goldsen, Andrew Gyorgy, Colonel Theodore A. Holdahl, USMC, Colonel Daniel Ivanovici, Morris Janowitz, Lt. Z. Jazwinski, Paul Kecskemeti, Konrad Kellen, Joseph Korbel, Daniel Lerner, Nicholas Spulber, and Witold Sworakowski. They have all been most generous with their knowledge and counsel. A special word of thanks is due to Miss Jean Neergaard who kept the varied operations of the research project moving smoothly.

Ithiel de Sola Pool

Cambridge, Mass.
February 21, 1955

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Subject of the Paper

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This is a study of leadership in Communist armies. More precisely it is a study of the conflict between two needs which the Communists face if they are to build up satellite armies: the need for loyal military leaders and the need for skilled ones. Every army, indeed every institution, has this dilemma. It needs leaders who believe in its cause, but it also needs leaders who are proficient. Even a free and stable society has some difficulty locating men who are both adequately loyal and adequately competent. For a dogmatic and revolutionary society the problem is more difficult.

A free society asks only basic loyalty not doctrinaire fanaticism, ~~and~~ basic loyalty it generally commands from those who grow up in it. A free and stable society can therefore pick the most capable men and take it for granted that they will ordinarily do what is demanded of them.

On the other hand, a society which demands that its leaders adhere to every detail of a dogmatic line cannot take loyalty for granted. A society with a fanatical creed must favor leaders who are orthodox over those who are able. If the fanatical society is a revolutionary one it must also favor untutored rebels over experienced leaders.

The Communist movement is both doctrinaire and revolutionary. It is a dogma in arms. Because it uses arms it has a desperate need for skilled military leadership. But because it is revolutionary and fanatical it often beheads its most skillful leaders.

That is a dilemma for the new Communist armies; it is the classic dilemma of revolutions. How the satellites attempt to resolve it and secure for themselves an adequate military leadership is the subject of this paper.

B The Satellite Armed Forces and Their Generals

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Until 1945 the Soviet Union, with such minor appendages as Outer Mongolia, was the world's sole Communist power. The Red Army was therefore the only Communist state army illustrating this dilemma between loyalty and professional skill. But the problem was not a new one to the Communists for they had come upon it in their considerable tradition of revolutionary militarism.

From the time of Engels, himself a military specialist, Communist political thinking has focused heavily on problems of utilization of armed forces. Revolutionary armies were built illegally and in turn collapsed as Communist bids for power failed. Even in countries where no Communist army had ever existed, Communists paid considerable attention to military affairs and trained their followers in the use of arms. The Twenty-One Points laid down at the Second

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Congress of the Comintern as conditions for admission into the Communist International required all parties to maintain an underground organization in preparation for civil war. All Communist parties were also instructed to colonize the armed forces both for subversion and for the training of their followers. One point required that,

> Persistent and systematic propaganda and agitation must be carried on in the army, where Communist groups should be formed in every military organization. Wherever, owing to repressive legislation, agitation becomes impossible it is necessary to carry on such agitation illegally. But refusal to carry on or participate in such work should be considered equal to treason to the revolutionary cause and incompatible with affiliation to the Third International.[1]

In Russia, Spain, and China there emerged out of civil wars a considerable number of experienced military men who were also revolutionary Communist politicians. In Russia the Civil War was the crucible in which an entire generation of Bolshevik leaders was formed and hardened. The revolutionary Chinese Communist Army, already a major force, was well on the way to becoming a state army, in the 1930's, though it still had many characteristics of a guerrilla force. The leaders of the Spanish International Brigade, including many Russian officers in camouflage, scattered after defeat to various countries where Communist violence was being prepared and there they became potential military leaders.

Thus there existed by 1945 a considerable body of Communist military leadership and also of Communist military doctrine, but except insofar as the Russian experience provided a model it all concerned the special situation of makeshift revolutionary struggle. It is only since 1945 that we have been able to decipher the lines of Communist military policy, beyond the borders of Russia in a period of state power rather than in a struggle for it. Since 1945 the Communists have acquired ten state armies backed by all the sanctions of legal compulsion, taxing power, and relative permanency. These are the armed forces of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, China, North Korea, East Germany, and Jugoslavia, which last the Muskovite Communists eventually lost.

In taking over these armies the Communists have drawn upon three sources for leaders:

1. The non-Communist regular armies which they supplanted
2. Irregular forces which the Communists had previously formed or supported
3. The Russian Army

To these elements a fourth is now being added: newly trained young officers whose entire career has been under the satellite regime.

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The relationship between these four elements has not been a static one. On the contrary the history of each satellite army is a history of purges. "Purging," we hasten to explain, is a word we use in its original and also Bolshevik sense of elimination. Some purge victims are just retired or fired. Some are imprisoned. A few are executed. The latter have given the term "purge" a frightful aura which it fully deserves but it should be understood that a man may be purged without severe punishment. He may simply be demoted or demobilized.

In the first stage of evolution of the satellite armies a few well-tried and fanatical Communist officers were put in key positions and at the same time some notably anti-Communist officers were either retired or tried as war criminals. At first, however, the bulk of the general officers in the new armies were experienced men retained from the old armies. Then followed three or four years in which these old-line officers were gradually replaced, partly by newly-trained younger men, partly by older Communists, and partly by Russian officers. The old Communists who have loyalty but not professional skill have not fared well in the long run. In the process of successive purges many of the hardened Communists from the prewar era have been eliminated by new personnel of a less revolutionary type. The planned end result of this process of successive recruitment and purging is supposed to be an armed force led by a new type of officer whom the Communists are desperately trying to train, a young Soviet-educated type who will be— they hope— unquestioningly Communist but also proficient militarily. The actual end result world politics will determine and only history will know.

C. Satellite and Russian Armies: Similarities and Differences

In a companion study to this one Daniel Lerner traces the parallel evolution of the Russian Army and finds that history bequeathed to it three main types of general officer: (1) the highly trained pre-revolutionary officer who is retained for his technical skill, (2) the 'muzhik' general or uneducated but dynamic man who won his power by personal leadership in the Civil War but who lacked the scientific and technical knowledge to build a modern army, and (3) the Soviet-trained young professional.[1a] As we noted above, each of these types has its analogues in the satellite countries and in addition there is a fourth type: the imported Russian officer.

The pre-Communist professional officers presented much the same problem in Russia and the satellites. In both they were needed for a certain length of time. In both many of the old officer corps were either excluded for unreliability or ruled themselves out by rejecting the Communist regime. Of those officers who remained available a few were selected, generally from among the lower ranks, and from among men who had shown their ambition and plasticity

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by actions— often reprehensible. In Russia a Civil War record of loyalty to the Bolshevik regime was the passport to acceptance. In the satellites the best passport was having lived in Russia. The old officers who were used longest in the satellites were often those who had gotten to Russia during World War II either as exiles or prisoners of war, had then been "re-educated," and had fought the Germans under Russian control. Besides these Russian-indoctrinated officers a surprising number of the career men whom the Russians promoted to high commands were scoundrels whose prewar career had been blighted by scandal, bribery, conspiracy, etc. And finally the Russians favored officers from ethnic minorities. These included Jews who were held back in prewar Eastern Europe and also Ukrainians, Hungarians in Romania, Slovaks in Hungary, etc. In short they favored men who in sociologists' jargon may be called "marginal," that is, men whose ties to the core of the old society were weak, men whom it had oppressed, men who were never part of the in-group, men with conflicting loyalties. These career officers were used and then discarded. In Russia they were used for twenty years. In the satellites they are disappearing faster. In Poland they have already vanished from key positions. In Czechoslovakia they were still in top positions eight years after World War II, but their days are clearly numbered.

Corresponding to the muzhik generals of Russia are the Communist party men in the satellites, but the differences between them and the muzhiks are as great as the similarities.

They share with the muzhik generals both an unswerving loyalty to the Soviet regime and technical incompetence. They differ in that they are politicians rather than soldiers. The muzhik generals were men of personal dynamism who made their records as leaders of men in combat. The Communist party generals in the satellites are more often behind-the-scenes intriguers who made their records as political officers or in the NKVD. A very few of them, for example General Swierczewski (Walter), were muzhiks of the Spanish Civil War. A few were in the underground in World War II, but no underground hero is now prominent in a satellite army. The underground leaders have been purged.

Some of the present high officers, like General Alexei Cepicka, the Czechoslovak Minister of the Armed Forces, have no military records at all, having made their reputations in politics. Lieutenant General Leontin Salajan, Romanian Chief of Staff, member of the Communist party since 1922, is another politician in uniform. He became an army officer for the first time when he was made Chief of Staff, and Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces in 1950. The majority of the Communist party officers, however, did serve in World War II. They served in Russian-organized divisions of their own nationality. The Russians organized Polish, Czech, Slovak, Romanian, Hungarian, and other units, sometimes out of refugees— sometimes

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out of prisoners of war. In these units lower officers were quickly promoted to high commands and Communists, often with limited military experience, were made political officers. The political officer, whether at the army, the division, or the brigade level, was normally second in command. These political officers at the end of World War II were captains, majors, or colonels. Rank, however, was no obstacle to their assuming top positions in the new armies. Fantastically rapid promotions were common. Communists who had not been military men at all or who had been field grade officers found themselves made major generals or lieutenant generals overnight. As one of the Romanian generals wrote in 1948, "There will be no more promotions according to ranks . . . Any candidate from any rank can be given any position."[2]

While rank did not hold the Communist generals back, incapacity did. The precise posts held by the Communist generals differ from satellite to satellite, but in principle we can say they were confined within four types of position:

1. The political department of the army
2. Branches concerned with supply and business administration such as the Quartermaster Corps, the Comptroller General, or munitions production
3. Titular top positions such as Minister or Deputy Minister, the latter especially if more experienced officers hold real power behind the scenes
4. Special security troops

Tried party men invariably staff the political administration. Old Communists also always staff the Ministry of State Security (or state control) and/or the Ministry of Interior[3] which includes the internal security troops. The positions under items 3 and 4 vary in the different satellites sometimes being reserved for old party men, sometimes not.

It is important to note that whether to fill a post with an old party man or not to is a deliberate decision made for that post or class of posts. The allocation of jobs among the different types of officers is not a matter of chance. It is not determined by the free competition of individuals each judged on his own merits. On the contrary, each class of posts is explicitly or implicitly reserved for old party men, or for Russians, or for members of the old officers corps, or for newly-trained young officers. When a post is vacated it is normally refilled by the same type of officer as before unless there has been a change in policy.

It is clear from the above that the long-time Communist agitators who became political generals are by no means always favored by the Kremlin. In this respect they differ clearly from the Russian muzhik generals who survived the Soviet purges. The Politburocrats in Moscow do not have ties of personal friendship for men like

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*648 Bodnaras, Farkas, Berling, or Cepicka such as they have for Vorishilov or Budenny. The Politburocrats undoubtedly regard the former, as they do all foreign Communists and indeed all Communists outside their own clique, with a large measure of contempt. So the Soviet bosses have kept the Communist generals from putting their hands to really important military professional matters and have freely purged them.

The most important differences between the Russian and satellite army leadership patterns arise from the fact that the satellites are satellites. Except perhaps in China, the armed forces which have been permitted to develop, are strictly subordinated to Russian control and to Russian needs, techniques, and personnel. In countries with long traditions of antagonism to Russia, as most of the satellite countries are, this creates an obvious source of tension and vulnerability within the satellite armed forces.

While this basic source of vulnerability is so obvious as to need no further comment here, it would be a mistake to consider the satellite armed forces as undifferentiated masses of discontented persons ready to seize the first opportunity for liberation. Such feelings certainly exist but it is a problem for research to determine some of the factors relevant to their intensity, distribution, and change-over time. Satellite armies are complicated combinations of fanatical Communists, would-be Titoists, would-be defectors waiting for a chance to escape, politically inert persons, and miscellaneous other elements.

D. The Uses of Military Elite Studies

121 One reason for studying how the Communists imposed their control upon the satellite armies, the kinds of satellite officers upon whom the Soviets rely, and the tensions among them, is that these facts have some bearing on the willingness and capability of the satellite forces to fight. We have no illusions that our data will foretell the conduct of the satellite forces in any given operational situation. We hope, however, that they may bring light to bear on a few of the relevant factors.

The importance of leadership in an army need not be stressed. We have chosen to study general officers because of their determining role in the making of key decisions or in a failure to make them. Mass demoralization in the ranks may destroy the fighting effectiveness of an army, but mass demoralization may itself be a symptom of leadership failings. The collapse of the Chinese Nationalist Army, for example, was not so much a failure of morale in the ranks as it was a failure of morale at the highest level. Corruption and defeatism were particularly prevalent at the command level. The political warfare that was most devastating to Chinese Army morale was that which bribed and disoriented its leading cadres. Students of sykewar have sometimes overlooked the implications of such facts. Despite

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the importance of leadership, students of psychological warfare in the recent past have tended to neglect the possibility of achieving results through communication to the opposing elite.[3a]

Elite communications are important even when the aim is mass demoralization; they are more important when elite actions are sought. Rebellion against the powers that be or resistance to their demands has far more often been sparked by dissident elite elements than by mass sufferings. In the last war, for example, the most dramatic resistance to Hitler—the July 20 movement—came from the higher ranks of the army and from aristocratic and elite elements of society. It was to them rather than to the masses of the German people that appeals of a political character were and could have been effectively addressed.

The elite are not unreachable. The elite have access to a breadth of information which is denied to men in the ranks. They have access to superior channels of information and have greater freedom of movement and contact.

While the elite are particularly important and also particularly accessible to sykewar, problems of reaching them have been studied less by scholars than problems of reaching armies as wholes. The way of life and attitudes of contemporary military leaders have been but little described in writing. A vast lore exists on the classical military man, but the modern military man is a new type. The complexity of modern warfare has made partly irrelevant what historians and biographers of the past have said about the conduct and feelings of military commanders. The modern general officer is a technician and specialist as well as a fighter and leader of men. The old image of the courageous and dramatic leader with a band of personally devoted followers is by no means out of date but it is now only part of a much more complex picture of what a commander must be. We have yet to delineate a full image of the motivations, loyalties, and attitudes of the general who must also concern himself with the complexities of modern science, technology logistics, record keeping, recruitment, propaganda, and finance.[3b]

No academic scholar regardless of his professional competence can hope to draw this image satisfactorily by himself. The scholar, ordinarily a man with a nonmilitary background and lacking a lifetime of training in military doctrine and military practice, can hope at best either to add a few insights arising from his specialized techniques or to systematize the far deeper perceptions which military specialists themselves are bound to have. It will only be when the present generation of military men from all countries has enriched the available body of firsthand material through memoirs, essays, and histories that the social scientist will be able to turn to this literature and add to it the understanding that arises from general theories of human behavior. We do not pretend for a moment in the present study to offer anything like a definitive interpretation of the mores and manners of any current military elites. We can provide only a few glimmering insights. The man of lifelong military experience may deepen these if he finds in here data whose significance his individual experience will enable him better to understand.

We cite as one example of the type of fact arising from our research the striking and significant finding that the satellite armies as distinct from Communist revolutionary armies, tend to select top leaders not for qualities of personal courage and personal leadership but for bureaucratic management skills.

This specific example of a change in the breed of men chosen for leadership after Communist regimes are stabilized illustrates the broader question of the relationship between elite structure and social behavior. Our present study is predicated upon the assumption that a man's way of life determines to a considerable extent the sort of person he will be and the types of things he will do. This is not a new notion. In 1889 Spenser Wilkinson, Chichele Professor of Military History at Oxford University, proclaimed that:

> "War is, from first to last, an affair of the soul; the predominant partner in the business is the mind or spirit . . . Examine your thoughts, your whole stock of ideas, and see where they come from. You will find that, for the most part, you caught them, like so many colds, from the people about you. Thoughts are the common property of a number of people living together, the connecting link between the members of a community. . . A child born into an English family learns as he grows the English words, in using which he begins to think the thoughts of his nation. As he grows up he imbibes the ideas of his class, or his trade, profession, of his political party, and of his church or sect. Tell me a man's birthplace, his family, his school, his occupation, sect and party, and I will tell you with pretty fair accuracy his stock of thoughts."[4]

Such extreme determinism is not implied by this study. We do not question for a minute that individuality and special circumstances interplay with these more stable background factors. The morale of a soldier varies with his immediate circumstances in regard to food, promotions, advance or retreat, mail service, etc., as well as his social background. Sykewar field operations require attention to such current facts around which discontent is expressed. But the more stable factors influence how a person will ultimately respond to situational variations.

The relationship between the situational and stable factors is a complicated one. Perhaps three points can be made. (1) Certain stable factors determine who will be vulnerable to which situational deprivations or inducements. (2) Certain stable factors determine the available communication nets through which situational discontents may be expressed or fail of expression. (3) Certain stable

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sources of discontent determine whether or not a given situation will be seized upon to rationalize that discontent.

(1) Many examples can be cited of differential vulnerability of different social strata to the same situations. Shils and Janowitz point out that among German deserters in World War II there was a very large participation of Volksdeutsche not to mention Austrians, Poles, and Russians.[5] Despite the fact that the Volksdeutsche had been among the most chauvinist elements in the period of Nazi successes, the fact that they were not easily assimilated into closely-knit primary groups in the German Army made them especially susceptible to surrender propaganda.

For different reasons German chaplains seemed to be particularly susceptible to the propaganda of the Russian-controlled Free Germany Committee. They were most vulnerable to humanitarian and semi-pacifist appeals for ending the war quickly— a further example of a predisposition to vulnerability arising from life history.

The Czechoslovak Army, due to the many vicissitudes it suffered, is a particularly good example of an army in which different social segments responded differently to different pressures because of different life experiences. It was originally formed in 1919 of a combination of ex-Austro-Hungarian officers, ex-officers of the Czech legion in Russia in World War I, and some former officers of Czech legions in France and Italy. During the twenties and thirties top positions in the army were shared by the legionnaires and the one-time Czech career officers of the Austrian Army. During the first decade the latter was the dominant group in the highest positions. These former Austrian officers had received good military education and experience during their lifetime service in the Austrian Army and they proved very useful to the young Czechoslovak Army. They were distinguished from the legionnaires in several respects. They were older. The greater part of them were born in Bohemia (near Germany) not in Moravia nor Slovakia. They came from a somewhat higher social stratum than did the legionnaires. They had started their careers in the army and had never experienced other occupations. Their military training was exclusively Austrian and they came from the most urbanized and industrialized portions of the country.

Around 1930 most of the ex-Austrian officers had been retired. By this time the younger legionnaires, most of whom had been recruited from Russian prisoner of war camps during World War I, had received enough theoretical military education and had advanced sufficiently in rank to take over the positions of the "Austrians." The great majority of the legionnaires had started their lives in non-military occupations before World War I. They came largely from Moravia. The reason for this was purely accidental although its ultimate consequence was significant. During World War I the Moravian recruits were sent to the Eastern Front whereas regiments recruited in Bohemia served on the Italian Front. When the Bolsheviks

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took power and quit the war, the organized Czech units who had been caught in Russia had to fight their way out, engaging in a long, bitter, and heroic struggle with the Bolsheviks all the way from the Eastern Front across Siberia to Vladivostok. In the course of this struggle they acquired experience and an esprit de corps which made them by the 1930's the leading elements of the new Czechoslovak Army. It therefore happened that the newer group of officers came largely from Moravia, a less industrialized and more Slavic portion of the country, and that their fathers were predominantly members of low and middle-income farm and white collar groups.

The majority of the legionnaire officers received their theoretical military education at the Czech War College established in 1919 by the French Military Mission and a considerable number had gone to the École de Guerre in Paris. This added to their common heritage of pro-Western experience. After the German occupation it was among the Slovaks who had not played a major role in the army previously that the strongest collaborationist force was built. There was apparently only one Slovak general officer in 1939, Division General Rudolf Viest, but others were promoted to general rank during the German occupation.

We could continue this story tracing what happened to the Czechoslovak Army-in-exile. The Czechoslovak refugees who arrived in France during the first months after the German occupation of Czechoslovakia found a considerable number of Slovaks who had been residents of France for many years. The refugees and these together made up the first Czechoslovak division in France. The Slovaks had been confused by the political events in Slovakia and as a result their attachment to the Czechoslovak cause was weak. In the chaos of the French defeat many of them considered the war lost and refused to leave France. About half the division was evacuated to Great Britain but this was a distinctly self-selected group. The number of officers was far out of proportion to the number of men and some hundreds of officers had to accept demotion to the ranks. A full 48 percent of the men who arrived in England were members of the intelligentsia and a large percentage were Jews. Many of the officers were young and inexperienced and some were anti-Semitic. Most of the difficulties and schisms were given a political veneer. Among a great portion of the soldiers there were strong socialist leanings and communist leanings besides nationalist ones. All this made the troops fertile soil for every possible kind of propaganda: defeatist, pro-German, pro-Hungarian, etc. The Communists in view of the Soviet-German treaty were agitating for desertion from the army. A number of them led by Dr. Vlado Clementis (recently executed in Prague) left the army for the duration of the Soviet-German pact, most of them to rejoin when the Soviet Union was attacked.

In this unusually complex history of an army sharply riven by national, political and career differences, we see in some detail how vulnerability to special situations may differ depending upon

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long-term identifications with various segments of the social structure.

(2) Not only does susceptibility to situational pressures vary with the social structure but so does the opportunity for communicating whatever discontent may arise. Whether an unfavorable event will have an adverse effect on morale obviously depends on the communication net which either promotes or restricts knowledge of it. In Germany toward the end of World War I, for example, the two key factors in the decline of morale were the food situation and the Social Democratic movement. The food situation affected many strata of the population and was the source of the most important discontent. It might, however, have had little effect on the German war effort if it had not been for the existence of a highly organized and powerful labor movement, which was semi-pacifist in its orientation. The main agitation of the Social Democrats was not around the food situation but rather around the desirability of negotiating for peace. This very abstract and ideological agitation became effective because of the coexistence of popular discontent arising from hunger, and at the same time the hunger became effective because an organized group provided a communication net for expression of anti-war feelings. Thus the organized proletariat was the source of Germany's greatest vulnerability. Although that class was not necessarily the most discontented group, it was the group whose discontents had an effective channel of expression.

(3) Situational discontents are also related to long-run social tensions in that they provide the rationalizations in terms of which continued hostilities are expressed. In China, for example, the main complaint against the Nationalist armies was that they were corrupt, demoralized, and irresponsible. The charges of corruption were no doubt borne out by facts. At the same time there is good reason to feel that corruption was not the real reason why much of the Chinese population turned against the Nationalist military leadership. The allegation of corruption was rather a rationalization of conflicts between major social segments in China. An earlier study in this series, Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites by Robert C. North, showed that the top leadership of the Nationalists was predominantly an urban merchant group, while the top leadership of the Communists was predominantly rural (both landlord and peasant) and intellectual.

According to Chinese traditions, nepotism, protection of one's family fortunes against the interests of the state, and what we would consider graft were parts of the mores of the business groups which provided much of the Nationalist leadership. Corruption did not carry the same connotations as in the West On the other hand, China as a whole is a peasant country and one in which top prestige goes not to business men but to scholars. Persons of rural origin and professional groups were not satisfied with the leadership provided by the western-oriented Nationalist trading elements. It was this conflict

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of social strata, of basic ideology, and of national perspective which was expressed in the revulsion against the graft and corruption of the business-oriented Nationalist leadership. The Nationalist failure was a failure to broaden its base of leadership rather than simply a failure of administration. The former, however, was seldom discussed in day-to-day politics. The latter was on everybody's lips.

Political intelligence requires awareness of both the immediate issues around which conflicts come to take place and of the social structure in which these conflicts develop. The former can only be studied quickly from day to day as the conflicts develop. Long-range planning must focus on some of the basic sources of vulnerability which can be kept in mind as specific situations emerge. This study is not designed to spot the particular sources of tension and conflict which may arise at any given time point in the future. It is designed to identify the elements in the lives and careers of satellite officers which may differentiate the reactions of one group from those of another, or which may lead them to view one another with either trust or distrust, or which may lead them to view broad world questions either with knowledge and perspective or provincially, or which may lead them to have either purely hostile or just mixed feelings about the Soviet regime.

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E. The Evolution and Future of the New Communist Armies

*648 In the United States the most popular lay theory about the satellite armies (as about the satellites themselves) is that they are temporary jerry-built structures riven by inner tension and designed only as a makeshift until such time as the Russians are ready to incorporate them within the Russian Army itself. Our research leads to a different conclusion, namely that the Soviet plan has been to build up the satellite armies for a long stint. We cannot exclude the possibility that some day in the future it may become Russian policy to eliminate the satellites as separate nations. It may even be that such a long-range plan rests today somewhere in the files of the Kremlin. While that is a possibility, it seems improbable from the evidence now available to us. Our findings indicate rather a Soviet plan to develop the satellite forces into important, strong, but separate offensive forces completely subordinate to and allied with, but not part of the Russian Army.

1. The Period of Coalition, 1945-48:

It was not until 1947 that this plan began to be implemented by the Soviets. Until that time their great problem in all the European satellites was to consolidate Communist power.

In each of the European satellites a coalition government was formed immediately after the war including both Communists and non-Communists. The Benes government-in-exile returned from

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London to Czechoslovakia by agreement with the Russians and with a firm resolution to co-operate sincerely with the Communists. The Communist party was given a few ministries in the new Czechoslovak government, but the Ministry of Defense as in most of the European satellites was put in the hands of at least a nominal non-Communist, a supposedly non-party general, who had, however, been commander of the Czechoslovak forces sponsored by the Russians on the Eastern Front. The Polish government-in-exile, unlike the Czechoslovak one, was unwilling to play the Communist game. The army of General Anders 200,000 strong preferred to stay abroad. Few career officers returned. Defense was therefore put under a known Communist but one who had earlier been a career officer. In Romania and Hungary the heads of the new armies of 1945-48 were men who had actually fought against the Russians at the time that their countries were allies of the Nazis. Though they were generally officers who had in some way resisted the Nazi policies either by helping to switch their countries to the Allied side at the end of the war or by resisting Nazi demands, they were career officers with non-Communist or even anti-Communist records. Still they were accepted as coalition elements by the Communists.

During this period of coalition, the Communists were strengthening their position and building bases for future action. They could afford to leave the nominal headship of the defense departments in non-Communist hands because the armies were then mostly shells often exceeded in size by the police and frontier forces in the Communist-controlled security ministry. The Communists took over the political department of each of the armies and also the special security forces and the police.

The political departments were innovations modeled upon Soviet practice. They were far more important than a western-type morale or education department although they fulfilled that function too. Two other crucial functions under their direction were control of loyalty and control of personnel. Special police squads were formed within the armed forces which carried out arrests. These took over the job from Revolutionary People's Committees which operated immediately at the close of the war. A control commission on the Soviet model operated to check deviations. A cadres division was formed within each political department to train and recruit loyal Communists. Potential opponents were purged.

All the satellite armies were subjected to purges even during the coalition period. The armies of the defeated countries, such as Hungary and Romania, were reduced by the terms of the peace treaties to a fraction of their former size. Some officers could be kept but the large majority had to be discharged. Communists gained control of the process of selection and used this as a means of eliminating all potentially strong opponents. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, former allies, the army was not reduced in the same way,

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but the Communists insisted that officers whom they distrusted be eliminated or relegated to minor positions. For example, the men whom Benes had singled out to be Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff were vetoed by the Communists and assigned by compromise to trivial posts.

Frontier troops or other special security troops were used as special Communist militias. Indeed in the defeated countries, since their regular armies were restricted by treaty, the special security forces, which the Communists completely controlled, became larger than the armies. Thus by 1947, when the order went out from Moscow to end the period of compromise and coalition, the Communists were in a position to take over the armies just as they were in a position to take over state power.

A key factor which cannot be neglected in explaining Communist strength, was the Soviet occupation troops. In the defeated countries Russian occupation troops remained by agreement of the Allies, and those countries were placed under the supervision of allied control commissions which however the Russians ran with an arbitrary hand. In Allied countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia, vast numbers of Russian troops remained to guard the lines of communication to Germany and Austria.

The presence of Russian forces put all the trumps in the Communists' hands; but even though they held all the high cards, the Communists were not willing to play competitive games. Around 1947-48, in a series of coups the Communists eliminated political competition. The leaders of the Small Holders and Social Democratic parties in Hungary were tried and imprisoned and Prime Minister Nagy was forced to leave the country in May 1947. In December 1947, King Michael was forced to abdicate his throne. In February 1948 the followers of Benes were forced into a second exile. The "people's democracies" were turned into totalitarian Soviet states.

2. The Period of Consolidation, 1948-50

At the moment when coalitions with non-Communists were being ended and power was being placed firmly in Communist hands, the Russians decided that the armies of the satellites would be sufficiently reliable and sufficiently under control to transform them from mere internal security and defensive forces to strong offensive instruments. That was also the moment at which the Western alliance was taking firm shape under the impact of steps such as the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. It was a moment, from the Russian point of view for counter measures. A rapid build-up was started which has increased satellite strength to roughly five times what it had been at the nadir.

The satellites were sold Russian tanks, motorized weapons, and airplanes. In each satellite the non-party or coalition Minister of Defense was replaced by a member of the Politburo who was one of

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the top four or five Communists in the country. In Romania Emil Bodnaras became Minister of Defense in December 1947. In August 1948 Mihaly Farkas received that post in Hungary. In November 1949, Marshal Konstantin Rokossovski, a leading officer of the Russian Army, became Minister of National Defense in Poland. Finally in April of 1950 Alexis Cepicka, the son-in-law of President Gottwald, took over the Defense Ministry in Czechoslovakia.

When each new Communist boss of the armed forces took over, purging and reorganization were vastly accelerated. The new boss was himself not necessarily a military man. He was a Communist militant with a long record of revolutionary action. That record may have included some fighting in the Spanish Civil War or on the Eastern Front in World War II. On the other hand in the case of General Cepicka, it included no previous military record at all. Yet the new Communist bosses and some of their associates were immediately given direct commissions as high ranking generals.

The first job of these Communist bosses was to eliminate potentially disloyal or factious elements. In this process the last of the leading officers of the old armies were eliminated. In Czechoslovakia, where the army had less of an anti-Russian tradition than elsewhere and where probably more pro-Communists could be found in its ranks, a good many former junior officers of the regular army were promoted to high positions, but both in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere the high ranking pre-Communist officers were finally eliminated at that moment, as were many prewar low ranking officers.

The consolidation of power over the army in the hands of a top ranking Communist, was also the signal for a new type of purge which took place between 1949 and 1952. All leading non-Communist elements having been eliminated, the purgers turned on the Communists themselves. These purges of Communists served the important function of eliminating loyal incompetents who had played their role by infiltrating and subverting the army but now were a barrier to its becoming an effective fighting force. The purges also served the purposes of political gleichgeschaltung or conformism. Potential factionalists, not only from the army but from all walks of life, were disgraced as Titoists and used as horrible examples.

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The Bolsheviks have a fantastic fear of even mere germs of political opposition. Any kind of political machine or any kind of group loyalty other than that organized by the Politburo itself must be ruthlessly eliminated. The Russian Communists have a vivid phrase to designate personal alliances or informal relations among officials; the phrase is "family relations." All such relations are condemned. Common loyalties or common historical origins of special groups are regarded as a danger. A major reason for the purges was to destroy the germs of possible groups or factions. In the Rajk trial in Hungary one such machine was destroyed. In

648 Romania the Prime Minister, i.e. the top Communist who alone is allowed to have some kind of machine, has placed two of his own men as Deputy Ministers of Defense thus barring close ties between the Deputies and the Minister who commands them, Bodnaras.

000 Only in China is this principle deviated from, but out of necessity, not preference. The Chinese Civil War was fought by a vast but primitive army. It had only meager means of communication and used elementary strategies. Its victory was a victory of guerrilla tactics and politics. Even after success the Chinese had neither the professional skill nor the transportation and communication equipment necessary to establish an effectively unified national army. They divided the control of China among four field armies. These field armies share with general headquarters at Peking much real power. Each of the four field armies is headed by a group of two to four top generals who could under appropriate circumstances come to be like war lords. They are the bosses of their areas in China. On the other hand these regional leaders are loyal to the regime and during recent months the Communist regime has been able to increasingly centralize its still loose control. Its unity is indeed greater than that of any predecessor regime, but it has not been able to reach the Communist desideratum of a situation in which no effectual power lies anywhere but in the Politburo itself. The situation that exists in China is one that Bolsheviks dread. It is a situation in which someone has enough power so that under certain hypothetical future circumstances he could follow an independent policy if he wished. This is as yet an unsolved problem for the Chinese Communists. As students of Lenin and Stalin they must view this situation as a temporary compromise to be changed as soon as possible.

*648 *701 With this one exception the satellite armies have been purged of all foci of independent action.[5a] The conditions for political opposition have been eliminated. At the same time indoctrination for political loyalty has been stepped up to fantastic proportions. The political departments undertake immense programs of indoctrination. All high officers are required to take courses at political military institutes, and many are sent to Russia for political as well as technical training.

The notion of a nonpolitical army whose members are not allowed to take part in partisan activity and who are sometimes not even allowed to vote is completely rejected behind the Iron Curtain. As soon as the Russians came in they insisted upon identifying each officer with a political party. By now, of course, only Communist party activities are permitted, but in the period of coalition the Communists even went so far as to compel career officers to associate themselves with non-Communist parties rather than to stay neutral. In Hungary, for example, where before the war officers were not permitted to take part in politics, the selection and pro-

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motion of officers after the war was done openly and explicitly on the basis of allocations to each party. The attack on nonpartisanship has been one of the characteristic features of all the Communist armies. The Kosice program of the new Czechoslovak government enunciated on March 27, 1945, announced,

> "In order to see our army educated in the spirit of the state, of democracy, and anti-Fascism, the government wants to make an end, once and for all, to the 'non-political nature' of the army. The government takes this view in the knowledge that under this 'nonpartisanship' hides underestimation of the moral factor in battle, and that under this cloak thrive reactionary, anti-democratic, and capitulationist tendencies. . . .
>
> "In order to develop and maintain among the members of the armed forces even under the hardest trials and most difficult conditions of battle a fighting morale and a high anti-Fascist spirit, the institution of 'enlightenment officers' shall be established in all military units, components, and institutions. These enlightenment officers shall be deputies of the respective commanders for the sphere of education and enlightenment, and at higher commands they shall direct departments of education and enlightenment. The directing educational organ in the framework of the Ministry of National Defense shall be the 'General Administration of Education and Enlightenment' whose chief shall be directly subordinated to the Minister of National Defense and his deputy."[6]

Political departments are now generally headed by one of the deputy ministers of defense. Reporting to him and his powerful and always Communist-controlled headquarters staff is a network of political officers. These political officers (referred to in the Kosice program above as Enlightenment Officers and often called commissars) serve in every unit, generally as the second in command. During the coalition period, if the commanding officer was not a Communist, the commissar was often the real power. The political department is a powerful agency of propaganda and control through which the Communists seek to assure the loyalty of the new satellite armies.

3. The Period of Development, 1950 on

Loyalty, however, is but one of the prime requisites of satellite officers. We have already noted that the great dilemma which the Communists face is to combine such loyalty with professional

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competence. Ever since the Communists decided, in 1947, to convert the satellite armies into effective, offensive forces, they have faced a situation in which the purely political abilities of Communist generals could satisfy them no more than the mixed loyalties of prewar career officers. The Kremlin knows that Communist fanaticism is no guarantee of military skill and that security depends upon having a leadership with an abundance of skill.

The Communist solution to this dilemma is to raise a new generation of officers trained by the Communists themselves and combining the desired traits of loyalty and professionalism.

In every one of the satellites a tremendous effort is being put on training and military education. Education, expansion, and modernization are the keynotes of satellite military activity during the past few years.[7] Military training is of course universal. A uniform pattern copying that of Russia was established in each of the European satellites in 1950. The age of service was lowered to twenty and the term was extended to two years with longer periods up to three years being required in the air force, the security troops, etc. In addition there is extensive military training through sports groups and mass organizations. In each of the satellites there is an organization such as the Czech SVARZAM, paralleling the Soviet DOSAAF. The SVARZAM or Federation for Cooperation with the Army encourages training units in schools, sports clubs, trade unions, factories, etc.

Along with this training of mass manpower goes an intensive program of officer training. The officer trainees are singled out for elite status with good pay and many privileges. They are, however, not recruited from among a social or economic elite. On the contrary, they are drawn widely from proletarian backgrounds. That they promote proletarians is the Communist boast and apparently also their practice. A small sample of Hungarian colonels which we studied revealed a large number who came from the work bench, thus confirming reports of refugee officers. Men who had shown qualities of leadership in trade unions and in communist activities have been given a chance to rise from proletarian status to the officer corps. In Eastern Europe this is a rare and significant opportunity because a military career is held in high esteem and until recently it was beyond the reasonable aspirations of an ordinary worker. It seems probable that men who have had such an opportunity opened to them view the Communist regime with less disfavor than the more fully oppressed elements of the population. The Soviets hope that they can secure the loyalty of the rising corps of young officers by virtue of the fact that the officers are individuals who could not have become officers under the old regime.

These young officers are not only proletarian in origin and privileged in status; they are also subjected to an intensive and thorough program of education. A system of military schools is being developed modeled on the Soviet pattern. Many of the instructors are Red

Army officers. The most promising and politically reliable officers are sent for advanced training to military academies in the Soviet Union.[7a] In addition military schools are proliferating in the satellite countries themselves. In December of 1951 the Poles opened a military technical academy in Warsaw and the Felix Djerzhinski Military Political Academy. In Czechoslovakia the Brno Polytechnic School was changed into a Military Technical Academy. Similar measures were taken at about the same time in all the satellites.

It is easy both to overestimate and to underestimate how well the political indoctrination and the technical training of this new generation of officers is taking. This is a topic on which our data does not shed a great deal of light. Our data perhaps enables us to estimate what the Soviet plan was in the period from 1950 on, but whether this plan will work is another story. The most significant evidence that it does not work is the continuing flow of occasional defectors from among the privileged strata of young officers being trained for top positions of military leadership. On the other hand, we should not exaggerate the significance of such defectors. Westerners have often underestimated the potentiality of the Soviet system for continuing to work even in the face of universal and profound discontent. The Soviet system depends upon total conformity but not upon total satisfaction. It places far more reliance on the whip than on the carrot.

We are prone to assume that Soviet prevarication and obscurantism defeat themselves, but the existence and the actions of considerable cadres of Communist officers is evidence enough that the Russian methods of indoctrination often do work to some extent. A surprising proportion of the Communist officers in our sample are former prisoners of war, men whom the Russians kept under miserable conditions in prison camps and then, when the time was auspicious, released to serve in Soviet-sponsored armies. It is easy to understand why these men elected combatant service that would take them back to their homelands rather than sitting idly in prison camps, but the ex P-W's were not simply transitory tools of Russian policy who seized an opportunity to get away from Russia. Many of them became effective and active Communist propagandists. Many of them became leaders in the process of infiltration, subversion, and purging which transformed the East European armies into Soviet tools. To some extent the Soviet process of indoctrination works and the Soviet processes of technical training work even more.

At the same time it would be foolish to assume that the new generation of Russian-trained satellite officers will be all the Russians expect them to be. "The new Soviet man" even in Russia is not what he is supposed to be. The qualities of dogged fanaticism, hard work, initiative, and loyalty which he is supposed to have as a result of Soviet training are even less conspicuous in him than in old capitalist men. If that is true in Russia, it is even more true in the satellites.

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*701 *248 In the satellite countries not only are there general human traits which resist molding, but there is also a heritage of anti-Russian nationalism. This nationalism is not likely to be stilled even in a generation of proletarian officers selected for their contempt for the old elites of prewar days. Nationalism does not die that easily.

Whatever turn future events actually take, the Soviet plan as revealed by developments starting in 1950 seems to be predicated upon the assumption that satellite officers can be transformed into loyal tools. Undoubtedly this plan overestimates the plasticity of human beings, as do all Soviet plans. How far it will prove wrong, the data of this study do not tell us. The data tell what the Soviet plan is or was that is important, for to some extent the plan will condition what the Soviets do and therefore what will actually happen.

4. The Future

If the 1950 program is adhered to we may expect some rather significant transformations in the structure of the satellite armies and countries within the next few years. At some point, probably not in 1955 or even 1956 but probably no further away than 1962 or 1963, the new generation of officers who have been in training since 1945 will be ready for promotion to general officer rank and to key positions. When this happens the character of the military elite will undergo a drastic change. At that time the present officers, whether Communist party militants with inadequate military knowledge or old career officers of doubtful loyalty, will be ready for removal in favor of the new type of officer. In the Soviet pattern this will be the signal for a purge. Such a purge occurred in Russia in 1937. Then, the entire leadership of the Red Army was ruthlessly liquidated. Tens of thousands of officers simply disappeared. Their positions were filled by products of recent Soviet military training. The parallel purge indicated for the satellite countries may be neither so complete nor so ruthless. There are indications that the Russians have learned some lessons from the great purges of the 1930's and are now handling purges in a more circumspect fashion. Furthermore, many of the officers who are now in leading positions in the satellite countries are Russians. It seems unlikely that the satellites will be permitted to handle these with the ruthlessness they apply to their natives.

There is considerable question whether Russian officers will be removed at all. Most commentators on the satellite armies seem to feel that the use of Russian officers is the trend of the future. This is one aspect of the belief that the satellite armies will be absorbed into the Russian Army and the satellites into the Soviet Union, a prognosis which we deem unlikely. A number of items of evidence lead to our contrary conclusion. In the first place it should be noted that the Russian officers are to a significant extent not pure and simple Russians. Many of the officers whom refugee propagandists label as Russians— and rightly from many points of view— also have some roots in the satellite countries they now rule. The Kremlin went through the ranks of the thousands of East Europeans living within Russia and serving within the Red Army and culled a group who could be sent back to their lands of origin to enter politics and military life there. These men, many of whom were originally Communist refugees from their home countries, are unquestionably loyal to Russia and to the Soviet regime. Many of them are much more Russian than anything else, but they do represent a mixed type which will not easily replenish itself. The Communists seem too aware, both in Europe and China, of the value of choosing leaders with some ethnic ties to those they lead, to make the mistake of attempting a policy of total Russianization.

Furthermore, the emphasis the Soviets are putting upon training of leading cadres among the new generation of satellite nationals indicates that it is on them rather than just on a continuing flow of imported Russian officers on whom they are counting for future satellite military leadership. This is not to say that technical advisers and behind-the-scenes emissaries from Russia will cease playing a dominant role. On the contrary they undoubtedly will continue to pull the wires and a familiar pattern of colonial rule will emerge in which a few key officers from the ruling land direct the activity of a dependent force. That seems more likely to be the pattern than one in which the very existence of the satellite nations, their armies, and their officer cadres will be terminated.

It may be noted that the history of the Baltic republics is a contrary example which indicates a preference for the more drastic pattern. The Baltic states not only became part of the Soviet Union, but they have been vigorously denationalized. Mass transfers of population have been perpetrated and at the time of writing the administration of these republics is being shaken up with Russians taking the key posts. When the Baltic republics were absorbed twenty Baltic generals were commissioned in the Russian Army. By 1952 only one of these had been promoted. They had served their purpose at the moment of absorption and were no longer needed. The other satellites, however, present a different problem for the Russians than do the Baltic republics. In the other satellites the magnitude of the populations and the areas to be absorbed would be much greater and so the process of absorption would create more problems than it would solve. From the Russian point of view it is probably preferable not to have to assimilate large populations with strong nationalist feelings and with recent experience in the non-Soviet world. The Russians probably prefer to hide behind two Iron Curtains against the West, one on the Elbe and a second on their own frontier. Considerations such as these perhaps explain a Russian

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program of building the satellite armies as units with the external trappings of separateness and independence although in reality they will of course be fully Russian-controlled.

On these assumptions about the probable future course of events we can anticipate an interesting and perhaps a bitter struggle between the different strata of officers when the time is ripe for a change in leadership to the now young officers of the Soviet generation. There will probably be no open factional struggles, for factions are too vigorously repressed in the Soviet system, but there will probably be charges of factional conspiracy as in Russia in 1937. In reality the tensions will perhaps be limited to feelings, prejudices, and attitudes expressed in covert ways. The lines of tension are already fairly clear. The career officers must know that their days are numbered, recognizing the portents of a purge in the rise of a new generation of officers.

The Communist militants on the one hand and the technicians on the other have conflicting myths in terms of which they justify their respective values. The myth of the Communist is a political one. He believes in his own omnipotence as a Marxist, if not as an individual. His dogma, he believes, gives him the power to successfully manipulate men who lack its magic key. He thinks the mana of Marxism offsets his lack of formal training. He made his mark in a hard school of illegal activity and conspiracy in which he started as the underdog. Now he finds that by virtue of his Marxism he has conquered the old ruling groups of professional officers, capitalists, aristocrats, etc. With all the confidence of the self-made man he is likely to think of the technician as a servant who should do what the politicians decide. He is apt to believe in the Soviet myth that a Bolshevik can do anything and that the doctrine which has brought him to power holds the key to all complex questions. His fantasy of power may have roots in genuine cunning and ruthlessness. His ability may merely be that of a behind-the-scenes operator, but he may sometimes also be a man of real magnetism who knows how to lead men, though if he carries that too far he is apt to be purged.

The officers of the new generation will be men of a very different stripe. They will rarely have the kind of dynamism, hardness, and purposefulness of the Communist militant. They may be unquestioningly loyal, but their loyalty is more apt to be of a passive than an active kind. Their interests will be technical and private rather than political and public. They will be good technicians and admire science and technological know-how. As experts they may take professional pride in their work but they are less apt to have an all embracing self-confidence in themselves as leaders of men.

Indeed the leader who wins the confidence of his men by qualities of personal devotion and drive is in some ways the forgotten man of the satellite military elite. His qualities impinge too closely upon the special prerogative of the party and of the political department.

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For that reason he is a dangerous character. He is capable of too much independence. In the satellite armies men of this type have been less able to hold higher military posts than have either the behind-the-scenes politicians or the military technicians. The leaders of the World War II underground movement have been virtually eliminated from top jobs. The successful infantry commanders rise neither so fast nor so far as artillery men, engineers, or other technicians. The qualities of personal leadership may be better appreciated at lower levels which do not come within the purview of this study, but at the apex of the military hierarchy personal leadership is something which the Communists do not permit. When a new generation of officers take the top posts, the level of competence may rise and perhaps the problem of loyalty may have become less acute, but the new elite will not consist of dynamic leaders. It will be an elite which has grown up under the controls of the political department, the security police, and Russian observers. It may be an elite not prone to exercise strong personal leadership. 701* 648

F. The Study and the Sample

The above conclusions are based upon an analysis of biographical data concerning generals in the satellite countries. From the biographical data we tried to get light on three aspects of the structure of the satellite armies. (1) We have attempted to describe the process by which the satellite armies were taken over and communized insofar as this process involved changes in the kinds of men wielding power. (2) We have attempted to evaluate the breadth of background, education, and experience of those types of men who have finally gained power with a view to providing a basis for judgment of their potential effectiveness as leaders, and their prospective loyalty or discontent. (3) We have attempted to identify whatever fissures and lines of differentiation exist between segments of the armed forces. 159 701* 648* 127

To study these three topics we collected biographical data on general officers in five satellite countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and China.[8] In each case we compiled as many biographies of general officers as we could obtain, the criterion of selection being availability. In view of the difficulty of obtaining any data no more rigorous type of sampling was possible. We included general officers of the air forces and navies as well as the land armies.[9] When we could obtain the data we added as special subsamples general officers in semi-military police and security formations. In all of the satellite countries the special security troops, though under the Ministry of Interior or its equivalent in peacetime, are integrated with the armed forces and commanded by officers with military rank.

Ideally a study of military leadership should study not only gen- 121* 701* 648

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erals but also lower ranking officers and also the relationships between the ranks. However, published biographies— our primary source— do not exist for lower ranking officers and do not tell us anyanything directly about relationships. This study attempts to do only that which can be done with an analysis of the top levels of the military elite viewed, of course, in the context of background information. It is not a complete study of military leadership in the satellites.

In order to trace the trends in the satellite regimes we stratified the sample of generals by time period. We collected biographical data not only about the postwar generals, but also for a sample of generals of the pre-Communist regimes. We broke the samples of satellite generals into groups according to the date at which their careers terminated. Thus for Romania we have a sample of pre-1940 generals, a sample of generals active on the axis side between 1940 and 1944, a sample of generals who maintained their careers during the early postwar years, 1944-47, and finally a sample of those generals who have continued to operate since 1948.

Data on contemporary history such as the data of this study quickly grows out of date. The research for this study was done during the academic year 1952-53. While every attempt was made to get up-to-date materials, it was inevitable that the satellite sources which were read and analyzed were published for the most part in 1951 and 1952. They too had a time lag between the facts to which they referred and the date at which they were printed. Roughly speaking, we can say that the picture presented in this study is the picture as of the year 1951.

The sources for a study of satellite armies are so thin at best that no consistent effort has been made to limit the moment for which we are presenting a snapshot. Wherever material is available we have used it. Where later information has come in, even up to the moment of the final revision of this text, we have tried to take account of it, although no systematic effort has been made to bring the study up to the minute. What we here present is a picture of Soviet plans and procedures as of two years ago with some corrections suggested by more recent events.

The most important event in the Soviet world during these past two years was of course the death of Stalin and the installation of the Malenkov regime with its slightly modified tactical line. Stalin died on March 5, 1953 by which time almost all the research for the study had been completed.

In the half year since then the new Soviet dictators have found it necessary to make concessions to the people at least while they are consolidating their rule. In Russia the emphasis has been on consumers' goods. In the satellites where riots in Berlin and strikes in Czechoslovakia have shown how intense is the prevailing discontent, the new line has also been to make concessions to the desires of the populace. Without any real evidence we may hazard the hunch

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that one unpublicized aspect of this new line may be a slowing down of the program of military preparation in the satellites and a re-evaluation of their military potential. Both the open outbreak of satellite discontent and the Politburo's desire to stress temporary economic concessions might lead to such changes in military policy.

For all these reasons we may guess that the picture to be drawn in this study, based as it is upon 1951 data, represents the Soviet plans for the satellite armies at the end of the Stalin era, but not in all respects the way in which things are actually working out at the present moment. We do not know how present actualities diverge from the plans nor what recent changes have been made in the plans. However great these divergences and changes may be, it still remains useful to see how the Politburo conceived the prospects of satellite military development just before the traumatic event of Stalin's death. Whatever corrections future developments will force us to make in our prognoses, one useful piece of data will be the intentions with which the Russians started. It is to ascertain these that our data is relevant.

G. The Method

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The methods used in this study are more fully described in the general introduction to the Hoover Institute Elite Series, The Comparative Study of Elites, An Introduction and Bibliography, by Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell. We record for each individual in our sample certain standardized biographical facts such as the date of his birth, date of death, cause of death, jobs held, place of origin, occupation of father, schools attended, associations joined, foreign travel, awards and decorations, publications, etc. A list of fifty characteristics for which we look when they are available is presented on pages 26-27 of the above mentioned volume. For general officers, among the most important special characteristics on which we sought data were their military training, their nonmilitary education, their branch of service, their combat record, the extent to which they held nonmilitary jobs, the extent to which they participated in politics, their record of promotions, etc.

The data on any individual is recorded on a punch card and tabulations are then made of the incidence of the coded characteristics in different armies or different parts of the same army.

H. The Problem of Sources

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It is difficult to obtain biographical information on officers, particularly on those from totalitarian countries. We started this project with an experimental attitude and with the hope, but no conviction, that the desired information might be obtained. On the whole

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we are more than satisfied with this aspect of our endeavor. The most fruitful single source consisted of Who's Who's and similar biographical dictionaries and encyclopedias. Other printed sources include memoirs, obituaries, and articles about prominent figures which appear from time to time even in totalitarian countries. We also relied to some extent on informants who had had firsthand contact with the armies in question. They were often able to provide kinds of information which do not normally appear in brief printed sources.

Unfortunately the sources are not consistent in their accuracy or criteria of reporting. For one country we may have very adequate information on education but not on parental occupation. For another country it may be the other way around. There is also the possibility and indeed likelihood of falsification in some of the biographical reports. The Communists often present fanciful biographies. They tend, for example, to play up or invent humble backgrounds. They also tend to emphasize the native satellite origins and experiences of officers whose real life histories may involve prolonged residence in Russia while refugee sources emphasize the foreign origins of Communist officials. Thus two quite different biographies of Marshal Rokossovski have been published.

Having expressed these warnings about the reliability of some of the sources, it would be a mistake to regard them as invalidating the data. While the data undoubtedly contain a wider margin of errors than is customary in domestic social science studies, they are far more precise and reliable than mere subjective untested impressions. Our goal was to get better information than heretofore available, not to get perfect information. What we report here is the result of as careful a process of checking and evaluation as we were able to make. We feel that there are some trends which it reveals of which there need be little doubt even though individual errors have crept into the data.

1. Introduction to the Case Studies

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In this introductory chapter we have talked of the European satellites as if they were more or less the same. In the subsequent chapters we shall examine them one by one. In so doing we shall note differences in the problems faced and solutions taken, differences which we have so far neglected. We have been able to discuss the East European satellites as a unit since they follow a common set of Russian-originated patterns. We have examined above the sequence of parallel policy changes from one of coalition to one of consolidation to one of training and development which seem to indicate a common set of Soviet directives. We have also noted the adherence to Russian practices in equipment, uniforms, training, and regulations.

The end result was an organizational structure for the satellite

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armies conforming fairly closely to that in Russia. The normal pattern at the time of Stalin's death was to have a Minister of Defense who was one of the top Communist bosses and under him three deputy ministers, one of them in charge of the land army, one of them Chief of Staff, and one of them head of the political department. At general headquarters below these men were a series of inspectors in charge of different arms and services. These and the commanders of the three or four military districts into which the country is divided constituted the top of the military elite.

But in the Soviet world no plan however permanent it is proclaimed to be, is more than a temporary pattern valid until a new line is adopted. Under the Malenkov regime some significant changes have been taking place in military and governmental structures in Russia which have been or will be imitated in the satellites. It would be a mistake to base long-run predictions upon the temporary expedients adopted by Malenkov in the period of consolidation of his power. It is our assumption that a far better clue to long-run Soviet policies and programs is to be found in the plans underway at the time of Stalin's death. Recent deviations from these are more likely to be temporary adjustments than permanent changes in line.

Both the temporary adjustments and the permanent changes are ordered from Moscow and copied in the satellites with a greater or lesser time lag. Each Russian twist or turn is mirrored throughout the Soviet world. An order from Moscow whether it be to give certain key jobs to the best of the newly trained officers, or whatever else it may be, could start a process of purging (with greater or lesser violence) which would sweep in disciplined fashion from one satellite to another. We are about to describe how the basic Soviet military pattern was followed with appropriate variations in each of the satellites from the end of the war to the end of the Stalinist era.

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II. CZECHOSLOVAKIA

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Of all the satellite armies, the Czechoslovak shows the most continuity with the past. Its evolution has been marked by purges, crises, and drastic shake-ups, but to a slightly lesser degree than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The main reason for the greater historical continuity in Czechoslovakia than elsewhere is the fact that the previous top governmental and military authorities made a sincere, even if shortsighted, effort to work with Russia and the local Communists.

On May 16, 1945, President Benes returned to Prague from London, where he had spent the war heading a government-in-exile. He returned to a country that had been liberated by the Allied Armies from the west, by the Russian Army from the east, and by resistance forces which had arisen in the last year of the war, notably in Slovakia. By December the Russian and Allied Armies had left Czechoslovakia and armed force was in the hands of a new Czechoslovak government formed by agreement of the London government and the Communists.

In May 1946 the first postwar elections were held and from these emerged what was supposed to have been the stable government of Czechoslovakia. In these elections the Communist party polled 37 percent of the vote, the largest vote for any one party. As a result, President Benes invited Klement Gottwald to become Prime Minister, but the government he formed was a coalition government with only nine Communist party members out of twenty-six ministers. Jan Masaryk, a non-party man, was Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Ludvik Svoboda, also technically a non-party man, was Minister of National Defense. Thus the government was in theory a coalition in which the Communists were to be but one party.

It was this government and the substantially similar provisional government that preceded the elections which had the task of establishing a new Czechoslovak Army. It had available to it a considerable reservoir of skilled and trained military personnel. It could draw its officers from three main sources: the London Army, the Moscow Army, and the resistance forces.

A. The London Army

In the introduction we traced the origins of the World War II army of the London government-in-exile. We noted there that it consisted both of recent refugees and of Czechs and Slovaks who had been living in France and elsewhere in the West. It included a substantial number of experienced officers from the Czechoslovak Army of the interwar period. It included such a large number of former officers, in fact, that until 1943 there were not enough enlisted men for all of them and 400 officers had to serve as plain soldiers. Among the officers were at least six leading ones who had been general officers before 1938. These were Generals Ingr, Neumann, Janousek, Hasal,

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Viest, and Vicherek. Also available were many field grade officers of wide experience.

The senior Czechoslovak officer in London was Division General Sergej Ingr, Minister of National Defense in the government-in-exile. General Ingr, who had fought in Russia and later in France and Italy during World War I, became a captain in the new Czechoslovak Army in 1918. Originally a volunteer in the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1914, he became a member of the Serbian Volunteer Division at Odessa in 1916, and of the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia in the same year. The following year he joined the Czechoslovak Legion in France and in 1918 the Czechoslovak Legion in Italy. In the new Czechoslovak Army he fought as an infantry officer in local conflicts in Teschen and Slovakia. Promoted to the rank of major, he was assigned to the War College in Prague from 1920-23, and after that entered general staff work. By 1925 he was lieutenant colonel and Vice-Chief of Staff of one of the three land military commands. He held field commands in 1928 in charge of Frontier Battalion 5, in 1931 as a colonel in command of the 38th Infantry Regiment, and again in 1933 when he commanded the 6th Infantry Brigade of the 8th Division, of which Division he became commander in 1935, after promotion to brigadier general. By 1938 he held the rank of division general and commanded an army corps. In the meantime he had also served additional time in the general staff, as a section chief and also in the office of the Minister of National Defense. When the German occupation began he was for a while the commander of the "ON" (Obrana Naroda), a military underground organization. He then escaped to France, where in 1939 he was Commander in Chief of the Czechoslovak forces. When France fell he escaped to Britain.

The career of the Chief of Staff of the Czechoslovak Army in Great Britain, Division General Bedrich Neumann, was similar. He too had fought in Russia during World War I. As a major in the 11th Rifle Regiment of the Czechoslovak Legion he fought the Bolsheviks, after the Revolution. Upon joining the new Czechoslovak Army he too went to the War College in Prague and when he finished in 1922 he was assigned to the general staff, where he became a section chief in 1929. By 1931 he was second deputy chief of the general staff. In the meantime, he had held field commands. In 1928 as a colonel he commanded the 5th Infantry Regiment. From 1935 to 1938 he commanded the 5th Division, first as a brigadier general and later as a division general. He too joined a military underground organization after the German occupation, the Vojenske Ustredi or Military Center. This Center operated largely out of the Office of Price Control of the Nazi puppet government of the protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia. Neumann had been appointed deputy chief of this office and took advantage of his post to staff the agency with fellow anti-Germans. In 1940 he escaped from Czechoslovakia to Great Britain, where he was Chief of Staff till toward the end of the War. He was

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000 then made chief of the SVAB, the staff intended for the rebuilding of the Czechoslovak armed forces after liberation.

A slightly different set of World War II experiences is revealed by General Karel Klapalek, who also served in the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia until 1920. He was a captain when he returned home to command first the 35th and then the 36th Infantry Regiments. In the early 1930's he taught in the Czechoslovak Military Academy. After the German occupation of Czechoslovakia Major Klapalek escaped to the Middle East and commanded a unit of about battalion strength which took part in the campaign of North Africa. Before the fall of France Czechoslovak officers and soldiers arrived regularly in Beirut after a difficult escape from Czechoslovakia through the Balkans in order to join the Czechoslovak Army in France. After
* the fall of France this escape route was cut and those Czechoslovak
701 officers stranded in the Near East formed a new military unit. When General Mezl, its first commander, died, Klapalek succeeded to the
*648 command of this unit. In 1944, when the fighting in North Africa ended, Klapalek along with many other Czechoslovak officers went to Russia and for the last year of the war fought on the Eastern Front.

These thumbnail biographies, along with two others appended in a footnote,[10] give a composite picture of one type of leader available to the new Czechoslovak Army: a career officer with experience beginning in the Czechoslovak Legion in World War I and continuing until service with the forces of the London government in World War II. After World War I they were trained and educated largely by the French, particularly in the Ecole de Guerre. The chief leadership material consisted of general staff officers who had had rotating staff and field assignments. Most had infantry command experience. After the German occupation most of them joined some underground circle, but soon escaped to the West. In World War II they fought in Western Europe, or in smaller numbers in North Africa. Some were later sent to Russia by the London government to fight on the Eastern Front. Their heritage of common experience and common training gave to the leadership of the Czechoslovak exile army a strong element of cohesion.

The record of the armed forces of the London government during World War II was a good one. The available infantry forces were not numerous but the Czechoslovak Tank Brigade took a prominent part in the siege of Dunkirk, where the German garrison put up a long and bitter fight. They advanced along with American forces to Pilsen and were then allowed to return to Prague in May 1945.

707 Though small, the most active and also the most successful Czechoslovak arm in the West during World War II was the air
*648 force. In October of 1940 an agreement was signed between the British and Czechoslovak governments according to which Czechoslovak airmen became members of the Royal Air Force for the duration of the war. Between July 1940 and May 1941 three Czechoslovak

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fighter squadrons and one bomber squadron were formed. Many Czechoslovak pilots who could not be placed with the Czechoslovak units served with British units in Great Britain, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Three Czechoslovak officers became commanders of British squadrons. In the Battle of Britain, the Czechoslovak pilots shot down 56 enemy planes and throughout the war in the West at least 313. Toward the end of 1940 the Czechoslovak air force in Great Britain consisted of 1,287 officers and men. [726] *

The land and air forces under the command of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in Great Britain were the main source of experienced officers from which the new Czechoslovak government was expected to draw in building its armed forces. 701* 648

B. The Moscow Army

A second source of officers was the Czechoslovak fighting forces under Russian sponsorship in Eastern Europe. In March and April of 1939 about twenty-five hundred Czechoslovak soldiers and officers had gone to Poland in the hope of fighting the Germans. Their hope was frustrated, however. They wished to form a Czechoslovak Legion and did organize a Czechoslovak military group in Krakow on April 30, 1939. A "legion of Czechs and Slovaks" was, however, not officially recognized by the Polish government until after the actual outbreak of war, since the Allies were anxious to avoid any acts which might be construed as provocations of the Germans. The French Embassy in Warsaw pressed both the Polish government and General Prchala, the highest ranking Czech officer in Poland, to abstain from official recognition. Under such circumstances, in which the Czechoslovaks were being organized only covertly and unofficially in the brief time from May to September, and, it might be added, with considerable conflicts and tensions among the Poles and Czechs, the Czech forces were never adequately organized or equipped. For these reasons the Czechoslovak military group in Krakow tried with partial success to find transportation to France beginning just before the outbreak of the War and continuing thereafter. Twelve hundred military persons reached France. The remainder, almost a thousand men, were concentrated in a military camp at Baranowicze in northeastern Poland. Except for 189 of these who were transferred to another camp and eventually made their way to the Middle East, this group was interned by the advancing Red Army when it occupied eastern Poland. The group was preserved as a unit in internment camps, first in the Ukraine and then east of Moscow. In 1940 the Soviet government agreed to a request of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile to release some of the officers and men, and two small units left the U.S.S.R. for the Middle East. Later in the spring of 1941 the whole group was transferred to the Middle East with the exception of twenty-five officers, three doctors,

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and sixty-five non-commissioned officers, who at the request of Lieutenant Colonel Svoboda remained in Russia as the nucleus of a possible future Czechoslovak fighting unit.

After the invasion of Russia by Germany in 1941, an agreement was signed between the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak government-in-exile providing for the formation in the Soviet Union of Czechoslovak military units under Czechoslovak commanders. The utilization of the units was to be determined by the Soviet high command. Thus Colonel Svoboda began organizing and training the first Czechoslovak battalion in the U.S.S.R., which was sent to the front under his command in January 1943. The unit consisted primarily of Czechoslovak and Carpathian Ruthenians who had fled to the Soviet Union and of Czechoslovak residents of Russia. The transfer of this unit to the front came about at Svoboda's special request, directed, without the knowledge of the Czechoslovak command in London, to Marshal Stalin.

With the permission to induct additional volunteers, the First Czechoslovak Brigade was formed in 1943. The Soviet military authorities then asked that Svoboda be promoted and appointed Commander of the brigade. The Ministry of National Defense in London complied. Later in 1944 additional Czechoslovak units were formed in the U.S.S.R. At that time General Kratochvil, the one-time Commander of the first Czechoslovak regiment which had fought in France in 1940, became for a few months Commander of all Czechoslovak forces in the U.S.S.R. while Svoboda commanded the brigade in the field. The Russians, however, soon restored their more pliant tool, General Svoboda, to full command.

General Ludvik Svoboda was presented by the Communists to the outside world as a non-Communist. He did not join the party openly until 1948 and it is not possible to say when he joined secretly before that. But from the beginning of his activity in the U.S.S.R. he was a pliant tool. His father had been a small farmer in Moravia and he himself had been drafted into the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1914. Like most of the other leaders of the inter-war Czechoslovak Army he served in the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia in which he was a captain of infantry. From 1921 to 1931 he continued as an infantry officer in the new Czechoslovak Army, rising from captain to major. Then he served for three years as a teacher in the Czechoslovak Military Academy, returning to a battalion command from 1934-38. Unlike the officers whose biographies we sketched above, he played no central role in the Czechoslovak Army until World War II. He achieved his prominence as the front man for the Communists. From the time the Russians found it expedient to use him until he was purged by them in 1951, he complied with their every request. He wrote a pamphlet in 1946 entitled Marxismus-Leninismus Statni Filosofie SSSR (Marxism-Leninism, the State Philosophy of the U.S.S.R.). He was a member of the presidium of the Central Com-

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mittee of the Russo-Czechoslovak Friendship Association. His daughter went to school in Moscow and by 1948, if not before, he was a member of the Communist party.

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As we noted before, it was a very small group of officers on whom Svoboda and the Communists could draw initially for the development of their new Czechoslovak forces. With the rapid growth of the Czechoslovak Army Corps in 1944 there arose a need for a greater number of officers. After long delays caused by political objections of the Soviet government, about one hundred Czechoslovak officers arrived from England and the Middle East to serve in the corps. At the same time the corps command selected 350 soldiers from the ranks and sent them to Soviet officers schools. After completion of their training they rejoined the corps as sublieutenants.

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But soon the available manpower began to grow rapidly as Slovak troops whom the Germans had mobilized began to desert to and be captured by the Allied side. Much of the original army corps was lost in September 1944, when the Red Army opened the Battle for the Dukla Pass in the Carpathians. Here the First Czechoslovak Army Corps fought its heaviest battle of the war. When after one month of bloody fighting the Corps had penetrated through the Pass and stood on the border of Slovakia, it counted about 18,000 men; the battle had cost it 6,500 casualties.

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After arrival in Czechoslovak territory the army corps began drafting Czechoslovak citizens into the ranks so that at the end of the war it stood 80,000 strong supported by the victorious Red Army and highly advertised as the nucleus of the new Czechoslovak Army of the future although still short on trained officers. Now, just as after World War I, a new Czechoslovak Army was to be built on the basis of its Russian antecedents, only this time the spirit was very different. Instead of a cohesive group with a common experience of national struggle against the Bolsheviks, it was an ad hoc group rapidly formed under Soviet sponsorship. In this respect it differed markedly in experience, morale, and traditions from the army leadership coming from London.

C. The Slovak Resistance Forces

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If it had not been for the assimilation of Slovak forces and resistance groups, the army corps coming from Russia would indeed have been a shell. It is to this third source of military personnel, the resistance movements, that we now turn our attention.

The most important resistance was in Slovakia. After the destruction of Czechoslovakia in 1939 the Germans established a Slovak State separated from Bohemia and Moravia with an army of its own. This army consisted of Slovak personnel from the prewar Czechoslovak Army and of the plant and equipment found at the time on the territory of Slovakia. There had been only one Slovak general in the

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* 701 Czechoslovak Army of 1939, Division General Rudolf Viest, a one-time legionnaire in Russia. He was appointed in 1939 to the post of Inspector General of the new Slovak Army. In the winter of 1939-40, however, he fled to France, where he became commander of the First Czechoslovak Division. From 1940-44 he served as Secretary of State in the Ministry of National Defense in London. He resigned this post when an uprising broke out in Slovakia and left to command the army in rebellion. When the uprising collapsed two months later, he and his deputy, General Golian, were captured by German troops and executed.

Since there were no high-ranking Slovak officers available, the leadership of the Slovak Army necessarily came from younger officers who were promoted to general rank by the new Slovak government. In 1941 the Germans asked the Slovaks to contribute as allies to the German military effort. The Slovaks sent a mechanized division to the southern front where it remained from 1941 until 1943, when the bulk of it deserted to the Russians. During these same years two other Slovak divisions performed occupation duty in Russia and another Slovak unit served in Italy.

725 In 1944 intensive partisan activity developed in Slovakia. The partisan units consisted mostly of Slovaks, but there were also Czechs, Russians, and even a number of French and other Allied ex-prisoners of war who had escaped from German captivity. Some of the units were led by Red Army officers, and they were often supplied by the Soviets with equipment and ammunition. That summer the partisans, sometimes in conjunction with units of the Slovak Army, controlled large parts of Slovakia, important lines of communication, and often whole towns. By the end of August it had become impossible for the Slovak government to assert its authority in Slovakia, and it was announced that the German Army would occupy the country and restore order.

In the meantime, a number of Slovak politicians, both Communist and non-Communist, and a small group of Slovak officers, had been preparing for an armed uprising. They had been in touch with the Czechoslovak government in London which had approved their plans. The preparations for the uprising were cut short by the announcement of the impending arrival of the German troops in Slovakia. On August 29, 1944, the Slovak National Council, and the Military commander appointed by the Czechoslovak government in London, in the name of the Czechoslovak Republic issued proclamations to the Slovak people and the Slovak Army asking them to join together in the fight against the invading German Army and the collaborationist Slovak government in Bratislava. Banska Bystrica, the headquarters of the land forces of the Slovak Army, became the center of the uprising and the headquarters of the First Czechoslovak Army in Slovakia. Slovak troops and the Slovak gendarmerie together with partisan units assumed control over most of central and western Slo-

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vakia, and began fighting the advancing German divisions. Only in eastern Slovakia the situation remained confused.

The rebellion failed, however. The reasons were varied. Some officers, mainly in eastern Slovakia, where two Slovak divisions were stationed, hesitated in taking decisive action; as a result the two divisions were practically immobilized. A satisfactory unity of command of the fighting forces in Slovakia had not been achieved. The First Czechoslovak Army, as the rebellious army was called, consisted primarily of units of the defunct Slovak Army, and was led by Slovak officers acting on behalf of the Czechoslovak Republic, and loyal to the Czechoslovak government in London. The partisan units on the other hand were in many cases under Communist, sometimes Russian, leadership; their primary loyalty belonged to the Red Army, and they were accordingly noncommital about the restoration of the Czechoslovak Republic. They continued to operate as independent units.

The principle cause of the failure of the rebellion was none of these. It was the lack of outside support. It was generally understood that the success of the uprising depended not only on the loyalty of the Slovak officers and soldiers of the Czechoslovak Republic, but also on adequate help from the outside. The Russians promised such help, but then failed to give it. They followed in a somewhat less conspicuous fashion the same policy in Slovakia which they later followed at Prague and most notoriously at Warsaw. That is to say, they promoted an uprising which they then did not support, permitting the rebellious forces to serve as a minor harassment to the Germans while at the same time being largely exterminated. Their extermination guaranteed that there would be no independent and organized resistance movement left after the Russians took over.

Facilities for Allied aid to the Slovak resistance were available. There were air fields for the landing of Allied planes. The Red Army stood at the time on the borders of eastern Slovakia, and it was expected that with Allied help Slovakia could be held militarily long enough to allow the Red Army to cross the Carpathians. But these calculations proved to be false. The Russians blocked effective aid.

While the fighting was in progress in Slovakia during September and October, the Czechoslovak government in London tried desperately to mobilize help from no matter where. Soviet authorities, however, protested against any possible Western interference in the operations in Slovakia. As a result Western help remained limited to the arrival by air from Italy of a group of American officers and soldiers of the OSS carrying a handful of arms. They were all eventually captured by the Germans and executed. From the Soviet side there had been promised that at least the Second Czechoslovak Paradesant Brigade would be shipped to Slovakia by air, but only small elements of it arrived, and other Soviet aid was limited to scattered

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725 small arms shipments and limited aerial support by the First Czechoslovak Air Regiment from the U.S.S.R.

On October 28, 1944, Banska Bystrica was occupied by German forces, and within the next few days the First Czechoslovak Army ceased to exist as an organized force. The partisans retired into the mountains and so did some of the Slovak troops; others dispersed and went home. When the new Czechoslovak Army was being formed after the War, the officers of the 1944 uprising provided a significant new element for the officers corps.

The Slovak officers who had prepared the uprising were all relatively young men educated in Czechoslovak military schools during the early years of the Republic, and dedicated to the Czechoslovak idea. The relatively high positions they came to hold in the Slovak Army were ideally suited for their conspiratorial activities. The most prominent of these men were Lieutenant Colonel Jan Golian, Chief of Staff of the Slovak Army Land Forces; Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Mikulas Ferjencik, Chief of the Slovak Army Veterinary Service; and Lieutenant Colonel Mirko Vesel, Chief of Slovak Army Intelligence. On the eve of the uprising Golian was promoted to brigadier general by the Czechoslovak government in London, and appointed Commander of the First Czechoslovak Army until the arrival from London of Division General Rudolf Viest. When Viest came to Slovakia and assumed command over the army, Golian served as his deputy.

After the collapse of the uprising, while retreating to the mountains, Generals Viest and Golian were captured in the first week of November by German troops and executed. Ferjencik and Vesel survived, the former in the mountains, the latter on a political mission in London. Both were promoted after the war to brigadier general, and both are today exiles in the West.

While numerically the most important source of resistance personnel came from the Slovak Army, mention should also be made of the resistance in the German protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia. We have already noted that in 1939 and 1940 there were military underground associations in the protectorate, but most of the leading officers in them eventually found their way to the West.

There was in Bohemia-Moravia a minor collaborationist force. More than anything else the government army was a German propaganda stunt. It was established by Adolf Hitler as a "concession" to the Czech people, and in recognition of their "autonomy" within the German Reich. This so-called army was made up of about seven thousand Czechs clad in old Czechoslovak uniforms, but it was devoid of any firearms. These troops were split up in small garrisons in a few larger Czech cities.

Later in the war the force was increased by a few thousand, and some units were sent to Italy for occupation duty behind the front. In time most of them deserted to the Allies. The remainder stayed

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at home in the protectorate, where they eventually took part in the May 1945 uprising against the Germans.

At the end of the war as German power was collapsing, the underground in Prague and elsewhere in Czechoslovakia came out into the open and tried to secure liberation a few days before the arrival of the Allied Armies. The uprising in Prague was predicated upon the assumption that the American troops, which were rapidly advancing, were about to arrive. However, by agreement with the Russians the Americans stopped at Pilsen, a short distance to the west of Prague. It was the troops of the Vlasov Army which had deserted from the German side which first arrived in Prague, leaving two days later followed by the Red Army four days after the uprising began.

D. The New Czechoslovak Army

1. The Sample

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It was from all these sources—the armed forces of the government-in-exile, the Czechoslovak armed forces mobilized by the Russians, and the resistance armed forces, many of whom were originally in German satellite armies— that the new Czechoslovak government could draw for its future leadership. In order to consider how the actual selection of leaders was made and how some groups gave way to others we have studied a sample of sixty-one men who were generals at some period between 1945 and the present. Ten of these are Communist militants, fifty-one are career officers. These sixty-one provide a fairly adequate sample of all those who have held general rank in the past eight years. Altogether we may estimate that some ninety generals were active between 1941 and 1951. Of these at least fifteen were killed in the war against Germany. A few were reaching normal retirement age by 1945.[11] It is thus clear that we have some data on a large majority of the generals of the last few years. In the remainder of this section of the report we shall study the characteristics of these sixty-one out of the 167 in our full Czechoslovak sample dating from 1918. Of the fifty-one career officers, seven came from the Czechoslovak Army in the U.S.S.R., of whom three had transferred from the London forces in the West. Some eighteen others were connected with the Czechoslovak government-in-exile. Three came from the Slovak Army and five others from the underground. Two others were mainly collaborators though they must have had some peculiar record to have obtained post-liberation posts. On sixteen we have no information about World War II activities. Ten of these are men who were very junior officers until after the completion of the Soviet take-over process, at which time they rose to prominence. They were men most of whom had spent the war years in Czechoslovakia or in the Russian forces.

Of the eighteen officers who were already generals by 1944, ten

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* 701 were connected with the Czechoslovak government-in-exile and four came out of the underground. Three others had already become generals before 1939 but played no major role in World War II. Thus our sample reveals that the solid core of experienced officers was the London group. Those who came to compete with them after 1945 were younger and less prominent.

2. The Communists Seize Control

*701 *648 Even before the war was ended and the exiles returned home from various directions, the struggle for control of the army had begun. "On April 18, 1945, at Kosice, Slovakia, where the first postwar Czechoslovak government was formed, President Edward Benes signed a decree appointing General Sergej Ingr, former Minister of National Defense in the London government-in-exile, commander-in-chief of the Czechoslovak armed forces, and General Alois Liska, former commander of the Czechoslovak armoured brigade in Great Britain, chief of staff. But these appointments were vetoed by the Kremlin and Benes had to sign a fresh decree nominating as Minister of National Defense General Ludvik Svoboda, commander of the Czechoslovak brigade formed in Russia, and as chief of staff General Bohumil Bocek-Chodsky, that is, two 'Muscovites' instead of two 'Londoners'."[12]

The Communists tried to start a frame-up to the effect that General Ingr together with General Moravec, Chief of the Intelligence Service of the London government, had promoted a Fascist coup. However, the Communists were not yet strong enough to dispose of their opponents by this typical Bolshevik device. The intervention of President Benes prevented this frame-up and in 1947 General Ingr, who in the meantime had been kept completely on the sidelines, was named Minister to the Netherlands.[12a] Moravec was given the command of a division from 1945 to 1948 despite the Communist charges. Liska, who had been scheduled to be Chief of Staff was given the less strategic post of Commander of the War College.

One top London officer who was not allowed to retain any position in the army was General Bedrich Neumann. It will be recalled that in 1944 he had been appointed Chief of the Staff for the rebuilding of the armed forces of the new Czechoslovak state. Though scheduled by the London government for that top post, he was too notably and vigorously anti-Communist to be permitted to hold any position between 1945 and his return to exile in 1948.

Unlike the very top London officers, Neumann and Ingr, most of the London officers were permitted (like Moravec) to retain military positions for the three years from 1945 until the coup in February 1948. They were, however, shunted into less influential positions. Of the sixteen London officers who were generals in the period 1945 to 1948, seven were in positions of lesser status under the

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new Czechoslovak government than they had been under the government-in-exile. In addition to those whom we have already mentioned, Janousek became representative of the chief of the general staff for international affairs instead of head of the air force. Langer became president of the Army Medical Research Institute instead of Director General of Medical Services. Spaniel after a short period as chief of the Military Office of the President was given a troop command in the provinces. Only two London generals found themselves temporarily in stronger positions after their return home. General Vicherek was put in command of the air force in place of General Janousek. Until 1943 he had been the chief of the Air Force Department of the Ministry of National Defense in London, but from then to the end of the war he was head of the Red Cross. The other advance was experienced by General Heliodor Pika, who, although with the London government, had spent the war in Moscow as military attaché. While General Pika was very anti-Communist and soon paid for his refusal to co-operate with the Stalin regime, still it is interesting that initially in choosing one London officer for the post of deputy chief of staff this one, whom the Russians knew well, was chosen. Three generals, Bartik, Hasal, and Kumpost, continued the same work that they had been doing in London while four officers changed to jobs so non-comparable that it is hard to say whether they represented changes in status. Two of these, however, received military posts abroad, one in Canada and one in London, positions in which their influence on events in Czechoslovakia was certainly reduced. The leading London officers and the only ones with positions of influence after 1945 were General Pika, deputy chief of staff, and General Hasal, chief of the Military Office of the President. Thus we see that the London officers were quickly pushed into positions where they had relatively little control.

Between 1945 and 1948 the Communist aim was to so structure the officers corps as to establish a strong power position for themselves and to influence key decisions. Until 1948 no attempt was made to dispense with the services of the officers who followed Benes. Rather they were neutralized and circumvented.

One measure used to weaken the power of the regular officers was to build up irregular military formations outside the army. As in each Communist country a National Security Corps (SNB) was formed in the Ministry of Interior which was headed by a Communist. In addition considerable power devolved at Communist insistence from the central government to localities where Communist-sponsored "national committees" exercised a good deal of authority in the early days after liberation from the Nazis.

The army itself was made to conform to the Soviet rather than Western models. The March 27, 1945 Kosice Program of the new government said:[13]

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> "The Government wants to continue solidifying the fighting collaboration of the Czechoslovak Army with the Red Army. The Government sees in the Red Army a model for the building of a new, a truly democratic, and anti-fascist Czechoslovak Army.
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> "In order to make possible the closest fighting cooperation with the Red Army . . . the organization, the equipment, and the training of the Czechoslovak armed forces shall be the same as the organization, the equipment, and the training of the Red Army."

While steps were taken in this direction at once—on May 20, 1945, General Svoboda announced that the new army would follow Soviet regulations and use Soviet equipment—it was not until 1950 that conformity to Russian practices became complete. For a few years compromise with the practices and power of the regular Czechoslovak Army prevailed.

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The situation remained in a tenuous balance until the coup of 1948. It is widely maintained that enough power remained with Benes and his loyal supporters in the army so that the coup could have been defeated had the President ordered the officers to resist. No such orders were given, however. Benes acceded to the Communist demands and remained as a figurehead until June while the Communists seized all real power. They destroyed the existing army leadership. Eighteen of the officers in our sample were purged in the coup, or refused to co-operate thereafter. Most of them escaped abroad into a second exile. Of these eighteen purgees, fourteen were men whom we described above as London officers. In addition four other officers in the sample, three of them originally from the underground, were purged in the coup. One other, General Neumann, had been purged earlier but as a London officer who joined the second exile, he could well be considered together with the eighteen victims of the 1948 coup. Just three London officers in our sample tried to stay on by accepting Communist policies. Thus the coup eliminated the large majority of the top generals.

What were the characteristics of these men whom the Communists eliminated from the Czechoslovak Army command? Their most important characteristic was belonging to a tightly-knit and cohesive group which had developed initially out of the Czechoslovak Legion in World War I, had been trained by the French in the École de Guerre and elsewhere during the inter-war years, and had fought for the government-in-exile during World War II. Ten of the eighteen had indeed belonged to the Czechoslovak Legion which fought in Russia during World War I and then fought the Bolsheviks. Another four had fought on other fronts in the First World War. All but two of them had records of combat experience. Ten of them had commanded

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infantry units. One of these and four others had been artillery officers. One doctor, one veterinarian, one intelligence officer, and one supply and transport officer account for the rest. They were thus a group with well-rounded command experience. They were for the most part mature men; their median age in 1945 was fifty, and all but four of them were between forty-five and fifty-five, two being older and two younger. Six of them had had general staff experience and had been trained at the War College. These officers were for the most part a well-educated middle class group. According to General Cepika even in 1945 only 7 percent of the students in the Czechoslovak Military Academy were of working class origin.[14] Thus all but a few of the men chosen for officer training came from comfortable backgrounds where they might have been expected to receive a good education.

It is obvious that the Czechoslovak Army suffered a severe loss of professional skill when the officers corps was purged of Benes' supporters. It was easy at that time to think that the result would be demoralization and a leadership of sycophants and fools. It does not seem to have turned out that way. As the Soviet Army purge of the 1930's also revealed, it is easy to overestimate the indispensability and irreplaceability of an established leadership. Confusion and ineptitude may reign temporarily but with a certain amount of compromise replacements can be developed. We now wish to examine who the replacements were, what sort of men they were, and what happened to them.

3. The Collaborationists

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Ultimately the Communists sought an army of convinced and trained Communists, but in the short run they had to use the services of some experienced officers from the old Czechoslovak Army whom they persuaded to stay on despite the coup. In retrospect one may wonder at the shortsightedness of these high-level officers who stayed on. All of them were eventually purged. At latest information the officers in our sample who remain in the Czechoslovak Army include none who in 1944 were higher than lieutenant colonel and the largest number of them were then only majors. The high-ranking officers whom the Russians persuaded to stay on after 1948 generally lasted in favor for no more than a couple of years. One in our sample was dropped early in 1948, four more in 1950, five more in 1951, and three in 1952, making a total of thirteen career officers in our sample who stayed on after the coup but were ultimately purged. The most striking fact which differentiated these thirteen officers from the eighteen who broke with the government of Czechoslovakia at the time of the coup was the small number of London officers in the collaborating group. It will be recalled that fourteen of the eighteen who supported Benes in 1948 had served the London

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government during the war. Of those in our sample who stayed on after 1948 only two had been London officers, General Alois Vicherek and General Rudolf Bulandr. General Vicherek had been chief of the Air Force Department of the Ministry of National Defense from 1941 to 1943 but at that time he lost this important post and from then till the end of the war he served as President of the Red Cross. General Bulandr fought in North Africa during the war and apparently joined the Communist party after his return to Czechoslovakia. He did not become prominent until after the coup of 1948, at which time he became brigadier general and deputy chief of the general staff. In addition to these two London officers three others who stayed on after 1948 had served with the government-in-exile but had later been transferred to the Czechoslovak Army in the U.S.S.R.

It is worth noting the Soviets' success in indoctrinating these men who served under them. We are readily aware of the disillusionment which so often follows from firsthand experience with Soviet life. But the reaction of contact is not always that. The net result of Soviet experience and indoctrination has been sufficiently binding for the Soviets to systematically favor persons who have lived under their influence. General Svoboda, who was Minister of National Defense from 1945-50, is one obvious example. In addition it is noteworthy that the two other prominent generals who joined Svoboda in February 1948, in a meeting of the Central Action Committee of the National Front and thus affirmed their loyalty to the new regime, were Generals Bocek and Klapalek both of whom had served in Russia in World War II.

General Bohumil Bocek had been captain in the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia in World War I and an infantry officer in the postwar Czechoslovak Army. In 1930 he had served in the Ministry of National Defense and after that commanded a frontier battalion. With the outbreak of World War II he made his way to France and served there and in Great Britain as a colonel until 1943. He was then selected as one of the officers to be sent to the U.S.S.R. In 1945 the Russians had sufficient confidence in him to permit him to become chief of the general staff. Thus he and Svoboda were the top officers during the Benes period. General Bocek's willingness to co-operate with the Communists after the coup did him little good. Within a few months he was removed from office. His name appeared again in the limelight in 1952, when he was arrested and implicated in the Slansky trial.

General Klapalek, it will be recalled, had commanded the Czechoslovak troops in the Middle East. When the fighting there was over, he too went to the U.S.S.R., where for a while he commanded the First Czechoslovak Army Corps. From 1945 until he was purged in 1950 he headed the Land Military Command of Prague. The third London officer in our sample who was transferred in 1943 to the Eastern Front was General Jan Satorie. He played no important role

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in the immediate post-liberation period but from 1950 to 1952 he was chief of the Military Office of the President. He is reported to have committed suicide when the government "discovered" that he was implicated in an illegal officers organization. While none of these officers survived long, all proved willing to work with the Russians as long as the Russians found them acceptable, a testimony tó the impact of Russian indoctrination and persuasion.

In addition to officers who had been indoctrinated by the Russians on the Eastern Front, a number of the officers who tried to continue working with the Communists came from the underground. General Zdenek Novak, who in 1945 commanded the military occupation of the border territories and from 1948 to 1950 headed the Brno Land Military Command, had been head of the military underground organization which succeeded the ON in 1944, and fought in the Prague uprising of 1945. He was used until 1951, when he was arrested. General Bruno Zapletal had been an official of the Office of Price Control of Bohemia-Moravia in 1939 and a member of the Military Underground. Before the war he was a quartermaster colonel. He did not play a prominent role in the immediate postwar years but later became chief of the quartermaster corps, from which post he was removed in 1951 for "neglect of duties." A third underground officer who remained in the Communist Army after 1948 reveals a slightly different pattern of experience. General Miso Sirica was a member of the Slovak Army. He had been a member of the Legion in Czech Russia in World War I and then an infantry officer in the Czechoslovak Army. He remained in the Nazi-controlled Slovak Army after 1939 and during World War II fought against the Red Army. He advanced to the rank of colonel and received several German decorations. Back in Slovakia in 1944 he joined the insurgent forces during the uprising, joined the Communist party, and was promoted to general. He played no conspicuous role in the immediate post-liberation years but then became Commander of the Land Military Command of Bratislava until finally purged in 1950. In that year it was announced that he left "for a cure in Carlsbad."

The Nazi collaborationist record of General Sirica before he reversed sides in 1944 is not unique. On the contrary, a number of officers who worked with the Communists did so after a record of Fascist or collaborationist activities. Joining the Communist party was less repulsive to these men than to the democratic followers of Benes, and also it was a means of protecting themselves against the consequences of their earlier actions. An even more striking example is that of General Simon Drgac. General Drgac served in Italy during the first World War and with the Czechoslovak Army after the war. He attended the course for general staff officers and the War College. He was military attaché to Paris from 1929 to 1931, and became a section chief of the general staff in 1934. After the German occupation of Czechoslovakia he was prominently active in the Ger-

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man-sponsored, semi-Fascist political organization Narodni Sourucenstvi, which was supposed to take the place of all political parties previously in existence. However, in 1945 General Drgac seems to have joined the Communist party. Despite his collaborationist record he was accepted and became Commander of the Military Academy in 1945. Then after the Communist coup in 1948 he was promoted to chief of the general staff.

One explanation of Drgac's acceptability to the Communists for several years is an interesting one. It has been asserted that in 1937, when he was head of Czechoslovak military intelligence, he was the man through whom some German documents passed to Russia (with the full cognizance of the Benes government) which implicated Tukachevskii and were the basis of his execution. Perhaps Drgac was being shown Russian gratitude for these documents, which ironically enough, were Nazi forgeries intended to reach Russia in just that way. Such Communist rewards are but fleeting, however. In 1950 Drgac was removed.

By drawing upon officers whom they had indoctrinated on the Eastern Front and on officers whose previous records left them at a disadvantage, the Communists maintained some continuity within the Czechoslovak Army after 1948. They did not recruit many officers who had been part of the cohesive and effective London forces but rather officers who did not belong to this cadre and particularly those who had betrayed their trust in the past. Needless to say, a large proportion of these officers were members of the Communist party but this is not a very significant fact because most of them joined only after 1945 or 1948 and joining was merely another way of expressing their willingness to collaborate with their new Communist bosses.

The last one of the thirteen in our sample of career officers who served after the coup is a special case. He had become an active Communist even before World War II. This was General Frantisek Pavel, whose life history is more like that of the new Communist generals whom we shall discuss below than it is like that of the career officers whom we are discussing here, although General Pavel had been a career officer before he became a Communist. He was a first lieutenant in the 30th Rifle Regiment of the Austro-Hungarian Army. After the war he became a career infantry officer and as a staff captain was sent to the War College from 1928 to 1931. The highest rank he reached was major on the staff of the 37th Infantry Regiment in 1934. When the civil war in Spain broke out Major Pavel joined the Republican Army and fought there. He next appeared as a Communist deputy in the Czechoslovak National Assembly in 1946. He was made Commander of the SNB, security troops, from 1948 to 1951. In 1949 and 1950, when the SNB was in the Ministry of Interior, Pavel was Deputy Minister of Interior and then when the Ministry of Interior was split in two and the SNB became part of the Ministry of

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National Security, he became Deputy Minister of National Security. He was arrested in 1951 and connected with Rudolf Slansky.

In addition to these thirteen men who tried to collaborate with the Communists but were ultimately purged, we have in our sample fourteen generals who were regular officers in the prewar Czechoslovak Army and who have apparently been successful in holding on to their positions up to now. We know less about these men than about the generals so far discussed since they were all officers of relatively low rank until after World War II. Two of them, Karel Vegr and Cenek Ruzicka, had become lieutenant colonels by the end of the war. Five others were majors. None of them became generals until 1948. In part, but only in part, the low status of these men until recently is due to their youth. In 1945 they were all between forty and fifty-three and all but four of them were over forty-five. They thus averaged about five years younger than the generals who were eliminated in the 1948 coup. Eight of them had fought in World War I while six entered the Czechoslovak Army from the Military Academy. This may be compared with the fact that of the eighteen officers in our sample who were purged in 1948 all but two had been World War I veterans and those two were Slovaks who had risen into prominence through the Slovak rebellion in 1944. Of the thirteen generals who tried to collaborate with the Communists but were purged, all but one had a World War I record. Being more youthful and [illegible] not being part of the old guard of the Czechoslovak Army which traced its power to the Czechoslovak struggle for independence in the first World War nor sharing that formative experience they were both more acceptable and more amenable to the Communists.

In line with their relatively junior status we find, as we would expect, that fewer of these officers had been to the War College or had had general staff experience. Only two of them had held important staff assignments before the Second World War. Josef Ejem was Staff Captain of the General Staff in the Ministry of National Defense in 1929 and Karel Vegr had the same status in 1930. Generals Ejem, Hanus, Janda, Papousek, and Tokan are known to have attended the War College in Prague.

Although these men were certainly old enough to have established significant military records in World War II, not one of them did so. Generals Hanus, Michalica, and Sacher are reported to have fought with the Russians in World War II. General Rypl was a Major and Flight Commander in the RAF commanding the 313th Czechoslovak Fighter Squadron. General Vegr was a member of the military underground and worked at a munitions factory in Vsetin, Moravia. For the rest, their World War II records were so inconspicuous as to be unknown although it may be presumed that the majority either fought in the East or were in some underground movement.

While it is thus clear that the regular officers on whom the Communist government of Czechoslovakia has drawn are not an outstand-

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TABLE 3

Rank of pre-1945 Career Officers included in the post-1945 Sample

	Purged Before 1948	Purged in 1948 Coup	Purged After 1948 Coup	Not Purged
Rank in 1939				
Lieutenant				2
Captain		2		2
Staff Captain	1			3
Major		4	3	5
Lieutenant Colonel	1	3	3	2
Colonel		5	4	
Brigadier General	3	1	3	
Higher General	1	3		
Don't know				
Rank in 1944				
Lieutenant				1
Captain				1
Staff Captain				2
Major		3	2	5
Lieutenant Colonel	1	4		2
Colonel	1	3	5	
Brigadier General	3	5	5	
Higher General	1	3	1	
Don't know				3
Total	6	18	13	14

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ing group, they have been elevated into a significant part of the current military leadership. They have risen rapidly from the lower ranks but provide a measure of continuity between the older, French-trained Czechoslovak Army and the new Communist Army. It may be expected, however, that with the passage of time these men will be continuously more isolated and many of them may be purged. Although valuable because they are technically trained and have a considerable amount of experience, they come nevertheless, out of an old school which a rising generation of communist-trained officers will probably regard with a certain amount of distrust and distance. For one thing they stem from higher social stations than do the young junior officers whom the Communist regime is now training. In 1950

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General Cepicka could claim that 50 percent of the entering students and 40 percent of the students in both years of Czechoslovak Military Academy were of proletarian origin in contrast to 7 percent in 1945.

In one interesting respect the old-line officers whom the Communists retained differed from the ones they purged or who refused to go along with them. The bulk of the generals in the pre-Communist Czechoslovak Army had primarily infantry experience or a combination of infantry and general staff experience. However, some belonged to more mechanized branches: artillery, cavalry, and air corps. These were 30 percent of our pre-Communist sample. When we tabulate those among them whom the Communists have retained as generals, we find that somewhat more, 43 percent, came from these more technical branches. This may reflect in part the Communists' needs. They found it necessary to accept the technical know-how of these officers. On the other hand it may also reflect a subtle difference in the officers' own points of view. The traditional military norms held to particularly by that group in the officer corps which had come out of the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia and which remained loyal to Benes may have had slightly less hold on a group of officers whose interests and careers centered on technical know-how; they were perhaps somewhat more susceptible to the communistic myths of industrialization and planning. Whatever the causes for the difference in the amount of collaborationism in the different branches, it manifests the general tendency for the technician, along with the bureaucrat, and the desk men, to be favored in the satellite armies.

These older officers, whom the Communists assimilated from the prewar army, have come to hold a good many of the highest positions. The Minister of National Defense is not himself one of them, but they do include the Chief of Staff and Deputy Minister of National Defense, General Vaclav Kratchovil, and another Deputy Minister of National Defense, Vaclav Thor. They also include the Commander of the Czechoslovak air force General Josef Hamus, and the Chief of the Military Office of the President, General Bohumil Chlan, as well as the Commander of the Prague Military District, until recently General Frantisek Janda, and the Commander of the Bratislava military region, General Jaroslav Tokan. A challenge to these men and their positions may ultimately be expected from the new post-1948 trainees of the Czechoslovak military schools.

4. The Communists

One might have expected an effective challenge to them already from old-line Communists without previous military careers. This expectation has proved to be wrong. There are a handful of old-line Communists in key positions in the Czechoslovak Army but they have suffered purging and insecurity to at least the same degree as the regular officers.

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As a matter of fact the Communist militants reached the apex of their power in 1950 when they were brought in temporarily to facilitate the major reorganization of the army which took place in that year. Shortly, however, there was a reaction in favor of the professionals. Before April 1950 all the top positions were held by career officers such as Minister of National Defense Svoboda and the Chief of Staff Drgac. Then when Alexej Cepicka took over as Minister, the top structure of the Ministry was reorganized. In 1950 four Deputy Ministers were appointed. Two like Cepicka were Communist militants with no military qualifications. These were the Chief of Staff Prochazka, who is now teaching at the University of Prague, and Bedrich Rejcin, head of military intelligence who has since been hanged. A third of the four Deputy Ministers, the head of the political department, General Lestovicka, although originally a career officer had joined the Communist movement in 1929. He was implicated in the Slansky trial. The other Deputy Minister was the only regular officer among them, General Drnec who was also later implicated in the Slansky trial.

By 1952 this leading group had been thoroughly purged with three of the five in complete disgrace. Only Cepicka remained. The three Deputy Ministers in 1952 included two career officers; Generals Kratochvil and Thor, and General Hruska, a Communist militant who had charge of the political department. The normal satellite balance had been struck by which professionals held the key technical posts and the Communist politicians had been relegated to their special political department. The Soviet masters of Czechoslovakia thus assured themselves of a professionally competent army, not merely a loyally Communist one.

The life histories of the Communist generals reveal both how little professional experience mattered to the Communists when they were primarily concerned with infiltrating, subverting, and controlling the army, but also how insecure were the men whom the Communists used as tools for these processes. All the Communist militants who headed the army except the top boss, Cepicka, have since been discarded. The Communist militants served a purpose, as dispensable tools in a period of transformation. They were useful as propagandists and conspirators, not soldiers. They had a background of residence in the Soviet Union, often coupled with service in Red Army Intelligence or the Red Army Political Affairs Department (e.g. Prochazka, Rejcin, Kopold, probably Pavel, and Lastovicka as Czech Ambassador to Moscow in 1948-50). Some had past politico-military experience in the Spanish Civil War (e.g. Lastovicka, Pavel, Kopold). Most of them have now been tried as traitors and purged (e.g. Rejcin, Lastovicka, Pavel, Kopold). With the appointment of Cepicka, the top military post, that of Minister of National Defense, was put into the hands of one of the three or four top Communists in Czechoslovakia instead of into the hands of a military leader.

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General Svoboda had been a pliant tool of the Russians, so much so that he outlasted by a couple of years the non-Politburo Ministers of Defense in the other satellite countries. Still in 1950 he was reduced from Minister of National Defense to the honorific status of Vice-Premier and Head of the State Office for Physical Education and Sport. He held this position until 1951. In 1952 he was listed as a member of the presidium of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Association. After being reduced to these purely titular offices he is reported to have disappeared physically during the last year.

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His successor, Dr. Alexej Cepicka, was born in 1908 and brought up by his widowed mother, who owned a private employment agency for domestic personnel in the provincial town of Kromeriz, Moravia. There he attended the gymnasium and was an average student. Later he studied law, in which he achieved his doctorate. He worked as a candidate for the bar in an attorney's office in Ostrava. Investigated for financial irregularities in the middle 1930's he was expelled from the list of candidates by the Chamber of Advocates in Brno. Cepicka's early politics are ambiguous at best. He joined the Communist party only in 1938, though he claims that during his student years he was a leader of Communist student organizations. On the other hand, however, during his imprisonment by the Germans in a concentration camp during World War II, the president of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, Dr. Hacha, intervened in his behalf and claimed in a letter to Hitler (a copy of which after the war was found in Hacha's office) that Cepicka in his younger years had assisted in editing a strictly rightist paper which attacked Masaryk and Benes as pro-Communists. Hacha's intervention was of no avail. After the war Cepicka returned to Kromeriz and became chairman of the local "national committee" of that town. He administered the community so arbitrarily that he embarrassed even some of the Communists. He was elected to the Constituent National Assembly in May 1946 and was one of the Communist party representatives on the Constitutional Committee. In December 1947 Cepicka succeeded his fellow Communist, Alois Zmrhal, as Minister of Internal Trade, to become after the coup in February 1948 Minister of Justice.

Before the coup Cepicka organized a bombing attempt on the lives of Jan Masaryk, Dr. Zenkl, and Dr. Drtina. The investigation of that plot carried out by the Ministry of Justice had already begun to compromise the Communist party when it was suddenly ended by the coup which made Cepicka himself Minister of Justice. The Justice Department officers, public prosecutors, the judges who had been assigned to the case were prosecuted and liquidated by Cepicka, who staged fake trials against them. He piloted through the Cabinet and National Assembly a new Act for the Protection of the Republic, acts to reorganize the profession of law and the judiciary, to replace the established courts by Communist-dominated people's courts,

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661 and new civil, criminal, and procedural codes. In addition to being Minister of Justice he was secretary general of the Central Action Committee of the National Front and head of the State Office for Ecclesiastical Affairs, in which capacity he persecuted the clergy and subjugated the churches. In April 1950, he was made Minister of National Defense. Up to that time there is no record of his having had any military service, but on October 6, 1950, he received the rank of army general.

Cepicka derived much of his power from his marriage to Martha, the daughter of Klement Gottwald, in July 1948. Martha Gottwald Cepicka has also been active in politics. She joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the coup and within a year she was a Chief of Division. Naturally there have been various rumors about fluctuations in the fortunes of Cepicka. At the time of the Slansky trial there were rumors that he might be in disgrace. More recently there have been rumors of an affair between Madame Cepicka and disgraced Bedrich Geminder and of a pending divorce. Such rumors notwithstanding, Cepicka became a Deputy Prime Minister on February 2, 1953, and was a member of the Czech delegation to Stalin's funeral. At the Gottwald funeral Cepicka was one of the four pallbearers and his wife appeared prominently. As of the date of writing Cepicka is a powerful member of the Politburo and seems as secure as any member of a satellite elite. *

701 *648 The Communist chief of the general staff, on the other hand, was a bird of passage. The first chief of the general staff after the war had been General Bohumil Bocek, a career officer who had fought under the Russians in World War II and whom they forced on an unwilling Benes. He did not long survive Benes in office, however. Although he backed the coup of 1948, he himself was removed a few months later and was replaced by General Simon Drgac whom we noted to be a former Nazi collaborator. The latter survived in this office until 1950. Then the prewar career officer Drgac was replaced by the Marxist theoretician, Army General Dr. Jaroslav Prochaska. Prochazka's father had been a teacher in an industrial school. He had studied law and had received his doctorate in that field. His first military experience came in the Austro-Hungarian Army in World War I. He fought in the Czechoslovak Legion, first in Russia and then in France, where he was a lieutenant of the 22d Infantry Regiment. He remained associated with that regiment of the Czechoslovak Army through 1922, but he was a reservist and not a regular officer. By 1919 he had already become a Communist, being a founding member of the Czechoslovak party. He served on the City Council at Pilsen around 1920. He then became an official of the Czechoslovak railways. In 1924 he left Czechoslovakia and from then until 1945 lived in Russia. It is alleged that he left Czechoslovakia in order to avoid service in the army.

During World War II the Soviet government made extensive use of

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Dr. Prochazka as a propagandist. He was a broadcaster on the Soviet radio in 1941 and editor of Nova Sloboda, the newspaper of the First Czechoslovak Army Corps in the U.S.S.R. In that army corps he headed the so called "enlightenment service," first as a captain and then as a major. Back in Czechoslovakia after liberation he was chief of the Army Educational Service from 1945 to 1950 and as such was responsible for Communist indoctrination in the army. Then in 1950 this Communist propagandist was made chief of the general staff. He remained in that post until 1952. Then despite his long record of communist activity and his extensive Communist connections—his brother is the principal author of the 1948 Czechoslovak constitution and was ambassador to the United States in 1950-52—he was abruptly dismissed, possibly in connection with the purge of Slansky and his associates. Prochazka then became professor in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Charles University at Prague. He was succeeded by Vaclav Kratchovil, one of the newly promoted prewar junior army officers to whom we referred above. Prochazka's Communist record served him no stead when, in 1952, the Communists decided to restore professional skill to full recognition.

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Another Communist purged in that process was Bedrich Rejcin born 1911, Fritz Reizinger. He was a Sudeten German of Jewish family from Pilsen. He received his political training in the U.S.S.R., where he lived for some time in the 1930's until 1945. From 1941 until 1945 he was a political education officer in the Czechoslovak Army in the U.S.S.R. In 1948 as a colonel he was chief of the secret police in the Ministry of the Interior. Then in 1950 he was made Deputy Minister of National Defense for Military Intelligence and promoted to brigadier general and then to division general. He was arrested in 1951 and in the Slansky trial he was charged not only with an attempt to seize the Communist party organization in the Czechoslovak Army, but also with Zionism, Titoism, Trotskyism, and treason. He was hanged in November 1952.

Another purged Communist Deputy Minister of National Defense was Bohuslav Lastovicka. He was born in Bohemia in 1905 and prepared for a military career. He entered the Military Academy around 1922 for training as an artillery officer and was commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1924. He served with the artillery until 1929, when he was transferred into the reserves as "incapable of field service, capable of local services," a formula used in the Czechoslovak Army of that period for politically unassimilable elements. Despite his Communist views he was promoted to first lieutenant in the reserves in 1931. During the 1930's he was editor of Rude Pravo, the central organ of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia. Then in 1936 he went to Spain and commanded the Gottwald Artillery Battery in the civil war. After the defeat of the Loyalists he became a refugee in France and then in England. He spent the war years in London as a broadcaster for the Czechoslovak section of the BBC.

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701 Upon his return to Prague he became director of the Czechoslovak *648 Broadcasting Corporation, which position he held until 1948. At that time he was appointed ambassador to the U.S.S.R. When he returned 661 from there in 1950, he became Deputy Minister for National Defense in charge of the army political department, with the rank of brigadier general and later division general. He remained in this position until 1951, at which time he was arrested, presumably in connection with the Slansky trial.

The Deputy Ministers of National Defense who now remained in office included, as already noted, the standard three for a satellite of whom but one is a Communist militant, General Cenek Hruska. He heads the political administration of the army. Little is known about General Hruska. He rose to his present position mainly through the political administration. As a brigadier general he was chief of the Central Political Administration from 1950 to 1952, at which time he became division general and Deputy Minister. He shares the status of Deputy Minister with General Kratchovil, whose life history we have already reviewed and with another professional officer, General Vaklav Thor. Thor began his military service in the Austro-Hungarian Army. He became a career officer in the Czechoslovak Army in 1920, transferring from the Reserves. He served in the artillery, rising from second lieutenant to staff captain in the years before the war. He, like Hruska, was made a Deputy Minister when the associates of Slansky were removed from office in 1952.

Our sample includes one other new Communist officer who was purged and whose biography reveals how freely the Communists bestow military rank for political purposes. That officer was Dr. Bohumil Ecer. Like Prochazka and Cepicka, he earned a doctor's degree in law. After the First World War he practiced in Brno, where he joined the Communist party. In 1930 he was Deputy Mayor of Brno as a member of the Communist party. In 1936 or 1937 he was expelled from the party for "Trotskyist tendencies." At the outbreak of the Second World War he lived in Paris from where he escaped to England in 1942. There he was employed in the Ministry of Justice working on a draft decree on retribution. He therefore later became the Czech delegate to the Interallied Commission for the Punishment of War Criminals and to the U.N. War Commission. For this essentially political and legal job he was made a colonel and later a brigadier general. After his return to Prague in September 1948, he became professor of international penal law in Brno University. Since 1950 he has disappeared from view. He was given his rank with no regard to military purposes, technical qualifications, or military experience. When his function was served the Communists discarded him just as readily as they appointed him, * and they left genuine military responsibilities in the hands of techni- 701 cally qualified persons not necessarily having a Communist record.

*648 The Communist militants who retained their positions have gen-

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erally been in the political administration of the army as, for example General Hruska, or in the security forces which, however, were probably thoroughly shaken up in the last few months. On September 15, 1953, as part of the Malenkov change of line, Minister of Security, General Karol Bacilek was demoted to Secretary of the Communist party in Slovakia. Our data precede that date, but as of the end of our information one Communist officer who remained in military office was Dr. Antonin Rasla, a lawyer, who is head of the military court in Bratislava. He was certainly not an officer of the Czechoslovak Army at any time through 1935. The first occasion on which he appears in a military role is in the Slovak uprising of 1944, in which he was a Communist party member of the Slovak National Council and of its presidium and had the military rank of staff captain. In 1945 he became a lieutenant colonel in the Ministry of National Defense, and in 1952 acquired his present position. Another Communist in a security position was General Hofmann, who until recently was Commander of the Personal Guard of Gottwald and other top party officials. In this capacity he was a general of the SNB. His military background stems from the Spanish Civil War.

We might, finally, mention Division General Oskar Jelen, Deputy Minister of National Security from 1952. Jelen was the illegitimate son of the Hungarian nobleman, Aladar Platt, on whose estate he was born. His mother was married to the estate manager, Jelen. He was brought up as a Hungarian and became a village school teacher. He attended a school for reserve officers and about 1927, after being drafted, he served as a reserve lieutenant in the artillery in the late 1920's and '30's. During World War II he joined the Nazi puppet Slovak Army. In 1945 he was regional secretary of the Slovak Communist party in Kosice and chairman of the District National Committee there. He was so inefficient in these functions that he was, it appears, to a great extent responsible for the defeat of the Communist party in the elections of 1946 in that region. He remained in these offices in Kosice for some time after the coup of 1948. He was next heard from when he suddenly appeared in the Ministry of National Security as Deputy Minister, first holding the rank of brigadier general and then in 1952 division general.

5. The Present Balance and the Future

While ruthless, demoralized, and uneducated political hatchet men may fill important security and political posts, the significant point to note is that for professional military activity the Communists have turned to professional military men wherever they felt they could trust them at all. In each satellite country there is a tenuous balance between professionally-qualified officers and bumptious Communist newcomers, which balance must hold until a new generation of young well-trained and well-indoctrinated officers is ready to take over. The balance is not the same in each case, how-

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ever. Later we shall note that in Poland no core of trustworthy professional officers was available to the Communists. They solved the problem by transforming Russian army officers into Poles, thus securing a leadership that is both skilled and loyal, even if not popular. In Romania too we shall note that apparently no core of acceptable officers is available. As a result we find there a group of prewar officers holding important positions but with Communist politicians riding herd on them in the very top positions. In Czechoslovakia the Communists found a solution from their point of view more satisfactory than the Romanian but perhaps less so than the Polish. They have relied on very junior career officers who have been rapidly promoted plus a few Communists relegated to political control positions.

This solution was arrived at in a step-by-step process, as in all the European satellites. The first step was the gradual establishment of Communist bases of influence between 1945 and 1948. The second step was initiated with the coup of February 1948 and involved the elimination of all officers who were not willing collaborators with the Soviets. The third step occurred in April 1950, when a sweeping reorganization adapted the army closely to the Soviet model and replaced even the would-be collaborators by new Communist officers. The final step so far was the replacement in 1952 of most of these Communists by new professionals of prewar low rank. Even this, however, is but a temporary expedient. The present group of officers will also go when Soviet-trained and Soviet-educated replacements become available. The final purge as yet foreseeable must await the maturation of the postwar, post-Soviet generation.

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III. POLAND

A. Introduction

The process by which the Polish Army was sovietized was in some ways similar and in some ways different from that just described for Czechoslovakia. In both cases a leadership which had cohesion and tradition was destroyed by the Communists. A new leadership had to be found, but in both Czechoslovakia and Poland, it consisted not primarily of Communist party militants, who were also purged from leading positions, but by military technicians. In both armies, however, the Communist activists retained the leading positions in the political administration and in the police and security forces. Thus in both armies there is a sharp differentiation between professional leadership in the purely military branches and civilians in uniform in a few other departments.

There are two important and inter-related differences between the way in which a new leadership was developed in Poland and in Czechoslovakia. 1. In Poland the new leadership of professionals was provided mainly by Russian Army officers ordered into the Polish Army, whereas in Czechoslovakia it has been temporarily provided by former low-ranking Czechoslovak career officers aided, it is true, by Soviet advisers and supplemented by a smaller number of imported Russian officers.. 2. In Poland there was less continuity than in Czechoslovakia between the prewar and postwar armies. Much of the prewar officer corps was destroyed in the Katyn massacres and many of those who remain alive followed General Anders in refusing to return to Poland thus marking themselves off from the path of Benes and his followers. The process of freezing out of the old leadership, which in Czechoslovakia occupied the Communists from 1945 to 1948, was already largely completed in Poland with the end of the war in 1945 since the old leadership was dead or in England.

Partly because the Polish Army was more quickly, completely, and effectively sovietized than the Czech, partly because of strong military traditions in Polish life, and partly because Poland's military potential is greater than that of any other satellite, the Russians have developed the Polish Army further than that of any other East European country. From the Russian point of view the use of Russian Army officers to man the upper reaches of the Polish Army assures a more satisfactory combination of loyalty and professional skill than could be obtained in any other way. These factors plus the fact that Poland was an Ally and therefore her rearming was at first viewed as legitimate even by the western powers facilitated a rapid remilitarization of the country. The Polish Army today is a power to be reckoned with.

Our whole sample includes biographies of 152 Polish generals. From these we have drawn a special sample of those who served or were available for service in the 1945-1952 period. This sample consists of 71 generals, who in turn break down into the following groups:

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14 generals who refused to return to Poland at the end of the war

5 who returned but have not been mentioned since and presumably were not admitted to the new army at all

18 officers of the prewar army who returned to Poland and served but were eliminated from the new army between 1947 and the present

4 officers who returned and apparently have been able to stay in the army up to now[15].

3 new Communist generals who have been purged

14 new Communist generals who have retained positions of influence in Poland, most of them, however, not in the army

11 Red Army officers who have been transferred to the Polish Army

B. The Polish Army to 1945

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In the years before World War I there was no Polish state. Thus the army officers of the postwar state were generally men who had received their initial training either in Austria, Germany, or Russia. Of the 100 generals in our full sample who served in pre-Communist Poland (all born before 1901) 40 were born under Austrian rule, 38 under Russian, and 8 under German. Although born under the rule of these three countries, they had a consciousness of their Polish national affiliation, and before 1918 many of them belonged to patriotic nationalist groups aiming at freeing the fatherland such as the Polish Riflemen's Union.

The outstanding nationalist leader of that period was Marshal Joseph Pilsudski. In 1914 he mobilized the para-military Polish units into a brigade to fight at the side of the Austrian Army against the Russians. In 1916 the Austrian government demanded of Pilsudski that his brigade take a loyalty oath. This demand was refused by Pilsudski and his staff and consequently many of the officers were charged with treason and put in Austrian military jails. Later they were released and the exploits of Pilsudski and his brigade in the Polish Legion of the Austrian Army grew into a national legend. By the end of the war in 1918 he and his staff formed the nucleus of the new army of the young republic. To this group were added some officers born and trained in Russian-occupied Poland and a very small number born and trained in German-occupied Poland.

These three elements—slightly heterogeneous but all patriotic Poles speaking the same language and reared in a traditional atmosphere of revolt against their respective partition powers—formed the highest level of the interwar Polish officer corps. Nearly all of them took part in the Russo-Polish War and led by Pilsudski they saved Warsaw from Russian occupation in 1920.

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At the end of the Russo-Polish War fierce party conflicts and disagreements characterized the Polish political scene. Pilsudski, who

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opposed the political parties, wrote from retirement defending the 701 point of view that the army and its officer corps represent the nation's 669 most treasured heritage and are independent of political power holders. The army, he argued, should not have to take orders from the Minister of War, who would necessarily be a politician. When the domestic situation in 1926 reached a nadir, Pilsudski staged a comeback with his famous march on Warsaw. Within three days, supported by regiments still loyal to him commanded by his followers, Generals Zeligowski and Rydz-Smigly, Marshal Pilsudski was in power again. He nominated a new cabinet with himself as Minister of War. While some of the officers who had influence in later years such as Generals Anders and Kukiel, fought against the Pilsudski coup, most of the top officers of the 1930's were part of the tightly-knit group that followed Pilsudski and rose to power with him.

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The cohesive officer corps of the interwar years not only shared 701 a set of common experiences and political identifications; they also had a common social background. They generally had a higher education. Out of fifty-eight interwar generals in our sample only six stopped their schooling at the secondary level and twenty-six had been to a civilian university. The large majority came from upper or middle class homes. Their fathers were often professional men or landlords. Many belonged to the nobility or had wives of aristocratic birth.

It was from this elite and cohesive officer corps that the government-in-exile in London drew its general officers although it should be noted that Sikorski, the head of the exile armies, purged a considerable number of former Pilsudski men. While the government-in-exile drew its military leadership from this prewar officer corps, only a small proportion of the total was available to it, for the toll of the Second World War was enormous. In 1939 there were 19,731 officers in the Polish Army not including reserve officers. Of these the large majority, perhaps as many as 17,000, became prisoners of war either of the Germans or of the Russians. Many of these were never heard from again. Something like eight thousand Polish officers disappeared in the Soviet Union during the war. Forty-three hundred of these can be accounted for as having been murdered by the Russians at Katyn. Thousands of others simply disappeared. Later in the war when Russia was no longer an ally of Germany but rather an "ally" of Poland, the Soviets permitted the remaining imprisoned officers to leave Russia to join the Allied fighting forces. Only a very few could be found alive to do so.

Of the few thousand Polish officers who were not imprisoned early in World War II, the majority went underground and participated in partisan warfare. Many of them succeeded in escaping into exile to serve with the Polish forces abroad.

From this limited group, later supplemented by the few survivors

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* 701 released from Soviet prison camps and still further supplemented by officers released toward the end of the war from German prison camps and by officers rising from the underground, the armies of the Polish government-in-exile were built. These forces numbered a couple of hundred thousand and their combat record was excellent. The first corps was based in England and included fifteen squadrons in the Royal Air Force as compared to twelve French, four Czech, etc. The second corps fought in Italy under the command of General Anders.

Our sample contains fifteen general officers of these forces. Out of the fifteen, six had been generals in prewar Poland. Four of them had been cavalry officers, a branch which in the interwar Polish Army was aristocratic in composition and prestigeful in status. If the group of officers in exile differed at all from a cross section of their colleagues who spent the War in prison or in Poland, however, it was only in being somewhat younger and more vigorous. Only two in our sample of exile officers had played a leading role in the Pilsudski group since their median age in 1939 was only forty-seven. In World War I and even 1926 they were young officers not yet in the inner circle. At those times they were, however, already launched in their careers and thus had had extensive combat experience in World War I, in the Russo-Polish War and in other military events of the time.

* C. 1945

701 *648 As in Czechoslovakia, this well-trained, loyal, and experienced officer corps of the government-in-exile did not become a significant factor in the new army. Unlike in Czechoslovakia, their exclusion occurred at once and partly on their own initiative. The Benes government-in-exile made every effort to appease the Russians. The Polish government-in-exile with the events of Katyn still fresh in its memory was neither so tractable nor so unrealistic. This is not the place to go into the complex history of the wartime struggle between the Mikolajzek government in London and the Lublin government formed by the Soviets. While a formal amalgamation was forced by the Allies, the Communist future of Poland was sufficiently clear in 1945 so that General Anders refused to return. He asked of the British government and was granted the right of resettlement within the British Commonwealth for the Polish army-in-exile of about 200,000. Some of these soldiers including a few high officers decided to return to their homeland to try to live under the new Communist regime, but the bulk of the military leadership of the wartime Polish Armies in the West remains in exile to this day. Thus the Polish Army began the process of sovietization at approximately the point of discontinuity with the past reached by the Czechoslovak regime at the end of the 1948 coup.

It is worthwhile comparing the generals who refused to return to Poland with those who did go back or who stayed in Poland. It is

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also interesting to compare those who returned and were accepted at least temporarily into the army with those with whom the Communists would have no truck. The esprit de corps that arose from belonging to an organized force with strong traditions and cohesion seems to have been a major factor fostering a refusal to return. Wartime groupings persist today. Those who served in the Polish Army in the West tended to stay in the West while those who spent the war years in prisoner of war camps were more likely than their colleagues to attempt to make peace with the Communists. The underground fighters, of course, found themselves in Poland rather than having to return. Furthermore there were two underground armies. The officers who had been members of the Communist underground naturally stayed in Communist Poland. So did some officers of the larger anti-Communist underground such as Tatar, Kirchmeyer, and Herman, but many leaders such as General Bor escaped Communist Poland and are now in exile. Those officers who spent the war years fighting in one of the three Polish divisions formed by the Russians on the Eastern Front were likely to stay in Communist Poland and were generally sufficiently acceptable to remain active in the new regime. Our sample is small, but it at least suggests these important differences in response to the new regime according to the individual's World War II associations.

TABLE 4

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Comparison of Returners and Non-returners

Main activity during war

	P.W.	Under-ground	Fought on E. Front	Fought on W. Front	Don't Know	Total
Returners						
Died or played no role after return	2	-	-	1	4	
In army then purged	7	5 1/2*	-	4 1/2*	1	18
Still in army	-	-	3 1/2*	1/2*	-	4
All Returners	9	5 1/2*	3 1/2*	6*	5	29
Non-returners	2	2	-	8	2	14

*In a couple of cases a man's activity was fairly evenly divided. One man was for fairly equal periods in the underground and then in the London Army, and another was in the Russian-sponsored and London Armies.
These two men are assigned 1/2 to each.

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Another factor associated with the decision to return or not was the branch of military service in which the officer had made his career. Again our sample must be used with caution because of its small size, but it is suggestive. Five out of seven cavalry men in our sample, remained in exile. On the other hand, those who had been closely associated with the prewar general staff tended to return— eight out of eleven. All the artillery men in the sample also returned. It is not possible to give a definitive explanation of these facts without knowing the inside history of the intrigues, factions, and personal ties which differentiated one group from another in the prewar Polish Army but it will be noted that the results do correspond to a set of similar ones which recur at other points in our data. Those segments of the old armies with the strongest traditions of personal leadership, of combat heroism, and professional pride— such as the aristocratic cavalry— resisted the Communist take-over process most strongly. On the other hand, the Communists were better able to temporize with those segments of the armies most concerned with industrial technology and also with those segments concerned with administration and politics. It was in the latter groups that they found a few collaborators and which they favored.

D. The Army of Communist Poland 1945-48

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Most of the experienced officers who returned to Poland at the end of the war were taken into the new Communist Army but did not last long. They were purged between 1947 and 1951. Perhaps the luckiest ones were those who were never taken in or who were purged early, for at first the Communists simply retired their victims. Later they were likely to try and execute them.

Our sample includes twenty-nine officers who returned to Communist Poland. Five apparently were not admitted to any postwar military career. Eighteen had such a career for a while and were then purged, and four appear to still hold office. Two died natural deaths.

The distinctive characteristics of the group which was never allowed into the military hierarchy of Communist Poland were age, rank, and identification with the Pilsudski clique. All of them were fifty-four or over in 1945;[16] four of them had been prewar generals; three had been prominent Pilsudskians.

In our sample of generals who could have been active in the period since 1945, there are nine individuals prominently identified with the Pilsudski group. Five of those were among the ones who refused to return to Poland at the end of the war. Three returned to Poland and played no role in the military life thereafter. Only one of those whom the Communists used in the Polish Army for shorter or longer periods after the war was identified by our researchers as associated with the Pilsudski group.

The officers who were permitted to resume their careers in 1945

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were of less exalted rank, younger, and with fewer Western contacts. The majority had been colonels in 1939 (thirteen out of twenty-four). The larger number had not served with the Polish Armies in the West. Seven were liberated from prisoner of war camps, and five had been in the underground throughout the war. Only five had served in the Anders armies. In addition, four had served in the Soviet-sponsored Polish Armies. These are the only four in our entire sample of prewar Polish officers who apparently still remain in office. All those in our sample who joined the new Polish Army upon returning from London, upon returning from prisoner camps, or upon coming out of hiding, have since been purged. Let us now review these purges.

The four most prominent officers— prewar generals—in our sample who were taken back into the new Communist Armies in 1945 were Generals Mieczyslaw Boruta-Spiechowicz, Gustav Paszkiewicz, Jerzy Kirchmayer, and Michal Zymierski. These four illustrate some of the typical experience patterns of prewar officers in Communist Poland.

General Boruta was an infantry officer throughout his career. He volunteered for the Austrian Army in 1914, when he was twenty, and rose from infantry private to captain during World War I. He fought also in the Polish-Russian war. From 1939-41 he was a prisoner of the Russians. Then in 1941 he was released and fought on the Eastern Front for a short while. He was one of the officers allowed to go West and the following year he was in the Middle East. He ended the war as a corps commander in Scotland. After the war he returned to Poland but was dismissed from the army in 1946. At that time he settled as a small farmer in the new territories of western Poland and has disappeared from public attention since then. It was reported in 1951[17] that he was serving in the army again, but in view of the failure of his name to appear in any prominent position this information is either incorrect or he is serving in a minor capacity.

Another officer who was simply released from the new Polish Army was General Gustav Paszkiewicz. General Paszkiewicz was born of good family in 1892 in Russian-occupied Poland. He married Helena Baroness Hartingh. He graduated from the military academy in Vilna and in 1913 became a cadet officer in the Russian infantry. After the First World War he served in an artillery regiment of the Polish Army and later in the infantry again. During the Second World War he served in the West as a major general. When he returned to Communist Poland in 1945 he was given the job of pacification of northeastern Poland; i. e., his job was to disarm and subdue the Polish underground. The units of the Home Army and Underground Fighters who had fought the Germans for Polish independence would not tolerate the surrender of their territory to the Russians and had to be suppressed. He did his job in a most brutal and bloody manner. He manifested his willingness to collaborate with the Communists in

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a number of other ways too. He was a member of parliament in Communist Poland supposedly representing the Peasant party from 1945 to 1948 and he was a member of the presidium of a Communist-front organization, the Union of Fighters for Democracy and Independence. Until 1948 he continued as a lieutenant general. At that time he was apparently released from the army despite the vigorous support he had given the Communist cause. He then received a trivial job in the Ministry of Forestry.

The above officers attempted to make their peace with the Russians even though they had served at least the larger part of the war in the West. The next two prewar generals to be examined served in the underground, one under London direction and one under Communist direction.

General Jerzy Kirchmayer was born in Krakow in 1895. He was first inducted into the army in 1918. In 1939 he was with the general staff, and in that year he was promoted from major to colonel. With the collapse of the Polish forces he became a part of the resistance serving as Chief of Staff of the Warsaw District of the London government's Armia Krajowa, or underground, army. He took part in the Warsaw uprising in 1944. This was the famous episode in which the Russians first called upon the underground to revolt and then halted their troops shortly in front of Warsaw while the Germans decimated the underground forces. As one of the survivors of this early "purge" he joined the new Communist Army in 1945 and was made an instructor in the General Staff Academy. He was promoted first to brigadier general and then major general. He worked with the new government as a publicist. He served with General Paszkiewicz on the presidium of the Union of Fighters for Democracy and Independence. He was even sent as a propagandist to the United States to influence American citizens of Polish origin. His attempts to hew to the line failed too, and in 1951 he was convicted of espionage and treason together with his fellow alumni of the anti-Nazi underground Generals Tatar, Herman, and Spychalski.

General Michael Zymierski had a somewhat atypical career although in its very atypicality it is in some respects representative of the Communist generals. Like General Pavel among the Czechoslovaks he combined a career as a regular army officer with a career as a Communist militant and is in some respects ty[illegible]al of each type. General Zymierski's real name is Lyzwinski. He was born in Krakow in 1890. His brother, a locksmith, was condemned to death for murdering the manager of a book firm. At that time, 1913, he changed his name to Zymirski. The heirs of a Polish hero by that name sued him and in order to save confusion, he changed his name again to Zymierski.

In 1914 he joined Pilsudski's legion and was gravely wounded. Unlike Pilsudski and his followers, however, he did not refuse the loyalty oath of allegiance to Austria in 1917.

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In 1918 he was accepted into the Polish Army and he fought the Soviets in 1920. In that war he advanced to the rank of general. After the war he was appointed assistant to the chief quartermaster in the Ministry of Military Affairs. In 1927 he was charged with taking a bribe and sentenced to loss of rank, dishonorable discharge, and five years imprisonment. Upon release he went to France and worked for the firm of Coty.

When the civil war broke out in Spain he enlisted with the Republic Army and it is at that point that he became involved with the Communists. After the Spanish Civil War he remained in exile until 1939. Then at the very moment that Polish patriots were escaping from Poland to the West, Zymierski returned to Poland. It will be recalled that at this period when Zymierski fled from France, Communists were evading military service in France and justifying the Soviet pact with Germany.

Zymierski offered his services to the Polish underground but he was not acceptable. However, after the Nazi invasion of Russia the Communists started their own underground called the People's Guard in which he became an important figure. Three years later he was appointed its Commander in Chief and also a member of the Presidium of the National Home Council. With the defeat of Germany he became the Commander in Chief of the Polish Armed Forces and from 1945 until 1949 he was the leading military man of Communist Poland.

General Zymierski was allowed to stay in office until November 6, 1949, when he was dismissed and replaced by Soviet Marshal Konstantin Rokossovski. Even before his dismissal he had been merely a figurehead tolerated by the Russians, who made all the important decisions through their technical advisers, but at the end of 1949 when the Russians decided to build up the Polish Army, equipping it with new and advanced weapons and increasing its numbers, Zymierski was fired and relegated to the relatively meaningless position of a member of the Council of State. That position was only the first step toward complete disappearance from public life. At the present time he is in disgrace and has vanished from view.

The history of the officers of the old Polish Army who tried to serve under the Communists is summarized for all intents and purposes in these four cases of prewar generals. Of the twenty-two career officers in our sample who entered service under the Communists, only a very small number were ever given important, policy-making positions and these only for a short while. Among the most prominent are the two we have already noted, Generals Zymierski and Paszkiewicz plus General Zygmunt Berling. In addition one career officer commanded the Navy for a while, two commanded military districts until 1950, two were in indeterminate positions in the artillery department of the Ministry of Defense. Three were division commanders after their return. Three were attachés, one in London

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701 until 1947, one in Washington until 1948, and one in Moscow in 1950-51. Three taught in the General Staff Academy. Two were Chiefs of *648 Staff of military districts. One was in charge of physical training; and one became curator of state race horses.[17a]

661 General Berling is a special case in that, like General Svoboda in Czechoslovakia, he had been the front man for the Communists in organizing a Russian-sponsored satellite force on the Eastern Front. Berling was a pre-1914 member of the Rifleman's Union. He fought in World War I and in the Pilsudski movement in 1926. In World War II he was in the small group of officers who were allowed to survive in Russian captivity. He was among some seventy singled out in 1940 for survival, segregation, and indoctrination in the famous "Villa of Bliss" in the suburbs of Moscow. Along with his fellow survivors he became an officer of the force which General Anders organized in Russia after the Nazi invasion of June 1941. However, when General Anders led that Polish Army out of Russia into Persia in 1942 Berling deserted and joined the Polish Communist units. He was then promoted to general officer rank and played the leading role in organizing the Kosciuszko Division of Poles in Russia in 1943. He commanded the Division and later the First Polish Corps into which it grew. After the War Berling's star waned rapidly. Our latest information is that in 1949 he was commandant of the General Staff Academy. Supposedly he is still a general in some inconspicuous position.

Berling, Zymierski, Paszkiewicz, and the other regular officers who once were important in the Polish Communist Army were birds of passage. Except for the four officers who had served in the Soviet-sponsored forces during World War II, all career officers in our sample were out of any military post by 1951, and two of those four may possibly have also been removed.[17b] The other eighteen career officers in the sample were retired or arrested.

The removals occurred in several stages. Four or five lost their posts in 1947 or shortly thereafter. In none of these cases was the victim publicly disgraced or arrested. In one case he was retired and in the others simply disappeared from view. The same thing happened to the two or three who lost their jobs in 1948. Of these, one, General Modelski, who ~~was~~ attaché in Washington, refused to return when called home. The others simply disappeared from their positions of prominence. Thus during the period of Zymierski's administration the method of ridding the new army of prewar military elements was relatively mild even though the generals eliminated at that period included all of the former government-in-exile officers in our sample of readmitted returners. They constituted five of the nine career officers in our sample definitely eliminated during Zymierski's incumbency.

When Zymierski was removed at the end of 1949 a number of other changes were made at the same time. In fact roughly three hundred officers of all ranks were removed in the six months after Rokossovski

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took over. Rear Admiral Steyer was released and the top Navy commands were taken over by two former Russian naval officers. Rear Admiral K. V. Cherokov is now Commander in Chief of the Navy and Rear Admiral Szylingowski is Commander of the Fleet. Admiral Steyer is apparently still free. Another general purged in 1949 was General Bruno Romiszewski, the prewar chief of the Artillery Department of the War Office. He was not only removed but was demoted from Major General to Colonel and arrested.

The remaining prewar generals in our sample who had not served under the Russians were all removed in one group in 1951. They were charged with conspiracy, espionage, and treason. The generals implicated were Mossor, Tatar, Kirchmayer, Kuropieska, Herman, and Spychalski. All but the last, who was a new Communist officer, were regular officers of the prewar Polish Army.

Thus by the end of 1951 the top level Polish officer corps was virtually a new one with but meagre vestiges of the old officer corps within it. Officers who had fought for liberation in the First World War, against the Russians in 1920, and in the army of the Polish government-in-exile in World War II were no longer to be found. Officers with such background and experience had been eliminated partly by their own choice in refusing to return in 1945 and those few who had chosen to return had by that date been discarded.

E. The New Polish Army

The new Polish military leadership is recruited from four main elements. 1. An insignificant handful of Russian-trained pre-1945 officers converted to the Communist cause. 2. A certain number of Communists trained for military careers in the Spanish Civil War, PW camps, the underground, and similar activities. 3. A considerable number of former officers of the Russian Army who hold all the key positions. 4. Young officers who have been trained in the last few years or are now being trained.

1. We have already noted that the prewar officers and career officers on whom greatest reliance was placed in the period of transition before 1950 and most notably the few who have survived are the ones who were trained and indoctrinated in Russia. We have described the segregation of a handful of officers reprieved from the mass murder of Katyn for future use.

After the War the Communists used a similar pattern of purging, selection and indoctrination on another group of non-Communist officers, the officers of the underground anti-Nazi Home Army. We know very little about this episode, nor what the Communists did with their prisoners. But it is known that when the Russians occupied Poland they arrested non-Communist underground fighters and

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deported many to Russia. There they were thoroughly screened and some successfully indoctrinated. Thus both from the Polish regular army and from the underground, there existed a corps of officers who had been subjected to Soviet indoctrination to which some of them had succumbed.

Even these thoroughly indoctrinated officers have been largely purged, however. Membership in the wartime underground, once a badge of courage and honor, has become a stigma in Communist Poland. The heroes of the underground are never mentioned in the Communist press. The heroic episodes of the resistance are buried in a pall of silence. The ex-members of the underground are watched by the police and are denied promotion. Like ex-aristocrats or ex-capitalists they are pariahs. Lt. Zdzislaw Jazwinsky who flew his MIG to Bornholm and thus escaped, reports that he hid his activity in the underground for he would not have been admitted to the pilot training program had it been known.

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2. The old Communists are also a passing element in Polish military leadership. They have not been eliminated, but as we have seen they have been relegated rather quickly either to civilian functions or to a few relatively subsidiary military functions. Of the twelve Communist generals in our sample who have not been purged, eight are no longer in military positions at all. As of 1953 one was Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a second one director of the press department in that Ministry. One was Minister of State Control, another Minister of Public Security, i.e., in charge of the police, and another chief of militia in that Ministry. Six are members of the Politburo and one is secretary of the Communist party. Another one has been reduced to a minor political position. Four of these eight switched from military to political activities almost immediately after the end of the war and the remaining four fairly quickly thereafter. Of the four who are apparently still in military life three are in the political administration of the army and one in the quartermaster department.[18]

Despite the fact that these "old" Communists are young men, their median age at present being between forty-seven and forty-eight, they are obviously not being permitted to play a major role in Poland's military development, for which role indeed they are not particularly qualified. All of them had some military experience fighting in the Soviet-sponsored forces or (in two instances) in the underground during World War II, and at least two of them fought in the Spanish Civil War. Nevertheless their activities even when they were in the army were largely political. Seven of them were political officers. Two others were in military police work, two in quartermaster work, and two in staff work. It is clear that this element in the Polish Army will not play a significant role outside of their narrow political preserve and is apt to be regarded with considerable resentment by the officers whose professional role is a more normally military one.

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3. The former Russian Army officers are the backbone of the present Polish military leadership. They hold all the top positions outside of the two specialties reserved for Polish Communists and they also hold many positions below the top level. When we identify a person as "Russian" here, we do not mean to imply that he has no Polish background at all. The Russians have often selected Red Army officers of appropriate ancestry or origins to colonize in satellite armies. When we call a general a Russian in this study we mean that he was for a considerable period a resident of Soviet Russia, that he was a citizen of the U. S. S. R., and—most important of all—that he had become a career officer in the Russian Army. We do not include in the category of colonized Russians those persons who fought for the Soviets only in World War II and who lived in Russia for only a few years. We do, however, include as Russians some persons who may claim to be Polish (and in other chapters Hungarian, etc., _mutatis mutandis_) in nationality, birth, or upbringing. It is important to stress this point for some propagandistic sources have left the impression that Russians without pretense are the men who have taken over some satellite officer corps. The situation is, however, a little less simple. The men the Russians sent back are sometimes marginal individuals. For example, they sometimes sent men who were originally Communist refugees from the jails of their home country. They fled to Russia and took up residence there, some as early as 1918. They have now been returned to high offices in their native lands after up to a quarter century of Russianization. They still have a flimsy basis, however, for claiming a satellite nationality. They can sometimes lay claim to satellite nationality in their knowledge of the language, in family ties, in early associations, etc. The language they often speak with a foreign accent either from long residence abroad or because they really belong to some special ethnic group. It is Russian policy to trust members of minorities to dominate their majority neighbors—e. g., Hungarians in Slovakia or Slovaks in Hungary. In Poland the biggest such group is the Ukrainians. Since national frontiers do not correspond to ethnic ones—and have varied at that—it is easy for the Communists to present a Ukrainian as a Pole. It is difficult to rigidly label many marginal persons as unreservedly "Poles" or "Russians."

While the large majority of Russian officers in Poland can make no pretense of being anything but Russian, for some key posts they have culled marginal persons from the Russian Army and planted them in the satellite forces. To take a hypothetical illustration: suppose a Ukrainian grew up in the western parts of Russia before World War I—parts that became Polish in the interwar years—and then was drafted into the Czarist Army; suppose, then, in 1918, he joined the Bolsheviks and served in the Red Army ever after; such a man would now qualify by Soviet standards to be passed off as a Pole. He would speak both Polish and Russian though both with a

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Ukrainian accent, and he would have a home town that was at one time in Poland. Yet he would clearly be a Muscovite Bolshevik in loyalties.

For the bulk of the Russian officers no camouflage is used. They are simply kept out of the limelight. Lieutenant Jazwinsky reports that the normal mode of communication on the job between Polish and Russian officers was that the Russians talked Russian and the Poles answered in Polish. Social conversation was mostly in Russian. Most of the Polish officers picked up some Russian. The Russians sometimes knew Polish and sometimes not. Furthermore the Russians below the top elite (and some were as low as majors) kept their Russian citizenship and military rank. Jazwinski said that as long as they did that they got paid by both armies. Despite these clear indications of a prevailing intent of the middle ranks to treat Polish service as a temporary assignment in a Russian career, key figures were drawn in many cases from the pool of marginal individuals. The Polish forces under Russian control in World War II and the mass of Communist refugees in Russia provided a pool for the recruiting of such a group of officers. It needs to be stressed that this is not a continuing source of supply.

Our sample of nine ex-Russian officers who are now generals in the Polish Army includes the Minister of National Defense and two of the three vice-ministers (the third heads the political administration.) It includes the Chief of Staff, the Head of the Engineers, the Commander of the Fleet, and one of the four District Commanders in Poland. Not included in our sample of biographies, but also former Russian officers, are the men who command the air forces, the armored forces, artillery, etc. Because biographies of less prominent men are hard to obtain the Russian officers on whom we were able to obtain biographies include only two generals in less prominent positions, one an artillery commander and one Chief of Staff of a military district. But it should be noted that general officers of the Polish Army today even below top levels are very largely ex-Soviet officers. They provide for the Polish Army the kind of technically qualified and experienced leadership which in Czechoslovakia was provided by former junior officers of the old Czechoslovak Army. Partly because Czechoslovakia is farther from Russia and so Russians could be less easily passed off as Czechoslovaks but even more because the cadres of the old officer corps were less co-operative with the new regime in Poland than in Czechoslovakia, the source of a technically qualified military leadership had to be slightly different, but in both cases we find that the importance of military experts is fully recognized and that military leadership is being given to military men, not to amateurs.

4. Two possibilities exist for the future. One, and the more commonly predicted one, is that the Polish military leadership will be totally absorbed by the Russian Army and no pretense will remain

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that the Polish Army is an independent force. That is likely to happen only if the Russians eventually decide on a policy of total absorption of Poland or the satellites into the Soviet Union as Soviet Republics. The other and more likely alternative is that the Russians intend eventually to replace the present officers by a new generation of Soviet-trained Poles. 701 * 648

Since the new generation of Soviet-trained Poles are still young men in the lower and middle ranks of the officers' corps, we cannot get a clear picture of the long-run Soviet plan from an analysis of the generals. The surmise that the Russians plan to develop a new satellite military leadership from the postwar officer candidates is based primarily upon the tremendous emphasis they place on training. The Polish Army, as all the satellite armies, has focused more attention in its publications, regulations, and plans upon educational and training programs both technical and political than on any other aspect of military life. A pre-military training corps for youth has 702 been organized as has been done in each of the satellite countries. There has also been a proliferation of new institutions for higher military education since 1950. The founding of an Academy of 874 the General Staff (named after General Karol Swierczwski), a technical military academy (named after Jaroslaw Dabrawski), and a political military academy (named after Felix Dzierzynski the Polish founder of the Russian secret police) were all decreed on March 22, 1951. These schools are for advanced training of selected officers. Below them are two less advanced types of officer schools. There are basic schools for officers' training and advanced schools for higher functions. Then the cream are sent to the academies. In 1952 Kultura listed twenty-seven military schools in Poland.[19]

The elaborate training program for a new generation of Polish 707 fliers has recently been fully described by the two courageous pilots 702 who escaped to Denmark in their Migs.[19a] Lt. Z. Jazwinski, a young man of twenty-two, who described his experience to the present author, had been a member of the underground in Warsaw at the age of fourteen or fifteen. He was wounded in the Warsaw uprising. After the war he entered a gymnasium from which he graduated in 1949. He then went to work in a radio factory to earn a living. At the same time he took evening courses in radio, but all along his ambition was to get into the air force. He had applied in 1948 and at that time was rejected. He volunteered again in 1950 and was accepted.

To get accepted he had had to make a record that from the point of view of the Young Communist League (the ZMP) was impeccable. The ZMP plays a major role in the process of officer selection, particularly for the air force and other elite branches. In fact, in July 1952 the ZMP officially "took over leadership of the Air Force." That is to say their role in the selection of the most suitable young people for the air force and the airplane industry was then formalized.[19b] It goes without saying that Jazwinski had to have been a

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707 member of the ZMP. That, indeed, was his reason for joining. In
702 the factory he was also a member of the trade union. Intense activity in these groups, however, was not required. It was enough to be a member; selection was not limited to active officers or leaders.

Among the candidates who applied for pilot training only a small number were admitted. The number runs between 5 and 7 percent and never goes higher than 10 percent. Among the criteria of selection, social background comes first and also absence of any such political disqualification as relatives abroad or former membership in the underground. Good health is also a major consideration. Finally, candidates take a theoretical and political examination.

Those volunteers who were rejected for the air force or the navy (the most prestigeful branches) were generally offered a chance to enter another officers' training program such as those for infantry, artillery, radio, communications, transport, quartermaster, engineers, cavalry, and political officer training.[19c]

707 The pilot training oourse for which Jazwinski was admitted took two years. During the first three months the candidates undergo
702 basic training and a life that is miserably hard. They exercise out
208 of doors in the middle of the winter in bathing suits. One day they were compelled to run 10 kilometers in full packs and gas masks. Food was bad and the work so hard that there was no time to write a letter. During this period they are supervised by infantry corporals

Those who survive this ordeal then enter three months of theoretical training, at the end of which they begin to learn to fly. They learn to fly a number of types of planes and take political as well as technical courses. They must pass examinations on both sets of subjects. The political information they learn more or less by rote and stock answers are required. However, the grades are taken seriously and make a good deal of difference to the candidate. He cannot be promoted if his grades on the political examinations are poor. A "C" on a political examination is more serious than a "C" on a technical one. The candidate must be able to answer such questions as: What Lenin said at the 10th Party Congress, what Stalin said at the latest Party Congress; questions on the history of the Russian Communist party; questions about Stalin's work; questions about the goals of Communism; questions on how Poland is following the example of the Soviet Union. There were no questions on Polish history before 1945, but students were expected to know such things as where the first Polish Government was formed after the war, who was the first prime minister after the war, and so forth. They had to know the official versions of the lives of Stalin, Beiruth, Dzierzynski, and Trotsky.

707 In addition to the grades on the political exams, candidates are constantly being rated by their associates. Everyone who deals with
702 a candidate must fill out forms concerning his behavior. These are filled out by political officers, commanding officers, instructors,

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etc. In addition, there is secret reporting by informants, but who does that the candidate seldom knows. 707

702 While life eases up after the first three months, it remains quite strenuous all through training school. Those who have gone that far are strongly motivated to fly. The students, Jaswinski believes, are so eager that the rigors of the program do not dismay them. They regard it as hard and occasionally when exhausted will give vent to anger, but in all probability would ask for more rather than less training in the field of their choice. Flying is their number one subject of conversation after the inevitable subject of girls. *

For two years the candidate looks forward to nothing but his commission. 701 The students do not even talk about the long-run prospects 707 of their future careers. It seems enough at that stage to get the commission which is so hard to earn and which carries so much weight. When the officer is commissioned his whole life changes. He becomes a member of the elite. The food he gets is excellent and the housing very satisfactory. At first a young officer sometimes has to share a room with another, but soon each gets a room to himself. Pay is at a level comparable to that of a cabinet minister, and the pilots carry the prestige that officers have always had in Polish life.

Political training continues, but is now reduced to two hours a week during which the officers listen to informal talks. These are no longer important since the officers are not working for grades, but attendance is required.

The best of the officers are given an opportunity to attend the Air [874] Force Academy in Moscow. (Unlike most branches the air force has no academy in Poland.) Not all the officers given this chance will accept, since acceptance requires a further postponement of marriage for several years and a lot of theoretical training instead of flying experience.

Training at the Academy does not affect an officer's promotion prospects in the short run, but it may have a great effect upon his ultimate rank. The few percent who get a chance to go to the Academy may expect to be promoted to captain after their return. In the meanwhile those who stayed at home have been in active service and during the same period would probably have been promoted also. However, only those who had been to the Academy could reasonably expect to be promoted beyond the rank of major later on. *

This whole pattern of training which exists not only in the air 701* force but in each branch of the armed forces is predicated upon the 648 belief among the trainees that they have an unlimited future in their military careers. At the present time, there are few Polish officers in the higher ranks. The higher commanders are, as already noted, officers borrowed from the Russian Army. After Rokossovski completed his reorganization, fully 90 percent of the leading posts in the Ministry of National Defense were given to officers with Soviet experience.[19d] All army commanders and district commanders are

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Soviet officers. But the level at which Soviet officers are found goes much lower than that. In a typical division the captains and lieutenants will be Polish; any general and the colonels will be Russian; majors may be both. The training program is obviously predicated upon the presupposition that new Polish officers will soon reach considerably higher ranks than is now common. While it may occur to a Westerner to wonder whether this is a Russian propaganda promise that will be soon broken, this apparently has not occurred to the eager and ambitious young Polish officers. The more energetic of them are convinced that there is no ceiling to their promotions and that the Russian officers are there temporarily. Indeed Jazwinski reports that during the period of his own training he saw the level of positions filled by Poles gradually rise. Polish instructors were beginning to replace some of the Russian instructors. Thus at the time Jazwinski left he would consider it normal to find at a training airfield only a couple of Russians, a commandant, and perhaps a deputy. At an operational base, however, there would normally be eight Russians to a division, including the commander of the division, the chief of engineers, three regimental commanders, and three regimental engineers. In his own division however two of these eight were Poles. Furthermore, Jazwinski believed that officers returning from the Academy in Moscow (most of whom were very well impressed with the excellence of their training) could expect appointments as regimental commanders.

The Russian plan may be for a gradual transition to an army commanded by an increasing number of new Polish officers, but we may well question how far their plan can create new men who are both loyal and skilled. In the presence of historic national hostility how far will the Russians be able to trust the new generation of Polish officers? The flight of Lieutenants Jarecki and Jazwinski and other patriotic Poles makes it clear that there are limits to the powers of Soviet indoctrination even when coupled with all the privileges and opportunities given the selected elite. But Lieutenant Jazwinski's own report helps us put this conflict of loyalties in proper perspective. Jazwinski reports fairly good relations between the Russians and Polish officers. The Russians are not ostracized as were the Germans during the last war. The difference in rank between most Polish and Russian officers limits the amount of social mixing, but Russian officers in general are judged as individuals. All the officers, both Polish and Russian, and their wives live in special apartment houses set aside for them in the town near the airfield. Social relations generally take place within the apartment house and within the officer group. There is little contact with the town. To the extent that differences in rank do not prevent it, officers of both nationalities meet at the same dances and affairs.

The Russian officers, while mixing with the Poles on a relatively good inter-personal basis, seldom adopt Polish nationality. A cer-

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tain number of them who drink or run into other difficulties are sent back to Russia. It is too early to know whether there will be a regular rotation for officers whose performance is satisfactory, but for the moment Russian officers in the Polish army since they are paid twice have a strong incentive to remain Russians.

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To the extent that living relationships are an index, it is clear that the carefully selected, trained, and highly rewarded younger generation of Polish officers are not in a state of constant incipient rebellion. On the other hand, they are undoubtedly patriotic Poles. Normal feelings of nationalism will undoubtedly persist among them, and when the opportunity comes, many will follow the lead of such courageous defectors as Jarecki and Jazwinski and show the hollowness of the Soviet hope for a generation of thoroughly loyal servants. But as long as a favorable environment for national liberation does not develop, the Soviets can probably count upon the utilization of a growing cadre of trained Communist career officers. To the extent that the Russians have or believe they have such a cadre, leadership will pass increasingly to them. When these young men, trained in the period since 1945, become sufficiently mature there may well be a drastic shift in the Polish military elite. It is unlikely that the shift will take the shape of a traditional Soviet purge. That is unlikely because the present leaders who will be recalled and retired are Russian and the Poles will not be permitted such an insubordinate action as a purge of Russians. However, many Russian officers will undoubtedly be quietly recalled to their homeland and others will be retired, though a leavening of Russians will undoubtedly remain. Just how this process will work out we cannot say, and it will undoubtedly involve changes in plan and friction between groups. How far the process will go will undoubtedly depend on how far the Russians find they can trust the young Communists they are training.

F. Some Sample Biographies

1. Some Muscovites

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The most prominent example of a Muscovite officer is Marshal Konstantin Rokossovski, Minister of National Defense and Vice-Premier of Poland. He was born in what is now Poland in 1896. His father was a locomotive engineer who died in 1904. He himself worked in a hosiery factory and as a stone cutter. In 1912 he was arrested in connection with a socialist demonstration and strike. In 1914 he was drafted into the Russian Army as a private. He joined the Bolshevik forces immediately after the revolution and made his career in the Red Army from then on. During the Civil War he was a cavalry commander. It is reported that as a result of the purge in 1937-38 he was retired or confined to quarters but was later released. By June 1940 he was a major general in the Red Army's armored units. His rise during the Second World War was dramatic especially as

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commanding officer at Stalingrad. In 1944 he was made Marshal in the Russian Army and in 1946 he was a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. This "Pole" was sent to Warsaw in 1949 to become Minister of National Defense and a member of the Politburo of the Communist party.

The significant thing about Rokossovski's appointment was not that it signaled much increase in Soviet infiltration of the Polish Army. Most of the other key positions were already held by former Red Army officers. The significant things about Rokossovski's appointment were (1) that it carried through the general satellite pattern of putting a very high-ranking promiment and trustworthy Communist in command of the satellite force in preparation for a major build up of it and (2) that it gave prominence to a man whom everybody knew to be a Russian. Until that time the Russian officers had been confined to posts somewhat less in the public eye although of great importance.

For example, the second most important officer in Poland was Army General Wladyslaw Korczyc, Vice-Minister of National Defense and Chief of Staff. He has held this position continuously from 1945 until the present. Despite his high post we do not know a great deal about his life history. He was drafted into the Russian Army as a private in 1914. By 1921 we find him in command of the Red Communard's Officers School in Moscow. It is not clear whether he was commander of the international unit of the school or of the entire school. The trainees in this school co-operated with a Red Army cavalry brigade in combat against Cossack forces in the Civil War. We do not know what General Korczye did in the years until World War II. By implication of some statements in his own writings, it seems that he was not engaged in the Spanish Civil War. He next appears as Chief of Staff of the Russian-sponsored Polish First Army in 1943 and as Commander of this army at the time of the capture of Warsaw in 1944. It will be recalled that this capture was deliberately delayed to permit the decimation of the Polish underground forces. For his part in this action, called the "defense" of Warsaw, he was decorated in 1945 by President Bierut of Communist Poland with the Cross Virtuti Militari Third Rank. He also became Chief of Staff of the Polish Army and was raised to the rank of general. The only indication about his origins is his name. Korczyc is a typical Polish peasant nobility name. The peasant nobility was the lowest stratum of gentry, who worked their own soil.[20] Korczyc has been on the editorial board of Bellona, the Warsaw military journal,[21] and he has written a number of articles including such items as "Main Aspects of Soviet Operational Art."[22]

The second Vice-Minister of National Defense is Army General Stanislav Giliarovich Poplawski. He succeeded General Karol Swierczewski (General Walter of Spanish Civil War fame) when the latter was assassinated by Ukrainian patriots. General Swierczewski, the

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son of an industrial worker, had been born in Warsaw in 1896 and evacuated, along with the entire Gerlach Optical Instrument Factory where he worked, to Russia proper in 1915. In 1917 he volunteered for the Red Army. Under General Korczyc he was political commissar of the school of Red Communards. From 1924 until 1927 he was trained at the Frunze Military Academy and continued to serve in the Red Army. During the Spanish Civil War he fought in the International Brigade commanding the Fourteenth Brigade. After Franco's victory he returned to Russia and was assigned to lecture, giving accounts of his experiences in Spain. During World War II he commanded the Second Polish Army under Soviet auspices and from 1945 to 1946 commanded the Poznan Military District. He then became Commander of all Polish Military Forces and Vice-Minister of National Defense. He was assassinated on March 28, 1947, when ambushed on a tour of inspection.

His place was taken by the present incumbent, now called Inspector of Combat Preparedness and Vice-Minister. General Poplawski had up to that time been Commander of the Wroclaw, or Third, Military District. He had come into the Polish Army from the Russian Army, in which he had been promoted to major general on February 14, 1943. In the Polish forces during World War II he was the Commanding Officer of the First Army on the Eastern Front.

The artillery, the engineers, the air force, and the navy, as well as other branches and departments, have also been commanded by a succession of former Russian officers. General Jerzy Bordzilowski, Commander of the Engineering Corps, was promoted to major general in the Russian Army in 1942 and lieutenant general of Engineers in July 1945. Rear Admiral Szylingowski, Fleet Commander (under Rear Admiral Cherokov, Naval Commander in Chief) served as a Soviet adviser from 1947 to 1949 but then became himself commanding officer. General Bolesdaw Czerniawski, one-time commander of artillery but recalled to Russia in 1948, was made a major general in the Russian Army in August 1942, and presumably has reverted to service in the Russian Army. Major General Aleksander Romeyko, one-time commanding officer of the Polish Air Force, has also been recalled to Russia. In this case the recall was somewhat more artfully managed. He was sent ostensibly as air attaché to Moscow in 1951, at which time another Russian officer, General Turkel, arrived to take the post.

2. Some Party Militants

It is clear that almost all the major policy-making positions are filled by Russian army officers. There are, however two exceptions, one important and the other less so. Both the Quartermaster Corps and the political administration of the army seem to be the reserve of the old Communists rather than of technically trained but not nec-

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essarily political Russian generals. The first quartermaster general and a Vice-Minister of National Defense was Brigadier General Piotr Jaroszewicz. He was not a military man. He was born in 1910 and until 1939 he was a public school teacher in Poland. Under German occupation he took part in the Communist underground and in 1942 was Chief of Staff. Then in 1943 he joined the Polish forces under Russian sponsorship, being a political officer first with the Kosciuszko Division and then of the First Army. He ended the war as a colonel and after the war was sent to the school for political officers in Warsaw. In January 1946 he was raised to the rank of General of the Brigade and later major general. In the meantime he had become Vice-Minister of Defense, switching from responsibility for political education[23] to responsibility for war industry[24] and finally to responsibility for the quartermaster department. Shortly thereafter, he shifted his field of activities from technical military matters to political matters and on November 21, 1953 became one of the eight Vice-Premiers of Poland.

He was succeeded as quartermaster by Brigadier General Jan Gorecki, who held the post of quartermaster general from 1947 to 1950. He was born in 1915 of a Jewish family and went to the Jagellon University in Krakow to study law. During World War II he fought in the First Infantry Division of the Soviet-sponsored Polish Army and then was second in command of an artillery battery. He rose rapidly from that position and in 1947 was promoted from being a Deputy to the Third Vice-Minister, Jaroszewicz, to become himself quartermaster general.

In 1950, after Rokossovski took over, Gorecki was succeeded by another old Communist, but one who had spent about two decades in Russia, General Waclaw Komar. General Komar was born around 1905. His origins are relatively little known, although we do know that he was a Communist for many years and some reports say that he comes from a worker's family and was arrested several times. He rose to prominence in the Civil War in Spain, where he was known as Colonel Wacek and was one of the associates of General Walter-Swierczewski. He headed a two-battalion group in the International Brigade. It may be that Komar served in the Soviet Army early in World War II, but there is no clear record to this effect. It seems more likely that he was a long-time resident in Russia and had been trained there as a Communist activist. It is believed that he had not been in Poland for any length of time since the middle 1920's. When the Russians formed a new Polish Army in World War II, Komar became the chief intelligence officer. After the war he organized the military Office of Foreign Affairs and also organized international brigades in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania to fight in the Civil War in Greece. These brigades were not used in Greece, however, but were sent instead to Lower Silesia in Poland. He also organized the military Office of Foreign Affairs which was in charge of liaison

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with military attachés, both Polish attachés abroad and foreign attachés in Warsaw. He replaced all prewar officers in posts as attachés by party members. He was thus in charge of a large part of military intelligence work. It may be added that he also had reporting to him security police agents abroad. There is some reason to believe that he was transferred to the post of quartermaster general because Rokossovski wanted only Russians in the intelligence department of the general staff. In March 1953 at the Eighth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Polish Communist Party, the Minister of Security, Radkiewicz, announced that Komar had been liquidated. While we would like to know if his successor is also an old Party militant, we have as yet no information.

It is not hard to see why the Russians left the Quartermaster Corps as Polish domain. In the first place, they may have regarded these positions as something of a sinecure. They certainly did not regard them as major military policy-making posts. More important, however, the members of the Quartermaster Corps deal with the public in a much more direct and dependent way than do other generals. They negotiate contracts, visit factories, and deal with civilians in economic enterprise.

It is still easier to see why the Russians permitted Poles to be political officers. In the first place, political officers must do propaganda and morale work within the ranks of an army which has no love for Russians. The political department, of all branches, needs rapport with the ranks. In the second place, the Soviet professional officers who head the Polish Army probably do not share the Politburo's regard for the political department. Lieutenant Jazwinski reports that the political department was the dumping ground for officer candidates not qualified for other branches. Candidates of peasant origin are pushed into that school on the assumption, widely shared in Eastern Europe, that peasants do not have the endowment and training for branches requiring greater intelligence. The educational requirement for political officers is lower than for any other branch. It is enough to have a primary education. Furthermore, candidates who fail in other programs are often transferred to the political department. Jazwinski referred to ten such cases in the pilot training program.

In the third place, low as other requirements may be, a political officer does need certain inclinations and corresponding aptitudes which are not necessarily those of a highly qualified technician. Some of the Russian officers like General Walter-Swierczewski, were old Communist militants and probably as well qualified for agitational work as any of the present incumbents, but for the most part the Soviet officers are technicians chosen because they combine experience with loyalty to Russia. While political officers need not be technically qualified, they can well use experience in the arts of skulduggery and manipulation. The political department, while it has

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been repeatedly purged, has remained in the hands of Polish Communist politicians.

The first postwar Chief of Political Affairs in the Polish Army was Major General (then Colonel) Wiktor Grosz. He held this position only briefly in 1945, when the army was still under overall Soviet command. He was a journalist by profession, and, according to John Gunther, knows eight languages. He had been director of press activities of the Union of Polish Patriots in Moscow in 1942. He volunteered for the Soviet Army immediately upon the Nazi invasion of Russia and by 1943 became political officer and second in command of the First Artillery Regiment of the First Kosciuszko Division. He was then a major. He rose to the position of Chief of the Main Political Office, but shortly after left the Department of Defense for the Foreign Office, in which he has played an important role since. He was first director of the press department and more recently has been Polish Ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

He was succeeded as the leading political officer by Piotr Jaroszewicz to whom we have already referred and then by Lieutenant General Marian Spychalski. General Spychalski was born in 1906 in Lodz, the son of a railway engineer. He got a diploma in architecture at the Polytechnic College in Warsaw. Already as a student he became involved in socialist activities under the name of Marek. He was a free lance architect for a while and then had a position in the Poznan city government. While there he was Regional Secretary of the Communist party. In 1937 he became assistant manager of the Planning Department of the City of Warsaw. After the outbreak of the war Spychalski went to Lwow, formed close contacts with the Russians, and returned to Warsaw in 1941. He became the first Chief of Staff of the Communist underground organization, the People's Guard, a position which he held until replaced by a more prominent Communist, Joswiak-Witold, who was smuggled back from Russia. He remained on the staff and headed intelligence and counterintelligence work. In 1944 he went to Moscow to assist in the organization of the National Home Council. He joined Berling's Army and became Chief of Staff. He advanced from lieutenant colonel to colonel and in 1945 was appointed first Vice-Minister of National Defense. He was also a member of the Politburo and mayor of Warsaw. As first Vice-Minister he was chief of political affairs. (Later on more emphasis was placed by the Russians on the military value of the Polish Army and the first Vice-Minister then became the one who headed the fighting forces, but at this earlier period the latter was third Vice-Minister, and the Pole in charge of political indoctrination had the title of first Vice-Minister.) General Spychalski soon fell from favor. While he took part in vigorously condemning the deviationist Gomulka in the central committee in 1948, he himself did not last long thereafter. In the same year he was put out of the political department and in the spring of 1949 he was removed entirely from his military posts and

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he returned to architecture and the position of Minister of Reconstruction. The year after that he was expelled from that post and from the Politburo. His attempts at self-criticism were rejected and he was fired and imprisoned for "rightist deviations" and "traitorous negligence."

He was succeeded as chief of the Main Office for Political Education by Major General Mieczyslaw Wagrowski, who had been a political officer in the first Polish Infantry Division under Soviet command in 1942, then in 1945 was military attaché at the Polish legation in London. From 1948 until November or December 1949, when Rokossovski took over, he headed the political work in the Polish Army. Since then, he was chairman of the District National Council in Gdansk and, in 1953, Polish member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea. Rokossovski replaced him in political education by General Edward Ochab, again an old Polish Communist. Ochab was the son of a policeman in Krakow. He worked as a printer and then went to commercial school. His first political interest was in the co-operative movement. From 1925 to 1928 he was an organizer for co-operatives. In 1928 he entered the reserve officers school but at that time he was becoming radical and was dishonorably discharged for political activity. From then on he was active in the Communist party, being arrested in 1930 and again in 1932, when he was sentenced to four years imprisonment. In 1937 he was again arrested and this time sentenced to ten years in prison but was released during the war with Germany in 1939. He then went to Russia and in 1943 turned up as second in command of the Kosciuszko Division and as its political officer. He was, however, only a colonel at that time. At the end of the war he held a number of important posts, being in 1945 first Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Public Administration and then the Plenipotentiary for Regained Territories. In 1948 he became Vice-Minister of National Defense and chief of the Main Political Office of the army until the middle of 1950. At that time Marian Naszkowski took his place and Ochab went into nonmilitary activities, becoming most recently secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist party.

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Naszkowski took Ochab's position as Vice-Minister of National Defense and as chief "Politruk." He came from a well-to-do, conservative Jewish family. His father was a notary public in Lwow. Naszkowski, who was born in 1912, studied law at the University of Lwow and joined the Communist party while a student there in 1935. He was arrested several times prior to 1939 and was finally sentenced to eight years in prison, but like Ochab was released in September of 1939. When the Russians occupied Lwow, he collaborated with them and then in 1941, when Russia was invaded, he joined the Polish forces in the Soviet Union. Like Ochab he was a political officer in the Kosciuszko Division, being deputy commander of the Third Regiment. After the war he became military attaché in Paris and then Ambas-

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sador to Moscow, where he served from 1946 until 1949, at which time he was called back to take charge of the Political Office of the army.

He has recently been replaced by Major General Kazimierz Witaszewski. That fact indicates that Rokossovski is still following the policy of heading the political department by old-line Polish Communists. Witaszewski in his early youth was a textile worker and tinsmith's apprentice in Lodz. He was arrested in 1928, at the age of twenty-two, for distributing illegal literature. He was a member of strike committees in 1928, 1933, and 1936. He was arrested again in 1937 and was elected to the Lodz Municipal Council in 1938. He apparently fled to Russia after the collapse of Poland in 1939. Then he too joined the Polish forces there serving as a political officer. His previous military experience had been as a draftee in 1929-31. After the war he was general secretary and chairman of the Central Committee of Polish Trade Unions, and from 1947 to 1949 Vice-Minister of Labor and Social Welfare. Most recently before being made a major general in 1952, he was chief of the cadre section of the Central Committee of the Communist party.

While the fact that the political department is left to Poles by the Russians might be taken as indicating some contempt for it by the professional officers, a review of the Polish press reveals that that is not the full story. The political department is regarded highly by the regime. The press gives primary play in its military news to the politization of the army. Whatever the Communists' esoteric evaluation of the relative significance of strategy, arms, and morale, their public attention is focused overwhelmingly on the preparation of the mind.

Military affairs continue to receive a considerable play in the press although less since 1948 than before. The present government entertains a lively sense of the important position of the army in the cultural value system of the Polish nation. The tone in which military themes are treated continues unchanged from prewar times insofar as the soldier, whether officer or enlisted man, is presented as a romantic hero.

Political education in the army is a theme which is played up far more than the state of its military preparedness or its function as an instrument of defense. A great deal is said about the new values to which the soldier must become oriented. An important new theme is the role of the officer from the general down as the teacher and protector of the soldier. Much is said about incidents of camaraderie between enlisted men and officers both during the war and after. The humble background and the revolutionary record of the generals is emphasized; on the other hand their military record is not overplayed, and no particular attempt is made to underplay the fact that these are political generals; both their political function and their political background are pointed up.

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The prima facie impression one receives from the press is that the chief effort of the administrative apparatus of the army is directed toward the indoctrination of the army personnel rather than toward direct military preparation. In this connection myth building is taking place around the figures of the generals with lasting organic connections with the Party; the myth emphasizes their political role and background.

Few of the prewar Polish or Russian-trained generals are emphasized. Such few hero-worshipped generals with Russian training as the late General Swierczewski are well established figures of long standing in the military pantheon of communism. On the other hand those prewar Polish generals who, like Prugar-Kettling, are played up, are anything but heroic—they are men of high professional competence and of obscure political background. Not unnaturally, their professional competence is made much of, while little if anything is said about their past or present political and social beliefs and activities or about their personal characteristics. But the press in general rarely mentions the professionals among the generals.[24a] The generals who are played up as personalities and accorded greatest prominence are those who occupy important positions in the Party, while little is said about personal characteristics of the professional soldiers, including Russian-trained men like Korczyc. The chief function of the publicized generals has been and is political education and control over the army.

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IV. ROMANIA

A. Introduction

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The last two chapters dealt with countries which had been in the Allied coalition in World War II. The next two chapters deal with states which joined the Axis against Russia and the Allies. Wartime alignment makes some difference, though less than one might guess, in the postwar development of a satellite's armies. The Soviets felt and behaved in much the same way toward the Romanian and Hungarian officer corps as toward their erstwhile allies, the Czechoslovaks and Poles. They feared and distrusted them all and dispensed with their leaders as quickly as feasible, but they also freely used them for a while.

The Soviets came to terms with the Romanian government in 1944 and promptly proceeded to accept as allies men who until then had been fighting against them on the field of battle. They retained these army leaders in 1945 and 1946 although, as in Czechoslovakia, Communists were increasingly infiltrated into the Romanian Army during those years. Then in December 1947, just over a month before the Czech coup, the Communists took over and started building a Soviet-type army.

While the parallels in developments in all the East European satellites are striking, the former enemy powers differ from the former allies in two respects: a) a Russian army of occupation remained on the spot in official control of former enemy territories, and b) no Western pressure backed the old officer corps and old elite of the enemy state against Russian purging.

a) In Romania and Hungary Soviet troops after the war were an army of occupation. In Poland and Czechoslovakia they were officially not a controlling force.

The importance of this difference should not be exaggerated. Russian troops remained in most of Eastern Europe. They were indeed withdrawn from Czechoslovakia within a few months after the end of the war. In Poland, on the other hand, five divisions stayed[25] ostensibly guarding lines of communication to eastern Germany. In Romania and Hungary, a strong Russian occupation force continued on the spot until after the signing of peace treaties giving the Soviets an effective lever of control. After the peace treaties were signed Soviet troops remained, the justification, as in Poland, being the need to guard lines of communication.

b) In Romania and Hungary, former enemy states, the Russians were under no allied pressure to assimilate the old elite such as the Benes' followers in Czechoslovakia. The West did not demand that the Russians accept officers who fought for the Axis in World War II. On the contrary there was some Western desire for their demobilization. Whatever promises of forgiveness the Russians gave were on

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their own initiative and directly to the Romanian and Hungarian officers themselves, not to foreign powers. In Czechoslovakia and Poland the Soviets were bound by wartime commitments to the United States and Britain to treat with the governments-in-exile and with their forces as genuine and legitimate parts of the new postwar regimes. When the Soviets repudiated these promises and eliminated the old non-Communist leadership from all significant power positions, the Western world was horrified and bitter. There was less Western support for the old leadership in Romania and Hungary. Few objected, for example, when Army General Nicolae Macici, who was held responsible for the cruelty of the administration of Odessa by Romanian occupation, was tried as a war criminal and sentenced to death, a sentence which was then commuted to twenty-five years ~~of hard~~ labor. This was a relatively noncontroversial act, even though he was among the most capable of the Romanian officers and, when Romania switched sides, brilliantly commanded the Romanian forces against the Germans. Many of the Romanian and Hungarian officers, like Macici, were viewed in the West as war criminals or at least as doubtful characters.

Nevertheless the Soviets did use many former officers. In Romania and Hungary, just as in Czechoslovakia, a considerable segment of the old army leadership was retained for a while.

In Romania, the prewar officers are still retained as generals in fairly considerable numbers. In Hungary, as we shall see, they were retained for a while, but few remain. In this respect the current situation in Romania is like that in Czechoslovakia, and the current situation in Hungary like that in Poland. There are a number of reasons for the difference. We have already referred to such factors as traditional national attitudes toward Russia, World War II records, willingness to collaborate, etc. But here we wish to note another factor: social composition. We have already noted the strong aristocratic element in the Polish officer corps. Below we shall note some different but relevant facts about the gentry in the Hungarian Army. In Czechoslovakia and Romania the available army leaderships were less tied to social strata due for Soviet liquidation. In Romania after World War I a deliberate effort was made to make officer careers available to peasants' sons. Stipends were offered making military education financially feasible for persons of modest means. The resulting officer corps lacked some of the group morale of the Polish, for example. For this and other reasons it was also a corps with a rather low reputation for integrity. It was widely asserted that many Romanian officers could be bought. Both the social and the moral characteristics of the Romanian officers helped the Russians find among them men acceptable for their purposes, and so they continue to use them.

B. The Evolution of the Present Romanian Army

From 1941 on the Romanian Army made substantial contributions

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726 *648 to the German military campaigns against the southern regions of the Soviet Union. Numbering approximately thirty divisions, the Romanians first achieved the reconquest of territory which Russia had recently severed from Romania. The Romanian forces were then moved across the Dniester to support the Germans in the successful campaign against Odessa. The Romanian Army was in large measure responsible for the successful siege of Sebastopol and the capture of the Crimea. In the autumn and winter of 1942 an estimated Romanian force of fifteen divisions fought alongside the German troops in the offensive against Stalingrad. Like the Germans, the Romanians suffered extremely heavy losses at Stalingrad, and their military strength on the Eastern Front was never again brought up to the level existing prior to that campaign.

[727] By August 1944 Romania had lost 110,000 men killed and 180,000 captured, though she still had twenty divisions active on the front and nine divisions stationed in the interior of Romania. By that time it had become clear that Germany was not going to win the war and that Romania had chosen the wrong side. The pro-Nazi government of Marshal Ion Antonescu was overthrown on August 23, 1944, by a coup d'état engineered by King Michael. Romania immediately changed sides in the war. The former enemy, Russia, became a military ally and the Axis associates of three years past became enemies. The Romanians faced the immediate task of clearing the country of the more than half million German troops remaining there. This was accomplished relatively quickly. The Red Army was in Bucharest by the last day of August. Then in co-operation with Soviet forces the Romanians participated in the campaigns against the German and Hungarian Armies in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

704 *648 Along with the regular Romanian troops used in these actions there were two divisions of Romanians which had been organized by the Soviets primarily out of prisoners of war and which for some time had already been fighting on the Soviet side. The members of these divisions gave their oath of allegiance to the "new order" not to the Romanian king.[26]

These two divisions were culled from among a much larger number of Romanian PW's. Besides the 180,000 PW's in August 1944, another 280,000 Romanians were seized and sent to Russia thereafter even though Romania was presumably Russia's ally. Of these hundreds of thousands the large majority never returned. A substantial portion of those who did return were the members of the divisions formed in the PW camps. These units were named the Tudor Vladimirescu and Horia-Closca-Crisan Divisions. The former was under the command of Nicolae Cambrea, a lieutenant colonel who had been captured at Stalingrad and who had been won over by the efforts of Ana Pauker and other Romanian Communists who worked in the prison camps. After the fighting on the Central Euro-

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pean Front ended, it became a major factor in the new Romanian 704*
Army. The Horia-Closca-Crisan Division was organized later and 648
did not become quite so important in the War but it also provided
much thoroughly indoctrinated personnel for the Communist regime. *

Another group of ex-PW officers returned long after the war was 701*
over. In 1946 the Communists sent back 500 specially selected and 648
indoctrinated officers. Those 500 officers were led by the then Colonel Victor Draganescu, a career artillery officer who has since become Major General, Ministerial Councillor in the Ministry of Interior, and commander of security troops. These 500 officers were greeted by big Communist-sponsored demonstrations and their return was presented as a token of Soviet magnanimity. Draganescu said, "We express our gratitude toward Generalissimo Stalin, because of his large understanding granted the Rumanian Government in allowing Rumanian prisoners to return even before the conclusion of peace."[27]

Re-trained PW's were thus one major source of Communist officers. Another source was a para-military force organized beginning in the autumn of 1944 by Emil Bodnaras. This was the "Guard of Patriotic Defense." It was equipped by the Soviet Occupation Army from captured German supplies. At the same time a law was passed incorporating all "anti-fascist fighters" into the Romanian Army in a bloc. "Actually the number of Partisans operating in Rumania during the war against Germany had been infinitesimal."[28] They were mainly organized afterwards by the Communists who decided who was to be considered as having been an anti-fascist fighter. Under this law such leading Communist politicians as Emil Bodnaras, Vasile Luca, George Vasilichi, and Ana Pauker became generals.

Another special force which the Communists built was that of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, (for a while divorced from that Ministry and placed in a separate Ministry of State Security, but perhaps now recombined.) The government of the Romanian People's Republic has devoted much attention to these special security forces. Some measure of their importance is revealed by the fact that a couple of years ago the budget for these troops was considerably larger than that of the Ministry of Armed Forces.[29] A more satisfactory index of relative size is troops. The troops under the Ministry of Interior
number at least 120,000, but probably 160,000, while the regular army
was estimated by Tito as 300,000 in 1950, but is probably only 225,000. *

While the ranks of the officers corps were being filled with Com- 701*
munists, regular officers were dismissed en masse after the War. 648
The first purge had already occurred with the coup d'état of August
1944 even before the Communists were involved. The Sanatescu gov- 661
ernment formed at that time was staffed largely by generals who had not been closely identified with the previous Antonescu regime or who, like Generals Radescu and Aldea, had opposed it. The generals

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701 and admirals who had been most intimately associated with Anton-
*648 escu were arrested and several, among them Generals Antonescu,
Pantazi, and Vasiliu, were taken to the Soviet Union, where they
661 were questioned and held until their trials in Bucharest in 1946.

With the end of the War the purge went further. Procedures for elimination of war criminals and collaborators were laid down in 1945 and numerous trials were held in 1946. At the same time the size of the army was being cut and many officers were simply dismissed. The Treaty of Paris in 1946 provided that the total military forces of Romania (including land, air, and marine force as well as frontier guards) could not exceed 138,000. The actual number of troops in active service at one time fell as low as 90,000. These were culled from fifteen regular divisions and two Communist divisions which had fought the Germans. The reduction in force was pushed as an ideal opportunity to get rid of political opponents.

The Communist take-over did not occur without resistance. The years from 1945 through 1950 were marked by a series of successively more stringent Communist demands for control.

668 The first prime minister after the coup was General Sanatescu.
He was not sufficiently acceptable to the Russians and on December
643 6, 1944, he was replaced by General Nicolae Radescu, who had been
known as an opponent of Antonescu and the Nazis and had spent some time in a concentration camp. Radescu, however, was by no means a pro-Communist or a Communist tool and he also lasted only briefly, being ousted on February 27, 1945 at the demand of Vyshinski, the Russian representative in Romania. A few days later a government was formed by Dr. Petru Groza who also had not been a Communist. He was indeed one of the wealthiest men in Romania and had been something of a collaborator with the Nazis, but he was sufficiently pliable to be used by the Russians for a considerable period. It was not until June 2, 1952, that he was replaced as Prime Minister by a top Communist leader, Gheorghiu-Dej. Groza is still a figurehead in Romanian politics under the title of President of the Presidium.

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701 With the formation of the Groza government there came the first
major shake-up in the army command. During the succeeding twelve
*648 months thousands of officers were removed. General Ion Negulescu,
Minister of National Defense, was replaced by General Constantin Ras-
661 canu, a man who had been Chief of the Military Police under the Antonescu regime and later was disgraced and sent home from the front for engaging in black market operations. He ingratiated himself with the Communists by leading the group of officers who forced Radescu out of office.

During 1946 the non-Communist officers showed increased resistance to the sovietization of the army and the country. Toward the end of the year the Communists decided upon a further shake-up. Rascanu was discharged as Minister of the Armed Forces and replaced by General Mihail Lascar, former prisoner of war, who had served in the Horia-Closca-Crisan Division. Before that he had fought well on

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the German side as commander of a brigade on the Russian front. 701 * He was then a major general and was decorated by the Germans with 648 the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and promoted to the rank of General of the Army. Before his capture he was often called the 'hero of 661 Stalingrad.' After his capture by the Russians, however, he co-operated well with them. Lascar served as Minister of Armed Forces until replaced by Emil Bodnaras in the next major shake-up on December 24, 1947. Lascar then became Inspector General of the Army and First Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces, a position which he held until the subsequent shake-up in March of 1950.

Of all these turning points perhaps the most important was that 669 of December 1947, the Romanian counterpart of the Prague coup of a month and a half later. In December 1947 Emil Bodnaras took over and at the same time King Michael was forced to abdicate. That was * the decisive shift in both the political and military spheres. General 701 * Lascar, Bodnaras' predecessor, had been a career officer even if an indoctrinated one. Bodnaras, on the other hand, was a long-time 648 Communist whose military career had ended in disgrace.

Bodnaras was born in the early 1900's in Bucovina. According to the usual story his father was a Ruthenian peasant of Ukrainian background and his mother a German. One of our informants who knew him indicates, however, that that is not so, and it seems that we have here one of the many cases in which interested refugee circles prefer to label current Communist leaders as foreigners rather than admit that their own nationals can be traitors.

In the middle 1920's Bodnaras went to military school and was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1927. From 1927 to 1930 he took an artillery course and in the latter year was promoted to first lieutenant. At the time he became involved in Communist espionage, and when caught fled to Russia. He was tried in absentia for desertion and espionage and sentenced to five years imprisonment. In 1933 he attempted to slip back into Romania, was caught and served the years from 1933 to 1936 in prison. At that time he escaped and again went to live in the U.S.S.R. During World War II Bodnaras was assigned to party organizational and propaganda activities rather than to fighting the Germans. When the war was over, the Communists placed him as Secretary of State in the office of the Prime Minister, a job concerned with the secret intelligence service. He was in this position until the Soviets decided to take complete control of the army and to communize and develop it.

When Bodnaras took over, he brought in a new group of deputy ministers and changed many commands. The end result of his activities to date is a situation in which Communist party militants control the very top positions but quite a few career officers remain in posts just below them. This result was reached in a zigzag course of three stages.

1. The reorganization in the period from December 1947 to 1950

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paralleled what was happening in all the satellites at the same period. The army was reorganized according to Soviet patterns, and supplies and equipment were brought into uniformity with Soviet standards. Instrumentalities were developed for strict political surveillance within the military forces. Provision was made for an elaborate program of political indoctrination and the Guard of Patriotic Defense was integrated in 1949 with the troops operating under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The process of purging hit old Communists, officers of the Tudor Vladimirescu and Horia-Closca-Crisan Divisions, and career officers alike, but it was most vigorously directed against the latter. Still career officers continued to play a role at all levels. It is not clear from our sources whether there were at that time the usual three or perhaps four deputy ministers of the armed forces, but of these three or four deputy ministers two continued to be career officers until March 1950.[30]

2. In March 1950 party militants came to fill all the deputy minister posts and from then until 1952 the emphasis seemed to be on Bolshevisation.

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3. The most recent major shake-up came in April of 1952 when five fliers of the Romanian Air Force flew to Yugoslavia. At that time the discharges hit not only prewar career officers, but also many of the Communist officers. These included the Vice-Minister of the Armed Forces, Major General Constantin Doncea, who is reported to have been executed, and Major General Villiam Suder, Inspector General of the Army and also Vice-Minister of the Armed Forces. Suder then became Minister of the Coal Industry, from which position he has now been dismissed, and he is presumably in disgrace. The military shake-up of 1952 is not well covered in the data yet available outside Romania. We, however, may take the discharge of two vice-ministers as a sign of a rather far-reaching and drastic shake-up at other levels too. The shake-up of late 1952 may well have marked a reaction to the dominance of incompetent politicians in favor of professional soldiers. The refugee Buletinul Militar of October 1953 informs us that "For about 6 months the Communist Party has made big efforts through the Ministry of Armed Forces to recruit career military men who had been previously removed as dangerous. They are promised either directly or indirectly very attractive advantages if they apply for recall in the active cadres of the Army." At the same time Communist officers are apparently being purged, and in typical Soviet fashion the charge leveled at the victims is that of doing precisely what the regime itself is doing. The nature of the regime's policy is thus camouflaged. "Numerous officers converted from civilians by the Party have been found guilty of conniving with career officers. Some of those, guilty of sincerity and naivete, have been thrown into Communist jails."[30a]

Whatever the latest trend, however, the period since 1948 was notable both for the retention of a significant number of career officers

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and for their subordination to a group of Communist generals who in turn took their orders from Soviet officers.

C. The Leading Cadres of the Present Romanian Army

Let us attempt a somewhat more detailed analysis of the two main identifiable groups of present general officers: the career officers and the old Communists.

We have biographies on ninety-one generals who have been in the army at some time since the Russian forces reached Romania toward the end of the last war. Of these forty-four have not been purged as of our latest information. Among these forty-four generals who are still in good repute with the regime, twenty-four are career officers and only twenty are new Communist officers. The reliance upon prewar cadres becomes even more clear when we note that five of the twenty Communist officers are no longer active in military positions but have transferred back to civilian political work and nine are in security posts not under the Ministry of Armed Forces. Thus our sample of Communist militants currently active in army affairs is reduced to six. The table below gives a breakdown of the sample of postwar officers.

TABLE 5

Romanian Generals in the Sample

Career officers who have not been purged	24	
Communist officers who have not been purged	20	
Total who have not been purged		44
Career officers purged in 1944	8	
Career officers purged in 1945	14	
Career officers purged in 1946	5	
Career officers purged in 1947	4	
Career officers purged in 1948	4	
Career officers purged in 1949	2	
Career officers purged in 1950	4	
Career officers purged in 1951	3	
Career officers purged in 1952	1	
Total career officers purged	45	
Communist officers purged	2*	
Total purged		47
Grand total		91
Total career officers	69	
Total Communists	22	

*One in 1952, one in 1953.

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While the ranks of the career officers have been ruthlessly purged, the purging has been selective. What criteria have been applied in selecting officers who have been reprieved and continue to be tolerated even now? The outstanding criterion has been Soviet experience. The Russians have trusted those officers whom they captured and indoctrinated during World War II. Of the forty-four officers who have been purged, only four (i.e. 9 percent) are known to have been prisoners of war. At least nine of the twenty-four officers still in office were such indoctrinated prisoners and at least one more fought under the Russians (i.e. 42 percent). We do not know the complete wartime careers of certain generals in the sample. If we did the contrast might well be still more striking. Within our sample only one career officer still in a position of command can definitely be established as not having been a Russian prisoner of war. Russian experience seems to be the passport of a considerable majority of the career officers whom the Russians have continued to trust in important military posts.

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When we turn to the Communists we also find that Russian experience and Russian affiliations are an important element in advahcement. Of the twenty Communist generals who retain positions of power we know that at least nine have had Soviet experience and regarding the other half we are simply uninformed. Probably many of these have also been in Russia. Four of the twenty Communist generals in our sample are themselves Russians camouflaged as Romanians. Two others were in Russia as Communists and helped organize the Romanian Communist divisions, as did also one of the two purged Communists.

As in Poland, Communist generals are heavily concentrated in the political administration of the army and in the special security troops. The lines between posts reserved for Communists and other posts are not drawn quite so sharply in Romania as they have been in Poland. Four of the twenty-four officers in our current career officer sample have security or police jobs rather than regular military jobs. One, Major General Nicolae Dobre, career artillery officer, is reported to be Chief of Staff of the security troops. A second career artillery officer is Major General Victor Draganescu, ex-prisoner of war of the Russians. He was reported in 1952 to be in command of security troops. One career general, Major General Alexander Petrescu, is president of the political department of the Military Court of Justice. He qualified himself for this job by a record as the outstanding war criminal under the Nazis. During the Antonescu regime he was Director General of concentration camps and also had sentenced several Communists to death. He was dismissed from service in 1944 but one year later he was again president of the political section of the Bucharest Military Tribunal. In that position he presided when the Communists tried Iuliu Maniu, the Peasant party leader.

While these few career men hold jobs in the security field, most such jobs are held by Communists and a considerable number by Russians disguised as Romanian Communists. There are four of the

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Communist generals in our sample who appear to be Russians operating under pseudonyms. These are Lieutenant General Pavel Cristescu, Lieutenant General Gheorghe Pintilie, Major General Vladimir Mazaru, Major General Nicolschi. All of them have been with the Ministry of Interior or Ministry of State Security, but of course carry military titles and command troops. In addition one other general whose nationality is unknown and who may perhaps be a Russian, Major General Bulan, is probably in command of security troops.

The Minister of Interior (formerly Minister of State Security), Major General Alexander Draghici, is a Romanian Communist who has been a party leader since the 1930's and was arrested then for Communist activities. In addition three other Romanian Communist generals command security or frontier troops. Security officers account for nine of the twenty Communist generals still in good favor with the regime and it will be recalled that five others were in nonmilitary political positions.

The remaining six party generals include the Minister of Armed Forces, Emil Bodnaras, and two deputy ministers. Another Deputy Minister has been changed within the last year and we do not know the identity of the incumbent. It would be revealing to know if the last is a party man like his predecessor, Major General Viliam Suder, or a professional.

D. Some Typical Officers

Let us review now some typical biographies of Romanian generals of each of the two main kinds.

1. Career officers

When General Bodnaras became Minister of the Armed Forces he continued at first to fill two of the Deputy Minister posts with career officers. One of them was General of the Army Mihail Lascar, who became Inspector General and first Deputy Minister. He was a retrained prisoner of war whose biography we have already surveyed. In March 1950 he was dismissed in disgrace and was accused of wartime atrocities against Russian partisans on the Eastern Front.

As second Deputy Minister and Chief of Staff, Bodnaras chose another career officer, General Septimus Pretorian. He had been commissioned in 1914 and had risen to the rank of Major General by 1942. During the Antonescu, pro-Nazi regime he was assistant chief of the Secretariat of the Ministry of War. Despite that unpromising background he managed to come to terms with the Communists by helping them in the overthrow of the Radescu regime in 1945 and the establishment of the Communist-controlled Groza government. This service did not render him secure for long. He lasted for only two months as Chief of the General Staff and a year later he was put on trial for bribery, misappropriation of public funds, and embezzlement, and sentenced to twelve years in prison. He was succeeded by General Constantin Popescu, whose first qualification for Communist confi-

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dence was also that he had participated with General Pretorian and a few others in signing the letter against Radescu which forced him out of power. After this act he was appointed Chief of the State Security Administration in the Ministry of Interior, a position in which he had abundant opportunity to prove his cruelty and adaptability to Communist demands and maneuvers. He remained Chief of the General Staff until March 1950, when a party militant took his place. He has since left military activities.

Below the ministerial level career generals continue in such posts as Inspector of Artillery, Deputy Chief of Staff, two commanders of military regions, Commander of the Military Academy, three division commanders, one commander of an army corps, one of an artillery corps, and one of an armored corps, Chief of Staff of the Security Troops, Commander in Chief of the Navy, etc. Our sample of twenty-four includes at least five lieutenant generals.

Typical of the remaining career officers is General Alexander Gavrilescu, Commander of the second military region with headquarters in Bucharest. General Gavrilescu is an artillery officer and a graduate of the War College in prewar Romania. In the fall of 1944 he was Chief of Staff of the Fourth Army fighting on the Eastern Front. When the Fourth Army turned upon the German and Hungarian troops in Transylvania and Hungary, General Gavrilescu denounced the Commander of the Army, General Avranescu, and his own deputy chief of staff to the Soviet Commander of their front, Marshal Malinovski. Both these officers were imprisoned and Gavrilescu succeeded to the command of the Fourth Army.

Two other top career officers in the present Romanian Army are Lieutenant Generals Stere Stefanescu and Iacob Teclu. Both these men are former prisoners of war of the Russians. Stefanescu is now Commander of the first military region with headquarters at Iasi and had been Commander of the second military region before Gavrilescu. He was also an artillery officer in the prewar Romanian Army and took part in the formation of the Horia-Closca-Crisan Division in the Russian prison camps. Lieutenant General Teclu was a colonel when he was captured in 1942. He then served as Chief of Staff of the Horia-Closca-Crisan Division.

It may be noted that most of the present general officers retained from the prewar Romanian Army were colonels until the Communists promoted them. We have information on the pre-Communist rank of ten career officers and of these eight were colonels and only two were already generals. The single most important distinguishing feature of the career officers who remain in the army, however, is the large proportion among them who are indoctrinated prisoners of war.

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2. Communist Officers

When Bodnaras became Minister of the Armed Forces, he immediately put a Communist in as Deputy Minister in charge of the

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Political Department. This is not surprising. It is indeed surprising that the Communists had permitted Major General Mihail Maltopol, a career officer, to hold this position until that time even though General (then Colonel) Maltopol had been a prisoner of war whom they indoctrinated and who joined the Tudor Vladimirescu Division. Still only a trusted Communist could be permitted to head the Political Department so Maltopol was made chief of the Military Museum.

Maltopol was replaced by Lieutenant General Petre Borila, the first of a series of prominent Communists to hold the position of Deputy Minister in charge of the Political Department. General Borila is a Romanian of Russian origin. He participated in the rebellion of Tatar Banar in Bessarabia in 1923-24, and was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. After five years he escaped from prison and went to Russia, where he joined the secret police. He came to Romania in 1944 as an agent of the NKVD with the rank of major. He became an instructor in the Directorate of Education, Culture, and Propaganda. Shortly after Bodnaras took office he promoted Borila to Major General and Deputy Minister. Since then Borila has left military work and his latest known position is with the Presidium of the State Control Commission or in other words, a purger. He was succeeded by Major General Mihail Florescu, Spanish Civil War veteran, who is now Minister of Chemical Industry, then by Major General Gheorghe Stefanescu, and finally by Major General Nicolae Ceausescu, who had previously been Deputy Minister of Agriculture.

General Ceausescu perhaps owes his position to an association with Prime Minister Gheorghiu-Dej going back to the thirties when they were railroaders together. Ceausescu joined the Communist party in 1932 when he was about twenty-nine but had no prominent record of activity until after the war. In 1944 he was a foreman in the Crivitsa engine works of the State Railway. In 1947 he became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist party and in 1948 of the Orgburo. On March 18, 1950 he was given the rank of major general although he had no previous military experience. In 1952 he was promoted to lieutenant general. He is regarded as Gheorghiu-Dej's man and a check on Bodnaras. The power of his position is indicated by the fact that he, not Bodnaras, attended Stalin's funeral.

Altogether there were in 1952 nine generals among the forty-six members of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist party. A typical one of them and one of the most important is Lieutenant General Leontin Salajan, Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces and Chief of the General Staff. According to our information General Salajan is a Hungarian born in Transylvania, his original name being Szilagy. He was a worker having worked both as a cobbler and as a steel turner. At the age of nineteen he became a Communist sympathizer. Two years later he joined the party. In 1926,

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* 701 665 the same year that he joined the Communist party, he entered his military service as an infantryman. Somehow he managed to escape a criminal record in Romania although he continued in Communist activity working in an airplane factory. During the war, if not earlier, he was in Russia though his activities there cannot be determined. After the war he turned up as secretary of the Communist party in the city of Oradea, which is located in the disputed border territory between Hungary and Romania. This section, which was at that time Hungarian, was in fact under the rule of the Red Army. It was returned to Romania after the Groza government was formed and the Soviets were satisfied that they could completely control the Romanian regime. By that time (1947) he was secretary of the Communist party of Salaj County, the province of his birth. In 1949 he became president of the army's Control Commission. In the same year he was also Deputy Minister of Justice and then Deputy Minister of Construction. He had still never been an officer. Then on March 18, 1950, he was made Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces and Chief of Staff. At the same time he was given the rank of major general and was promoted the following year to lieutenant general. In 1950 he was also given the Order of the Defense of the Fatherland. In 1952 he became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist party. According to some reports Salajan owes his ascendance for the most part to his friendship with the Prime Minister of Romania Georghiu-Dej. These sources claim that he is Georghiu-Dej's man, placed as Chief of Staff as a check on Bodnaras. Whether these rumors have any foundation or not, it is clear that Salajan's function as Chief of Staff must be primarily political and not military. A Western observer may wonder how such a man with his meagre knowledge of the arts of war can be Chief of Staff. The reason that Salajan can do without professional military competence is that the real Chief of Staff is not Salajan but the representative of the Russian General Staff for the Romanian Army. That, however, is a solution only for the moment.

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E. Prospects of Romanian Military Development

701 If our analysis of the trends in the satellite armies is correct, we must regard the present situation in the Romanian Army as an unstable and transitory one. Power is shared between a small group of utterly incompetent and unprofessional political Communists at the very top and some career officers who have been indoctrinated by the Communists (largely in PW camps) immediately below them. At the same time Russian officers perform many functions behind the scenes (not as in the Polish Army being openly integrated into the regular normal chain of command). This is not a satisfactory situation from the Soviet point of view either in terms of efficiency or in terms of loyalty. Both the Communist militants and the career officers are lacking in some respects.

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Their successors will be young officers now in training, for in Romania as in the other satellites "the selection of future officers is the primary preoccupation of the regime."[31] The majority of officer candidates are chosen from among soldiers in training though members of the Young Communist League may be admitted directly to officer candidates school. The candidates are chosen above all for social origin, are screened carefully, and are given political as well as technical training. New political officers too now generally come out of this kind of training rather than being directly commissioned from civilian life as in the period up to 1950. The officers training course lasts two years. For more advanced and theoretical training many officers are sent to the Soviet Union.

To some extent this training scheme undoubtedly works to produce effective and reliable officers. A refugee source has admitted that "Officers who have completed the Communist schools are well prepared from the professional point of view and the majority are devoted to the Communist regime. This is due to the fact that a majority are people of low social origins who now have a material situation and social position such as they could not have dreamed of before and who know that if this regime collapsed they would lose all their privileges."[31a]

Perhaps there are more seeds of disaffection than the quotation indicates, but it well portrays one set of facts and the ones on which the Russians are banking. For the moment the Russians are probably far less satisfied with the leadership of the Romanian Army than they are with that of the Polish, and even the Czechoslovak Armies for it fails notably to combine technical skill with political loyalty in a proper amalgam. It would not be surprising for a "conspiracy" to be announced involving some of the highest officers in the Romanian Ministry of Armed Forces. Whether or not the changes take that form, the direction of reform away from the present mixed military leadership toward a more professional young one may reasonably be predicted.

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A. The Hungarian Army in 1945

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The Hungarian Army is one in which generals from the prewar officer corps have almost all been eliminated. The Russians eliminated prewar officers in Hungary partly because they viewed the Hungarian officer corps as pro-German in orientation. Many Hungarian officers were of German descent. It is often hard to trace their German origins, since it became common to Magyarize German names, but a notable proportion of officers had German roots. Furthermore the Hungarian Army was an outgrowth of the Austro-Hungarian Army. At the end of World War I the Imperial Army was divided, Austrian officers joining the Austrian Army and Hungarian officers the Hungarian, but old traditions and associations retained some hold. Feelings of solidarity with Austrian officers even before 1918 had been tinged with ambivalence arising from jealousy and a sense of inferiority. Moreover after 1918 Hungarians put great emphasis on the severance of ties with Austria; they wanted to be independent, vide the changing of names. Yet some potential identification with their Austrian colleagues remained, arising from common background and training.

The strongest factor making for a pro-German orientation in the interwar years was probably Hungarian revisionism rather than inherited tradition. The Germans were looked upon as possible allies in a struggle to recover Transylvania from Romania. As Germany's revisionist stand grew more pronounced under Hitler, the pro-German orientation of the Hungarian Army was strengthened. At the same time the overwhelming strength of the German "ally" aroused great apprehension. Latent fear of the Germans was concentrated among Hungarian officers of non-German stock. German minority members easily became pan-Germanist. Others, especially around the Regent Horthy and in civilian circles, began to see in German power a grave portent.

The conflict between some groups of civil politicians and the army in their attitude toward Germany became clear when Hitler invaded Russia on June 22, 1941. Two days later the general staff recommended that Hungary join the Axis in the war. The foreign office was opposed. At that point the German and Hungarian military authorities announced that the Soviets had bombed Hungarian territory, an episode which may or may not have actually occurred. On the basis of this incident Hungary was forced into the war.

While an ally of Germany against Russia, Hungary's war effort was rather halting and halfhearted. It was considerably smaller than that of Romania. The Hungarians did send two armies into the field the first of which was very small. Ultimately both were completely cut to pieces, the Russians taking many Hungarian prisoners of war.

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Not only was the Hungarian military effort relatively unenthusiastic, so too was the Hungarian adoption of Nazi domestic policies. There was probably more freedom in Hungary during the first years of the war than in any other portion of the Axis territories except Finland. The relative mildness of the Hungarian regime may be seen in the character of its persecution of the Jews. Stringent anti-Jewish laws were enacted in 1938. They were, however, mild compared to those of the Nazis, and there was no systematic extermination until March 1944, when German troops occupied Hungary. A good many army officers with some Jewish blood or with Jewish wives were retired in 1941 or even before, but some few were protected and remained until 1944. While Jews were not inducted into the ordinary units of the armed forces, during the War, neither were they put into concentration camps or gas chambers. They were mobilized into a Jewish Labor Battalion which was sent to the Eastern Front and was there overrun by the Russians, who took its personnel prisoner.

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The relative mildness of the Hungarian regime gave way in 1943 to a brutal fascist dictatorship, when the Sztójay-Imredy government was formed, and even more after the Germans occupied Hungary. The Regent Horthy opposed these developments. When German fortunes in the war declined, he dismissed the Sztójay-Imredy government and tried to duplicate the feat of King Michael by announcing that Hungary was withdrawing from the war against Russia. His attempted coup in October 1944 failed, however, and the Germans put Szalasi in for a few bitter months of totalitarian rule.

The desperate measures of Szalasi and the Nazis were obviously futile by this time, and some leading Hungarian officers went over to the Russians. In October of 1944, Colonel General Bela Miklos, who had been Commander of the First Army, was sent to negotiate an armistice and came to terms with the Russians. Colonel General Janos Vörös and Lieutenant General Gabor Faragho also went over. These generals in Debrecen formed a Russian-sponsored provisional government, in which Miklos was Prime Minister, Vörös Minister of Defense, and Faragho Minister of Supply. While the bulk of the Hungarian officer corps did not follow Miklos but continued to fight, the new government was able to return to Budapest in April of 1945 on the heels of Russian advances.

The Miklos government lasted thirteen months. It and the generals associated with it were used by the Soviets during the critical transition period. In November 1945 it was replaced and its members were all soon arrested. Vörös, the Minister of Defense, was seized in January of 1946 and was liquidated. Miklos died naturally in 1952.

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Miklos, Vörös, and Faragho had all been prominent officers in the pre-Soviet Hungarian Army. Faragho had been military attaché in Moscow in 1940 and a member of the peace mission to Moscow

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701 sent by Horthy in 1944, which experience, however, did not save
k 648 him in the end. The Soviets were willing to work with such a man as long as expediency demanded, but not permanently. Against these favorable facts from the Russian viewpoint was the fact that he had
661 been Chief Inspector of the Gendarmerie in 1943. It may be noted that in prewar Hungary the gendarmerie and state police, which in peace time were under the Ministry of Interior, in war time were incorporated into the army directly under the Chief of Staff. Miklos had been first aide-de-camp to Horthy and was therefore, in the long run, not acceptable to the Communists. Vörös, who had been Chief of the General Staff in 1944, had in that capacity accompanied Horthy on a visit to Hitler. The services which these men performed for the Russians at the end of the war exempted them from immediate removal and in some cases, such as that of Miklos, from execution. But they did not, in the long run, exempt them from removal.

One reason why the officers who went over to the Russians at the end of the war were purged so quickly— more quickly than in Romania— is that they were of relatively upper class origins. One of the factors determining an officer's attitude toward the German occupation, Nazism, and the Szalasi Fascist movement was class origins. It is not accidental that those generals who in the great crisis remained loyal to the Regent and directly or indirectly took part in the frustrated armistice attempt were perhaps without exception members of Magyar gentry families. They included such generals as Lajos Veress, Bela Miklos, Istvan Naday, Gabor Faragho, Geza Lakatos, Sz'lard Bakay, and others. None of them came from the lower-middle classes. Descendants of the lower-middle classes were more inclined to follow a new star, such as that of the demagogue Szalasi and later the Communists, while the gentry in its nationalistic conservatism was opposed to parvenus such as Hitler or Szalasi. Because of their high status and conservatism the generals who rejected Nazism and stood close to Horthy, backing his attempt to end the war, were for the long haul quite unacceptable to the Russians, despite the fact that they had brought Hungary over to the Russian side. No ideological dogmatism prevented the Russians from using them when they needed them. But as men of unacceptable views and a strong independent social standing they did not fit the long-run requirements of the Stalinist system of organizing power, which is based on total control from the center and the elimination of autonomous elites.

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B. The Period of Communist Infiltration

665 As in all the satellite countries, the period between 1945 and 1947 was one of uneasy coalition between the Communists and non-Communist parties. As in each of the satellite countries, the titular heads
642 of the government were leaders of non-Communist parties who fought

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a rearguard action against both the Russian occupation authorities and the Communist party in order to save their country from total dictatorship. The Communists, however, were step-by-step building up bases of action, finding sources of support, and infiltrating key positions in the country.

In Hungary the major party was the Small Holders party. From November 1945, when the Miklos provisional government came to an end, to December 1948, when a clearly Communist government took over, there were a series of governments headed by members of the Small Holders party. The prime ministers were, in sequence, Zolt'an Tildy, Ferenc Nagy, and Lajos Dinnyés. At the same time there was a series of Ministers of National Defense, who were also until September 9, 1948, members of other parties than the Communist. Some of these were high-ranking generals, some were not. As our previous case studies reveal, the Minister of National Defense in the Communist satellite countries (and in those countries also before the Communists took over) was normally a general. There was not the sharp distinction between civil and military authority which is common in some Western countries. It is as unusual in East Europe for the Minister of National Defense not to be the top-ranking general as it is unusual here for him to be so.

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In Hungary, however, that was not the situation. Until September 1948 the Ministers of National Defense, though officers, were chosen in terms of civilian politics as much as for military considerations. The list of Ministers of Defense includes, in sequence: Janos Vörös, Jenö Tombor, Albert Bartha, Lajos Dinnyés, Peter Veres, Mihaly Farkas, and Istvan Bata. Until Veres they were all Small Holders party members. Veres was a member of the National Peasant party and a more pliable tool of the Communists. Farkas was a Communist leader and Bata a Soviet officer. Of these Ministers we have already met Colonel General Janos Vörös, one of the three leading officers in the Miklos group which went over to the Russians at the end of the war. Albert Bartha was also a leading officer who just before his appointment had been one of the three commissioners responsible for selecting officers for discharge as the Hungarian Army was cut to treaty size. On this commission he represented the non-Communist point of view but was consistently outvoted two-to-one in trying to retain career officers and keep out Communists. Bartha had been a Social Democrat in 1918 and rejoined them in 1945. Ferenc Nagy gives an interesting picture of the procedure by which Bartha was chosen Minister. He writes in his memoirs:

> "I still had to appoint a new man as Minister of Education and another in the place of Eugene Tombor, Minister of Defense, who had died . . . My nominee for the defense post was John Erös, until now

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> reparations commissioner . . . I took my list to Sviridov [the Soviet Commander in occupied Hungary]. Sviridov's attitude was as I had supposed. First he protested sharply against my wish to appoint a civilian Minister of War . . . I began to argue with him, pointing out that we had no high-ranking soldier capable of reorganizing the army well. For this reason a man distinguished in public affairs should head it.
>
> "Sviridov began to name a list of generals. I knew well that he wanted me to appoint General Palffy-Oesterreicher, but he did not dare to mention his name to me. Finally, he proposed Albert Bartha, retired general and a Smallholder Member of Parliament."[32]

Bartha lasted from August 20, 1946, to March 14, 1947, when he was replaced by a more pliant leader of the Smallholders party, Lajos Dinnyés. Dinnyés, as we have noted, was soon promoted to Prime Minister, and his place was taken by Veres, the last non-Communist Minister of Defense.

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All this while the Minister of Defense, like the Prime Minister himself, was becoming more and more of a figurehead. Communist officers within his department were acting on their own, taking orders from their party leaders and from Russian occupation officials instead of from their official superiors. A typical episode is related by Nagy:

> "Just before Christmas prime ministry officials received confidential reports that the army's political squad had arrested eight or ten men . . . This political squad, originally established by the Debrecen government to investigate officers who had fled or been forced by the Nazis to retreat to the West, now was headed by the very dangerous Communist, General Palffy-Oesterreicher . . .
>
> "Startled by the report, I called the War Minister to account: 'Are you aware that the political squad in your ministry arrested a number of prominent men?'
>
> " 'General Palffy-Oesterreicher is the head of the division. He has reported nothing,' he answered, 'I too learned of the arrests by accident and was just about to order a report.'
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> " 'Please let me have the details immediately,' I instructed.

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" 'I shall bring General Palffy along and we shall report together,' Bartha replied.

"A few hours later, I was informed that the political squad had taken Dominick Szentivanyi, one of the signers of the Moscow armistice of 1944, and a Minister Plenipotentiary in the foreign office, and another group of officers; my source added the charges of conspiracy had been fabricated . . . In the afternoon Bartha and General Palffy-Oesterreicher called on me.

" 'I understand, General, that the political squad which you head has arrested a number of officers and civilians. When I asked your minister for an explanation, he informed me that you had not reported the matter to him.'

" 'We were not able to inform the minister because our reports were incomplete. Now, however, I am in a position to say what happened.' His story was that former officers were conspiring to overthrow the present order and set up a new regime . . . .

"I turned to Bartha, 'Please go and question the suspects yourself, to verify the assertions of General Palffy. Then please report to me immediately afterwards.'

" 'Good,' said Bartha. After Palffy had left he added: 'There are suspicious doings in the political division. I have been informed that its assistant director, Lt. Colonel Kruchina, is not permitted to set foot in their house of detention.'

" 'Send Kruchina to me,' I requested . . .

"The following morning my secretary told me that Lt. Colonel Kruchina had come furtively to the prime ministry and wished to speak to me. 'What need is there for secrecy?' I asked as Kruchina stepped into the room. 'They are watching every move I make, ever since Palffy gave orders not to let me into the house of detention.'

"Kruchina told me . . . that only Palffy and two Communist catchpoles communicated with the prisoners; no one else was allowed at the interrogations . . .

"A few days later, in a dark street, Kruchina was

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> attacked and almost abducted; wounded, he shot at his fleeing assailant. He found refuge at the British Military Mission and was finally able to leave Hungary . . .
>
> "Next day Bartha told me that he had visited the house of detention, as instructed, but Communist subordinates had refused to allow him to see the prisoners in the absence of Palffy. Palffy, arriving, stated that the prisoners had been handed over to the police because there were civilians among them and that he could not have permitted the minister to speak with the prisoners in any case, because it had been expressly forbidden by General Sviridov."

The narrative goes on to tell how the Minister of Defense Bartha, at the instructions of the Prime Minister, went again to try to see the prisoners. The Chief of the Political Division of the Police, Gabor Peter, first refused to let him in. Then Peter's superior, Minister of Interior Rajk, also refused, always referring to the desires of General Sviridov. Then Nagy himself went to see General Sviridov, who denied giving any such orders.

With this statement of Sviridov's in hand Nagy felt that General Palffy had been compromised and started proceedings to discipline and discharge him for disobeying the orders of his superior and refusing to permit his Minister in to see the prisoners. Nagy felt that "At last this notorious Communist agent was caught in his own trap." But this confidence of Nagy's was naive. As soon as he took steps against Palffy, the Communists went into action. The political squad made new arrests and Rajk telephoned the Prime Minister to tell him that the investigations would have to be continued against his wishes, "because they had unearthed a serious large-scale conspiracy."

Rakosi, the Hungarian Communist leader, then phoned and demanded, "How can you even think of starting an investigation against someone [Palffy] at the very time when, discovering the conspiracy directed against our democracy, he is rendering the greatest service to it . . . Besides, Palffy-Oesterreicher is an exemplary democrat." But despite Rakosi's diatribes, Nagy thought he could go on with the proceedings against Palffy. Then, however, came the final blow. A Soviet general arrived with a message from Sviridov. Sviridov continued to deny that he had given orders to Palffy to keep the Minister of War from the prisoners, but he said that the translator had made a mistake and Palffy had thought that there was such an order. There was therefore nothing wrong or malicious in Palffy's actions and, concluded the message, "If you, Mr. Premier, do not stop the investigation of Palffy, the Soviet Military Police will take over the

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entire proceedings in the matter of the conspiracy."[32] The Soviet Commander thus made it clear that the Communist clique in the Ministry of Defense was to be given a free hand in disregard of the nominal Minister. 701 648 661 *

This pattern of infiltration, dual power, and conspiracy is the same as that in all the satellite countries in the years 1945-48. There were, however, three rather distinctive features in the Hungarian development, all of which arose out of the character of Hungary's participation in World War II. *

First, there was no corps of wartime officers with a record of collaboration with the Soviets. As we have already noted, the Russians had fewer high Hungarian officers whom they could use in 1945 than they did in Romania because the officer corps was partly pro-German and had made far less effort against Germany in the last days of the war. A majority of Hungarian officers did not follow Miklos but continued to fight against the Russians. Furthermore there was virtually no underground activity against the Nazis in Hungary. The handful of individuals in our sample whose biographies contain some record of anti-Nazi underground activities are almost invariably Jews. Not only was a group who had made an anti-Nazi record relatively lacking among the Hungarian officers at home. There had also been a relatively minor effort by ex Hungarian prisoners of war whom the Soviets re-trained. There were hundreds of thousands of Hungarian prisoners in the Soviet camps but there was no r[illegible] Hungarian Army recruited among these. There was no Soviet-sponsored force comparable to the Polish Army on the Eastern Front nor to the Tudor Vladimirescu and Horia-Closca-Crisan Division formed by the Romanians. The Soviets did indeed organize some forces out of the PW camps, but as we shall see, they were relatively minor. There was therefore no officer cadre allied to the Soviets on whom the Russians could draw for military leadership. 701 648 *

A second distinctive point in Hungarian development is that the Jewish minority played a more significant role in the Hungarian Army than elsewhere, and a third is that a tightly-knit clique around Palffy began in 1947-48 to take control of the army.

To explain these three points, we turn to our sample of Hungarian generals who have been active in the period from 1945 to now. Our sample consists of twenty-one career officers (of whom four remain in the army, the other seventeen having been purged) and twelve new Communist generals (none of whom have been purged to date). We shall examine the origins and careers of these thirty-three men.

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1. The Available Sources of Recruitment

The generals used since 1945 came from a number of different sources. There was, as we have noted, no one obvious source of recruitment for the Communists comparable to the Polish or Romanian Soviet-controlled army which fought on the Eastern Front in World War II, or for that matter comparable to the western armies of the Polish and Czecho- 701 648 648 702 *

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slovakian governments-in-exile. The sources were the following:

a. Career Officers Who Went Over to the Russians. Four of the Hungarian officers in our sample were officers who had gone over to the Russians along with Miklos at the end of the war, but as we have already seen, there were relatively few such officers and on the whole they did not last long in the new army because of their gentry and Horthyite backgrounds. Three of the four capitulators in our sample were purged in 1945 and one lasted until 1950.

b. PW's. The Hungarian prisoners of the Russians included, of course, both officers and enlisted men. Our sample of postwar generals includes five former PW's, of whom three were already career officers and two were enlisted men raised by the Communists to officer rank.

There were quite a few Hungarian prisoners of war, the Hungarian Second Army of 150,000 and the much smaller Hungarian First Army having been pretty well smashed on the Eastern Front. The prisoners were organized and propagandized by Hungarian Communists who had been living in Russia for many years. The leading figures in this effort were Sandor Nogradi, now Deputy Minister of Defense, and Geza Revesz, now Inspector General of the Land Army. They organized a number of Hungarian partisan units and Nogradi served as liaison officer between these partisan units and the Red Army. They also started to organize the first independent Hungarian Division, for the leadership of which they chose artillery captain György Porfy.

Porfy, who was born about 1909, went to cadet school in Hungary and to the Ludovika Military Academy, the Hungarian officers' training school. He fought on the Eastern Front in 1941 and 1942, at which time he was captured. Proving himself amenable to Communist blandishment he was sent for a one-year military course in Leningrad and to a Communist party training school. After taking part in the formation of the first independent division he returned to Hungary and was made deputy city commander of Budapest in 1946. His role in those years was as a leading security officer. He next appears, after the Communists had completely taken over the Hungarian Army, as a major general and Inspector of Artillery, or in other words, head of the artillery department of the Ministry of Defense. As a career officer and graduate of the Ludovika he did not last long, however. He was reported arrested in 1950.

In our sample the two PW career officers have been purged, one in 1950, one in 1951. The three PW enlisted men, who have since become generals, survive. An interesting example of the latter is Major General Ferenc Janossy.

Janossy was a Protestant clergyman. He had, however, the misfortune to have some Jewish blood and so in Axis Hungary he was assigned not to the regular army but to the Jewish Labor Brigade. There he served as chaplain to the Protestants of Jewish descent in

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the Brigade. When taken prisoner he became a Communist and was sent to a Communist party training school and a partisan warfare training school in the U.S.S.R. He learned his Communist lesson so well that he was given the job, in postwar Hungary, of organizing the education and training of political officers. In 1948 he organized an academy for such officers both of the army and in the police. His military rank rose to that of major general and his latest position is Deputy Minister of People's Culture.

These biographies illustrate the type of officer drawn from the PW camps but this source was less abundant than in other satellite countries.

c. Other Career Officers. Four out of the twenty-one career officers in our sample remain in the army. The rest have been eliminated. If this sample is at all representative, then it is clear that only a very small number of leading officers from the prewar army retain any function in present-day Hungary. It is significant to note that of these four, two are in highly technical units. One of these is Major General Imre Radvany, Deputy Chief of the Institute of Military Technology, and another is General Daniel Görgenyi, Inspector General of Technical Units. Before the war Görgenyi was an engineering officer and Radvany an artillery officer. After the war Radvany established his loyalty to the Communists by joining the Small Holders party as a Communist plant. It is probably not that alone, however, which has yielded him his current security, but rather his technical know-how.[33a] The other two career officers from our sample who are still in the army include the District Commander in Debrecen, General Victor Gomöri, and a quartermaster officer.

d. The Bela Kunists. One group that has shown very great survival power in the present Hungarian Army are the early members of the Communist party. Ever since the unsuccessful Bela Kun regime in Hungary, a considerable number of the defeated Bela Kun supporters lived in exile in Russia. In addition, a number of people who were engaged in minor capacities in that episode had since been living in Hungary. Some of them, in recent years, have been taken into important Communist positions.

The attitude of the Soviet regime toward the Hungarian exiles living in Russia was far from uniformly favorable. They had been roughly handled in the great purges of the 1930's in which Bela Kun himself was toppled from his position as hero to that of traitor and liquidated. The Hungarian refugees who survived the purges, however, were thoroughly subservient and indoctrinated Stalinists. The Russians could count on them. Furthermore, the Russians had to use them for they found hardly any native Communists of professional standing in Hungary, and not even people with a resistance record. The new Communist leadership was therefore largely provided from among the émigrés who had somehow weathered all the

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purges. These men are of course no longer young. Their minimum age must be around fifty, but some of them are still available. At least five and probably more of the present Communist generals in our sample have experience in the Bela Kun regime.

One of these men is General Geza Revesz, an extremely important figure in the present Hungarian Army, to whom we have already referred. Revesz was born in 1903. He was sentenced for his part in the Bela Kun episode to four years in jail, but was sent to Russia in 1922 in a prisoner exchange. He lived in Russia from 1922 until 1945 except for a period when he fought in the Spanish Civil War. In the meantime he had been getting technical training. He had gone to technical school in Budapest for one year, and then in the late 1920's he took an engineering course in the U.S.S.R. While in engineering school he married a Russian fellow-student. In 1932 he enlisted as a captain in the Corps of Engineers of the Russian Army. He ultimately rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel. During World War II, as we have already noted, he was chosen by the Russians to recruit Hungarian prisoners for use in partisan warfare.

Another important officer who was involved in the Bela Kun regime is Major General Mihaly Szalvay, a former mason and the son of a peasant family. Our informants indicate that he has been an exile from Hungary since 1919, when he was twenty-four. He lived all over Europe until the early 1930's, when he went to the U.S.S.R. Then from 1936 to 1939 he fought in the Spanish Civil War as Commander of the Rakosi Brigade. He had already been a captain in the Russian Army before going to Spain and upon his return he went to a school for partisan warfare and rejoined the Red Army. Late in the war he was assigned to the First Hungarian Division under Soviet sponsorship and returned to Hungary as a lieutenant colonel. From 1948 to 1950 he was Commander in Chief of the Frontier Guards, a very important assignment for reasons that we shall see later. Since then he has been in the Ministry of Defense.

Not all those who were involved in the Bela Kun episode spent the intervening years in Russian exile. An interesting example is Major General Istvan Gyori-Nagy, head of the legal section of the Judge Advocate's Department in the years 1949 and 1950. He had been a regular officer in that department in 1914-19. He was stripped of his rank and dismissed in 1919, being rehabilitated on Communist orders in 1945.

e. Other Communist Officers. A number of other old Communists whose activities date back to 1919 or before should perhaps be considered in much the same category as the survivors of the Bela Kun exile, even though they did not chance to be in Hungary in 1919. Among these are apparently Generals Nogradi, Bata, and Muennich.

Nogradi, born Nussbaum in Nograd County, which lies just over the Czechoslovak border from post-World War I Hungary, was an iron worker. He became involved in the Social Democratic movement

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before 1919. Since 1919, when he was twenty-five, he has been a Communist activist. He served as a courier between the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia and did party work in Spain during the Civil War. After the Spanish Civil War he went to the Leningrad Military Academy for two years of training in partisan warfare. His World War II activity in organizing partisans among the Hungarian prisoners we have already described. He is now a Deputy Minister of Defense.

General Istvan Bata deserves special comment. At the time that this study was completed he was Chief of the General Staff. But then in July 1953 a major shake-up occurred in the Hungarian regime which marked the turn to a new tactical course in the satellites. Following the death of Stalin, the Berlin riots, and Czech strikes, a new more lenient policy was decided upon for the satellites. Peasants were permitted to leave the collective farms. Consumers were promised better living standards quickly (though, of course, not given them.)

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While the new course has been adopted in all the European satellites, it was first and most dramatically introduced in Hungary. In typical Soviet fashion a new line had to be announced to the world by a dramatic shake-up and purge. In this instance the dramatic move was the resignation of the famous Communist Matyas Rakosi as Premier on July, 2, 1953 and his replacement by Imre Nagy. At the same time Mihaly Farkos was replaced as Minister of Defense by Istvan Bata.

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Bata was born in Tura, Hungary, in 1901, in a Slovak peasant family. By 1918 he had gone to the Soviet Union and enlisted in the Red Army, which remained his career. He was a staff officer of the Russian Army in World War II and indeed did not return to Hungary until 1948, at which time the Russians decided he should be a Hungarian. He was presented to the senior Hungarian Army officers at the Communist party headquarters by Geza Revesz in 1948. In 1950 he was promoted to be Chief of the General Staff. At that time he was still not a Deputy Minister, but he outranked General Szabo who was Second Deputy Minister, the position ordinarily belonging to the Chief of Staff. In July 1953 Bata jumped directly into the post of Minister.

Until Bata became Minister of Defense, Russian Army officers in the higher ranks of the Hungarian Army were relatively inconspicuous compared to their situations in Poland and they are also relatively few. Revesz and Bata were both mysterious figures hiding in the shadows. Revesz's proclivity for behind-the-scenes action is illustrated by the pattern of his behavior on his return to Hungary from the U.S.S.R. in 1945. Without any publicity he occupied a tiny room at Communist party headquarters as the actual head of the Military Affairs Department of the party although he did not have that title. Not even his name plate appeared on his door and few had any idea of his position. Revesz and Bata were lieutenant generals and

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701 both held posts which, according to the ordinary satellite pattern, *648 would make them Deputy Ministers of Defense. They, together with the then Minister of Defense Farkas, and Deputy Minister Nogradi, were the most important officers in Hungary. However, neither of the Russians was officially a Deputy Minister. Now Bata has emerged from the shadows, but he and other Russian officers still avoid publicity and limelight.

It is worthy of note that at the very moment that Bata was raised to control of the armed forces, the general tenor of the shifts made in enforcing the new course was "to install 'native' rather than 'Muscovite' leaderships."[33b] The replacement of Farkas by Bata was probably a move toward achieving greater military proficiency rather than part of a general shift toward more open sovietization.

The three Deputy Ministers of Defense were, at latest information (the summer of 1953): Sandor Nogradi, whom we have already discussed, Istvan Szabo, whom we mentioned as Bata's former nominal superior, and Karoly Janza. Janza, who was a colonel in the political department of the Ministry of Defense as late as the spring of 1950, was born around 1900. He worked in the Ganz shipyards in Budapest until the Second World War. After the war he was sent to a Communist party propaganda school and made departmental chief and managing director of the Ganz shipyards, in which post he served from 1947 to 1950. Then in 1950 he was sent to take an officers' training course and put in the political department. In the same year he was promoted to major general and Deputy Minister. As a sidelight on his character it is interesting to note that he was convicted and imprisoned in December 1945 for membership in a gangster group charged with robbery. The post he holds as Deputy Minister (formerly the third) would ordinarily make him at least a lieutenant general, and Revesz's superior. But we note that in fact Revesz (like Bata) was the lieutenant general and Janza only a major general, and that Revesz is Inspector General of the Land Army, the position ordinarily held by the First Deputy Minister.

Nogradi, who heads the political department, which ordinarily rates only the Third Deputy Minister, was First Deputy Minister until the numbering scheme was dropped. The reason for this is obvious. He is the only one of the three Deputy Ministers who really was a Deputy Minister in terms of status and in terms of power over the operations in his area of the department. The two figurehead Deputy Ministers were therefore ranked below him until the numbers were dropped.

This departure from the ordinary satellite pattern may well not last long, if indeed it has not already been rectified under Bata. Indeed, when this manuscript was first completed in May 1953 we wound up this section saying

> "If a change is imposed to establish normal practice, one of two things may happen. The mysterious

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> and powerful Soviet officers, Revesz and Bata . . . may be moved into the public limelight and openly become Deputy Ministers. Alternatively some newly trained rising Communists . . . may combine the jobs now held both by the Deputy Ministers and the Soviet officers."

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Events went faster than we anticipated. Bata jumped not to Deputy Minister but to Minister. We do not know if all the other anomalies have been ironed out, and only time will tell whether the other half of our prediction, the rise of newly-trained Communist officers, will also be confirmed or prove to be a groundless speculation.

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2. Jewish Officers

So far we have noted the absence of any one main source for recruitment of leading officers for the present Hungarian Army. We turn now, however, to a group which has or had significant representation in this army though it plays a relatively small role in the other satellite armies. That is officers of Jewish descent. Such officers have been rather extensively represented both among the Bela Kunist exiles and among the career officers whom the Communists used and then discarded. 701 563

Until World War II, Eastern Europe was the largest center of Jewish population and an area in which the peculiar position of the Jews was such that one might have expected them to play a major role in postwar satellite armies. Actually, except in Hungary, they do not do so, partly due to Nazi extermination and partly due to Russian anti-Semitism. The Jews before the war were a fairly large minority in Eastern Europe. More important than their numbers in the total population is the fact that in these predominantly peasant countries the Jews were a quite significant portion of the urban population, and it is the urban population which has been politically active in the new regime. In prewar Poland, for example, 27 percent of the urban population was Jewish, and if we were to consider only the relatively well-educated, politically-alert segments of the urban population, the proportion would be even higher. 563 648*

Furthermore, the Jews were a persecuted minority. Even before the Hitler terror they lived in a state of continuous oppression and consequent dissatisfaction. After the rise of Hitler this entire population lived in the shadow of impending doom. For ten or twelve years they saw the handwriting on the wall and for much of that time lived never knowing whether the next day would be their last, never knowing when they would be seized and thrown into a gas chamber. Those Jews who found themselves captured by the Russians were, therefore, fortunate. Their reception was far from friendly, but those who succeeded in escaping death under the Nazis found themselves at least favored with prison camp tutelage and a propaganda barrage. One would ordinarily expect this group to provide fertile soil for Soviet indoctrination, and indeed the history of some Commu-

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563 *448 nist leaders in Eastern Europe reveals that on some this indoctrination took. But against all these factors rendering some Jews susceptible to use by the Soviets were a number of other factors which have limited the role of Jews in satellite military elites. The two most important factors operating to limit their role in satellite armies are Soviet anti-Semitism and the physical destruction of potential Jewish leadership in most of Eastern Europe.

It is only in the last two years that the western world has become acutely aware of Soviet anti-Semitism. The anti-Jewish trials in Czechoslovakia and other satellite countries within recent months have made the point perfectly clear. But, as a matter of fact, the process of eliminating Jews from key positions has been going on for some time in most Soviet-dominated areas. Jews have not been totally eliminated. There is a lot more variation in the Soviet process of anti-Semitic purging than there was in the ideological anti-Semitism of the Nazis. The Soviets distrust the Jews because they are intellectual, educated, and western oriented— cosmopolitans in Soviet jargon—but they have been eliminating them individual by individual rather than by flat edict. Nevertheless a large proportion of satellite Jewish leaders in the past few years have been eliminated. In our sample of the Hungarian military elite, half of the generals of Jewish origin, descent, or relationship had been removed by 1950
* and more have been removed in the last few months.

701 563 In our sample of thirty-four generals who have been active since 1945, ten were in some way identified with the Jewish minority. It is significant that only five of these ten were themselves actually Jews. Two others had married Jews, one (whose biography we have already given) was a Protestant of Jewish origin, another a Catholic of Jewish origin, and another part-Jewish. By the standards of East European and Nazi anti-Semitism, however, they were branded with the label of Jew. With few exceptions they were purged from the wartime Hungarian Army and forced into the Jewish Labor Brigade. They became susceptible to the blandishments of the new regime in Hungary because they had been mistreated by the old.

At the same time the mistreatment they suffered was not such as to destroy them completely. We must not forget that under Hitler six million Jews were exterminated in Eastern Europe. That fact, plus the fact that in countries like prewar Poland it was virtually impossible for a person of Jewish origin to have a military career at all, means that after the war there were available in most of the countries of Eastern Europe relatively few Jewish officers with training and experience. A certain number of Jews are found in the political department and other unspecialized parts of the satellite armies, but except in Hungary they are for the most part not found among the professionally skilled military leaders. In Hungary it was possible for a person with some Jewish blood or Jewish relatives to have a military career and it was also somewhat more likely that he might

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survive the Hitler era. Thus we find that six out of the twenty-two career 701 officers in our sample have some ethnic ties to the Jewish minority as do 563 four out of the twelve new Communist officers in our sample. It is significant that the proportion is much the same for the two groups.

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Before we leave this topic, it might be well to comment on the reason for the large proportion of what we are calling Jewish repre- 701* sentation in the army which is not really Jewish at all, but consists 648* of persons with some ancestral or marital ties to the Jewish community. It is striking that of the ten "Jews," fully half are not per- 563 sons who considered themselves Jews or even whose parents considered themselves Jews, for it goes without saying that nobody who has a leading post in a satellite country today attributes any religion to himself. The men who were vulnerable to the Communist blandishments were not ones who belonged to the Jewish minority, knew it and accepted it, but were rather persons who wanted to consider themselves part of the majority community but found that the majority community would not accept them. They were persons whose families had been converted, or persons who were completely Christian in origin and identification, but who suddenly found themselves being discriminated against because of their wives.

The most famous of these characters, who turned to the Communists because of discriminations arising from the Jewish origin of his wife, was the notorious General Palffy. The fact that he was regarded as in some sense Jewish (although actually he was not), and that Farkas, the former Minister of National Defense, is Jewish made the Jews in the Hungarian Army appear to be more conspicuous than their statistical distribution justified. They are, however, overrepresented and as such illustrate a general principle which we have found to hold, not only in the Hungarian Army, but in all the satellite armies: namely that members of national minority groups in the various East European countries are particularly likely to be selected by the Communists to provide leadership.

Particularly in the secret police and the political department the Communists prefer to terrorize the population by agents who are not members of that population themselves. In Russia itself the Cheka was, originally, primarily a Latvian and Polish organization. In Hungary the former, but now purged, head of the State Defense Authority (the secret police) was Jewish. The Communists feel that persons who are not part of the majority community will have fewer personal connections and thus less sympathy for those among whom they live. At the same time Soviet anti-Semitism and particularly that of Malenkov has reversed that policy as far as Jews are concerned and has eliminated most of them from leadership by now.

3. The Palffy Clique

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The signal for the rise of a postwar military elite in Hungary was 701 Soviet General Sviridov's authorization to Major General Palffy, 648*

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organizer and head of Hungary's new military intelligence, to organize the frontier guard in the summer of 1946. The avowed aim of this measure was to prevent hostile elements from infiltrating the country. But in fact this new organization, in co-operation with the military political department and the state security organ of the police, began to build the Iron Curtain around Hungary. It soon became a force of fifteen battalions, i. e., about two-thirds of the country's armed force at that time. It developed, in other words, into a Communist party army.

Initially the authorization was for a somewhat smaller force but still one of sufficient size to represent a real threat to the government. The origins of this force in 1946 are reported by Nagy. He tells how the Minister of Defense, Eugene Tombor, called him aside and told him that, "he had called by request at the office of General Konratov,[34] the Soviet head of the military section of the Allied Control Commission," the latter "have instructed him to increase the border guard from 5,000 to 10,000 men and appoint as commander . . . Colonel Palffy-Oesterreicher." Tombor at first threatened to resign but finally accepted these orders. His indignation arose largely because Palffy was regarded with abhorrence and aversion by all military circles in Hungary.

General Palffy (He changed his name from Oessterreicher in 1934) was born in a middle-class family in Romania in 1909. His father was a bank manager and his father's family had been small landowners. He graduated from the Ludovika Military Academy at the age of twenty-three and was commissioned second lieutenant in the artillery. He was selected as a candidate for training for the general staff. (In prewar Hungary, as in most European countries, the general staff corps was an elite group separated from the rest of the army by special training and by the addition of the phrase "of the general staff" to the rank.) As with all trainees for general staff positions, he was sent abroad for a year of experience, in his case to the Italian Army. In 1939 he participated as a captain in the occupation of the Carpatho-Ukraine and won praise from the Minister of Defense for his part.

However, in the same year he resigned his army commission because of his Jewish wife. He went to work in the United Incandescent Bulb Factory, where a fellow employee and future associate was Captain of the General Staff Laszlo Solym, a man with problems similar to those of Palffy and a man who had already joined the Communist party. At the end of the war Palffy rejoined the army. He organized the political department of the Ministry of Defense and was promoted in 1945 from major to colonel and in 1946 to major general. We have already noted that he organized the Frontier Guards at the same time as he was head of the political department.

By 1947 Palffy had become the leading military personality of the country. The military elite for the period 1947-48 was identical with

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his personal entourage. This clique was most homogeneous. Its members were men of about forty years of age, graduates from the Ludovika Military Academy, whose career had been broken during the previous regime for one reason or another. These reasons were in some cases Jewish mothers or wives and in other cases personal malfeasance. They were gifted, ambitious men, most of them opportunists. Their training as professional army officers traditionally conservative in spirit formed a most peculiar background to the Communist attitude which they assumed in or about 1945. Their rise to elite status was accomplished in February 1948, when Palffy was promoted from his job as head of the political department to be Inspector General of the army replacing General Huthy, the last Mohican of the old guard. In accordance with the usual satellite pattern the Inspector General, who is in effect the Commander in Chief, became Deputy Minister of Defense, and he was promoted at the same time to lieutenant general. From that time until Farkas became Minister of Defense in August of the same year, Palffy was the real boss of the Hungarian Army since the non-Communist Minister had by then been reduced to a mere figurehead.

Altogether seven officers in our sample can be described as members of the Palffy clique. These include Lieutenant General Laszlo Solym, Chief of Staff from 1948-50; Major General Bela Kiraly, Deputy Chief of Staff at the same time; Major General La[illegible] [illegible]ldi, who succeeded Palffy as head of the political department when Palffy was promoted; Lieutenant Gustav Illy, Inspector of Training from 1947 to 1949; Lieutenant General Kalman Revai, who succeeded Palffy as Inspector General of the Army for a short time; Major General Merenyi-Scholtz, surgeon general; and Lieutenant Istvan Beleznay. Of these General Solym was of part-Jewish and part-German descent though he was himself a Roman Catholic. General Beleznay married a Jewish woman. General Földi was convicted of embezzlement of army funds in 1937 and retired. General Illy was a homosexual and also was of part-Jewish descent, although himself a Roman Catholic. General Revai was Jewish. General Merenyi-Scholtz had been decorated by the Nazis. These were the facts which had disrupted their careers and which drew them together into a clique, motivated by mutual advantage and ready to sell out to the Communists for military advancement.

The Communists could not tolerate such a tightly-knit, homogeneous clique in control of the army. They could tolerate it no more when it was nominally a Communist clique than when it consisted of followers of Benes in Czechoslovakia or of Pilsudskians in Poland. Under no Communist regime is a personal machine permitted to emerge if it can be helped. The only machine must be that of the top leaders of the party. Any other personal ties within a formal organization are in Russia abusively labeled "family relations" and are condemned. It is therefore not surprising that in 1948, or more

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701 *648 likely the end of 1947, when word went out from Moscow to the satellite countries that the satellite armies were to be built up into a major military force and that they were at the same time to be completely taken over by the Communists, it was not Palffy, the head of the military clique, who was made boss of the army but a Politburo member and Communist leader who had not been part of the Hungarian Army until then. Mihaly Farkas became the Hungarian counterpart of Emil Bodnaras, Alexis Cepicka, and Konstantin Rokossowski. *

701 *648 661 Palffy was not immediately ousted. He remained on as Deputy Minister of Defense and Inspector General of the army for a few months but the significance of the move was at once apparent. Palffy was immediately compelled to throw some of his close associates to the lions including Major General Lajös Földi, whom he had just put in as his successor as head of the political department. Within a week after Farkas took over, Major General Lajos Földi was arrested and charged with sedition and espionage. These events clearly foreshadowed the great purge which was to take place about a year later. Perhaps Palffy thought that by presenting a few heads on a silver platter he might evade the obviously impending purge. Enver Hoxha in Albania was able to get away with a similar move when he delivered General Koxhi Xoxe to Moscow's sacerdotes. In Hungary, however, the last vestiges of Palffydom were to be purged in 1949-50. By the middle of 1950 not one member of the clique remained free. About eighty officers had been purged as Palffyites. Palffy himself turned up as one of the principal defendents in the Rajk trial and was executed by hanging on October 24, 1949.

The indictment states, along with a lot of nonsense about an international espionage plot, the real Communist objections to Palffy, although these are stated in Aesopian language. In effect, it says that he tried to build a personal clique and that he had under his own control a sufficient military force so that he could prove a dangerous and independent character. The indictment said in part, "It was Palffy's task to direct the organization in the military sphere. With Rajk's consent he protected and promoted reactionary Horthyite fascist officers in the army appointing to high and important posts those whom he knew would blindly follow his villainous aims and instructions." In other words, he built up a clique of old army officers. "He drew up and set forth in writing a plan which he considered could be carried out with the help of ten battalions. These battalions were designed by Palffy for the seizure of important public buildings, post offices, broadcasting stations, the premises of the Central Committee of the Party," etc. In Communist Aesopian language this, of course, refers to the special Frontier Guard which Palffy had indeed built up at Russian behest and which he did indeed control as a kind of personal army.

The Hungarian case probably makes clearer than any other the hostility of the Communists to any kind of cohesive, well-integrated

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clique, machine, or group. In Czechoslovakia we saw that the Communists destroyed a cohesive officer corps with common experiences in World War I, common training shortly thereafter, and loyalty to a common leader, Benes. In Poland likewise we saw that they quickly eliminated a tightly-knit group of Pilsudskians. In Hungary the picture is even clearer because they destroyed not only a tightly-knit and cohesive old officer corps, but also a new communist officer group which threatened to emerge with loyalties and private relations of its own. The corps of regular officers in the Hungarian Army did indeed have considerable elements of cohesion. These arose not primarily from common social origins but rather from common training and experience.

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Before 1918 a military career carried considerable prestige in Hungary though not as much as in Germanic lands. It was not ordinarily the career choice for aristocrats' sons, except for a few crack regiments. Nor was the officers' uniform a mystical object as in Prussia. Yet the prestige of the officer was high and the gentry was well represented in the officer corps. The gentry was a class ranking just below the aristocrats, but (regardless of wealth) above business men and professionals.

After 1918 the prestige of a military career declined for the opportunities were limited. Pay was poor. The army was reduced in size. The crack regiments were abolished. The proportion of non-gentry officers therefore rose and a large sector of the officer corps came to consist of members of national minorities such as Austrians and Czechs.

All in all the Hungarian Army of 1939 was led by an officer corps in which an overwhelming majority came from the wide range of the lower and upper-middle classes including the lesser gentry. Top aristocrats were scarce in the army but so were sons of proletarians. There was thus no sharply defined military caste comparable to that in Prussia and to some extent in Poland. It is true indeed that there was a tradition that at least one son should follow his father's example in choosing a military career, but other factors contributed to democratization. In the early 1920's there was a brief period in which sons of non-commissioned officers of the regular army, who were themselves predominantly of peasant stock, were strongly encouraged to attend cadet schools or military academies. Another wave of such democratization was a corollary of Gömbös' premiership since Gömbös was himself the son of a village teacher.

While the base of recruitment was thus broad, the process of selection created a rather tightly-knit officer corps. With hardly any exceptions, senior officers were graduates of cadet schools or military academies. It was possible for inductees to attend officer candidate schools and qualify for regular army careers after post-commission courses, but very few of this category ever rose to senior rank.

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701 Hungary's one and only military academy was the Ludovika in Budapest, but it was not unusual for Hungarian boys to have attended 974 military academies in Austria. Candidates graduated as a rule as second lieutenants at the age of about twenty-one.[35] Military academies could be entered after completion of secondary school or military secondary school. A parallel sequence of training was that in the cadet schools both in Hungary and Austria, which were attended by students in the fourteen to eighteen age groups. The graduates of these emerged as "third lieutenants" at the age of about eighteen. Technical officers were often sent—usually as first lieutenants—to technical universities, where they gained civilian degrees.

Before 1918 staff officers were trained in the Vienna Staff College and during the war at various staff courses. After the Treaty of * Trianon, Hungarian staff officer candidates attended the new Buda- 701 pest Staff College. Graduates had to serve a brief trial period as staff officers and were then given the title "of the General Staff" affixed to their rank. They served as a rule from time to time as field officers thus interrupting their staff service. As staff officers or staff officer candidates, they spent several months abroad assigned to a foreign army unit on special duty and it was compulsory for them to master at least two foreign languages, one of them German. The priority sequence was German, French, English, Italian, Czech and Slovak, Serbo Croat, Romanian.

Almost all generals came from the ranks of these officers "of the General Staff" with the exception of a very few of the lowest ranking generals, major generals. In the early 1920's it became a rule that only general staff officers could rise to the rank of general. A very few exceptions occurred, however, during World War II.

Thus we see that, with perhaps one or two exceptions, all members of the military elite chose a military career before the age of eighteen. They were then put through a common course of training and belonged to a common select group of staff officers. After retirement they often continued to play an important elite role. Some retired generals were appointed by the Regent as members of the upper house and/or privy counsellors. The Commander in Chief of the army and, after the abolition of this post, the Chief of General Staff, were ex-officio members of the upper house. Generals in the Regent's entourage remained, after retirement, unofficially his military advisers. Some had more influence on high level military policy after their retirement than any officers on the active list.

Furthermore, the only way to reach this influential status was through the normal channels of promotion. Direct commissions were unknown in the prewar Hungarian Army. Every officer began his career as a lieutenant. There were rigid rules of promotion according to seniority and efficiency rating. Priority by virtue of efficiency rating was limited—below the rank of colonel—to a maximum of five years over the normal seniority scale. Extraordinary promotions

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for gallantry occurred only in time of war. On account of poor efficiency ratings promotions could be delayed or suspended. 701 An elaborate system of court martial, disciplinary and court of honor proceedings was provided for cases of criminal or immoral behavior to decide upon forced retirement with or without pension and with or without the right of keeping the rank. Officers on the active list, of whom the number of generals was generally around one hundred, were barred from political and business activities. Members of the armed forces including the police, commissioned and non-commissioned, were disenfranchised and had no right to belong to a political party. After 1944, however, membership in the Fascist Arrow Cross Party was no longer prohibited and after the war all the legal parties, Communist, Small Holders, etc., played a major role in selecting officers. Finally certain common historic struggles added to the cohesiveness of the old officer corps. A certain elite status was acquired by an officer's record in the counterrevolutionary movement in 1919 and his belonging to Horthy's National Army at that time.

It is obvious that the cohesive character of the regular Hungarian officer corps was one reason for the rapid elimination of these men by the Communists. The first Communist reaction was to replace them by men who had been thrown out of this tightly-knit group for reasons of their behavior or for reasons of discrimination. However, when the group of officers whom they brought in showed signs themselves of forming a tightly-knit corps, the Communists cracked down ruthlessly with a demonstration trial designed to make the lesson clear: no one but the Politburo may have ambitions for power.

C. The Final Period of Bolshevization

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The elimination of the career officers and Ludovika graduates, 701 even those who belonged to the Palffy clique, posed for the Hungarian Army 703 * the same dilemma as was posed in each of the satellite countries and for that matter in the Soviet Union too — how to obtain 448 both professional skill and political loyalty. We have seen that the dilemma was solved in slightly different ways in the different countries. In Hungary, as in Romania, it was temporarily solved by bringing a group of politicians into the top posts, despite the fact that they had had relatively inadequate military experience. Among these there were indeed a sprinkling of career officers concentrated in the more technical positions and a sprinkling of converted Russian Army officers. From 1949 until 1953 the political horn of the dilemma was seized in preference to the professional one. That was the period during which the old Bolshevik Farkas was Minister of Defense. The army was reorganized with considerations of loyalty being put above considerations of efficiency. That is probably why the Hungarian Army is still relatively small and less heavily relied on by the Russians than the "friendly" Czech army or the well-con-

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701 trolled and Russified Polish force. The resolution of the central [702] problem faced by the Russians was slower in the army of Hungary. Only with the appointment of the experienced Russian soldier, General Bata, as Minister of Defense has professionalism acquired *648 appropriate standing.

On the whole Russia has had to cope with the lack of adequate professional officers in Hungary, as in Romania, by subordinating the satellite army very definitely to the Soviet forces on the spot. The power of the Soviet occupation is summarized in a document on Soviet Imperialism: Hungary 1944-48.[36] It was agreed at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that each of the ex-enemy countries in Eastern Europe would be supervised by the three main allied powers acting jointly, and an allied Control Commission was set up. "The Allies agreed that the chairman of the Commission would be the Soviet representative . . . but the representatives of the three powers were to act jointly . . . From the very start the Soviet representatives consistently acted unilaterally in the name of the commission without consultation or notice to their British and American colleagues . . . Moreover the Soviet chairman ordered that all communications between the representatives of the western allies and the Hungarian authorities be channeled through him.

"The Soviet element used its military powers to further the cause [208] of the Hungarian Communists in many ways. For example, it exercised censorship over all telegraph connections and permitted criticisms of the western allies in press and radio, but none of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet element seized virtually all of the newsprint in the country and Hungarian newspapers were able to obtain the paper only with the consent of the Red Army . . .

"Soviet influence was further strengthened by the presence of the Red Army in Hungary. Early in 1945 these troops numbered as high as one million and, despite protests from the western allies, were withdrawn very slowly . . . In the final treaty, negotiated in Paris during the winter of 1946-47, the USSR won the right to keep troops in Hungary." In 1951 at least four active Soviet divisions were estimated to be in Hungary and some estimates of Soviet troops there ran very much higher.[37]

That is why when Mihaly Farkas took over control of the Hungarian Army he needed only a modicum of military skill. That modicum he had. He had served in the Spanish Civil War and indeed had also had some military training in the Czechoslovak Army before that. After the Spanish Civil War he served in the Russian Army as an officer. He was, however, not regarded primarily as a military man and his first job after the war was as Undersecretary of Interior in charge of the organization of police. He was Deputy Secretary General of the Communist party and a member of the Politburo. In general his background and training, as that of all of the satellite Ministers of Defense whom we have studied except Rokossowski, was muc

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more that of the politician than of the military man. He had been engaged in revolutionary activities since 1920, when at the age of sixteen he participated in the Young Workers Movement in eastern Slovakia. Farkas when appointed Defense Minister was simply referred to as Comrade Farkas without military rank, and on the photograph of his oath-taking ceremony he appeared in mufti. This was not unnatural in Hungary, for his predecessors had also been civilians at the time of becoming Minister. The following May Day, however, he received a direct commission as Colonel General and took the salute of the parade in uniform, his breast covered with medals. In radio talks to the forces, he was often referred to as "Hungary's first soldier." Since his replacement as Minister of Defense Farkas has returned to civilian political activity. He is still a member of the Politburo.

During the period he headed it, Farkas was typical of the very top men in the Hungarian military establishment. Of five of these men on whom we have biographies (including the Minister and two Deputy Ministers) three formerly fought in the Spanish Civil War and two others were primarily Russian Army officers. Four had active Russian Army experience. None were simply Hungarian Communists with no military background, but at the same time all of them were Communists first and military professionals second. Like Farkas, who had been a printer's apprentice, then a revolutionary in Czechoslovakia, and then the holder of high political office before he moved into the army, so too had Nogradi, first Deputy Minister, been an iron worker and then a revolutionary in Czechoslovakia. After World War II Nogradi became Undersecretary for Industry, Undersecretary at the Prime Minister's Office, and finally Vice-Chairman of the Committee for Appointment of Civil Servants before moving into the Ministry of Defense.

While the new military leadership of 1949 may have been professionally untrained, it would be a mistake to assume that the result was a disintegration of the Hungarian Army. On the contrary, as we have noted in each of the satellite countries, it was with the decision to build the satellite armies into important fighting forces that the Russians made the decision to subject each of them to major Communist control. This has been done most effectively in Poland, where the Communist control was exercised by well-trained professional Russian officers. The transitional compromise arrangements in Romania and Hungary were undoubtedly less satisfactory from the point of view of the Russians and so these armies have been given a smaller role and have been permitted a smaller build-up. But on the other hand, as soon as Farkas took over things began to happen. These may be summarized under three heads: 1) the complete imposition of Soviet rules, patterns, and methods of organization; 2) the rapid build-up of the army; and 3) a systematic effort to train a new generation of young, professionally qualified but politically loyal, officers who will some day take over from both the vestiges of the

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* 701 old career officers and from the Communist politicians, except perhaps in the very top post or posts.

*648 In August 1950 Soviet military regulations were made compulsory in the Hungarian Army. At that time Nogradi explained in a speech that this action would inject "a new warrior spirit" into the army. "Having learned Stalinist strategy and tactics, our armed forces will be ready to fight and to win."38

[728] The new army did not long stay within the confines of the treaty of peace. According to Article 12 of the treaty, the armed forces were to consist of no more than 65,000 men. In December 1950 Marshal Tito estimated them at 165,000, and in July of 1951 Dedijer estimated them at 200,000.39 They were already three times as numerous as permitted in the treaty. The build-up continued, however. The 1951 military expenditures were estimated to exceed those of 1949 and 1950 combined and to be ten times as great as those in 1948. Roads, railways, and air fields were built. Indeed even in the period since the death of Stalin the Hungarians announced a new and expanded build-up of their armed forces.

* 701 *648 661 This expansion under Farkas was accompanied by accelerated purges. According to a speech which Farkas delivered in March 1951 the number of new officers in the Hungarian Army staff rose from 5.5 percent in January 1949 to 80.7 percent in January 1951. The new officers, he said, included 38.1 percent industrial workers, 20.5 percent agricultural workers, 13.5 percent peasants, 7.4 percent artisans and merchants, and 20.5 percent intellectuals.40 The rapid increase in new officers meant both that old officers had been purged and that the number of officers had grown greatly. The two years after Farkas took over were years of the most rapid and profound change.

By 1953 the Hungarian Army had been transformed into a politically-acceptable force but its highly political leadership no longer met the needs for technical competence and had done its own job so well that it could be replaced. General Bata then took over.

* 701 *648 It is, of course, difficult to get valid information on the new military structure. In 1950 the organization and administrative structure of the Ministry of Defense and of military offices became a secret even to the staff themselves. Organizational charts are no longer posted in the offices and name plates rarely appear on doors. Jurisdiction and spheres of activity are no longer clearly and publicly defined and amendments to the defense act are not published. In this respect, of course, Hungary is simply following the standard Iron Curtain pattern.

We have, however, for Hungary one set of data which we do not have for any of the other satellites and which tells us a little about the program for training a new officer corps composed of people who are both professionally qualified and politically loyal. For Hungary we have a small sample of biographies of colonels. Because they are

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not very prominent, their biographies tend to be sketchy, but we do have a few significant facts about them. Our sample contains nine colonels who are now in the Hungarian Army. They hold posts such as Deputy Chief of the Military Political Department, political officer in the department, head of the confidential group in that department, section chief at the Education Department in the Ministry of Defense, Deputy Chief of the Operational Department in the Ministry of Defense, two divisional commanders, and one regimental commander.

Of these men a very significant proportion are proletarian in origin. One was formerly an iron worker, another a butcher, another a locksmith, another a tailor's assistant, and another a factory laborer. Three of them were prisoners of the Russians during World War II. The four whose dates of birth we know were born in 1905, 1907, 1917, and 1919. If these four are at all representative, the group is fairly young ranging primarily between thirty-five and forty-five. Some of the ones in the political department tend to be either Jewish or of Jewish descent. None of the others in our sample are, however.

The most significant single fact about them is the recency of their training. While a number of them had seen military service earlier, their training as officers has generally been accomplished under the Communist regime. One of them was a reserve lieutenant in the Romanian Army before World War II and became a captain in the Hungarian Army immediately after the war. Another was a reserve second lieutenant of artillery before the war. Both of these became prisoners of war and were re-trained. Four others, however, are clearly "quickie" officers. One was recently sent to an infantry officers' course for six months and was made a lieutenant colonel upon graduation. Another was a Communist party secretary and was commissioned third lieutenant in 1945 in the military political department and has risen since. Another was a lawyer who was sent to school in Moscow in 1947 and upon his return was put into the military political department, and the fourth became an officer after a three-months' course of training in an anti-aircraft program within the last few years. We do not know the precise military course of three of the other colonels but we do know that their regular education stopped with four years or, in two cases, six years of elementary school, an educational background which would have completely excluded them from officers' ranks until the Communist program of training.

There is good reason to believe that the pattern here revealed is substantially similar to that in each of the other satellites for which we have no data on the field grade officers. If it is representative, we may conclude that it will not be long before these men rise to replace the men who were their chiefs under Farkas. The type of newly trained young man who is both politically reliable and at the same time has become a career army man or is being trained for it is

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apparently not confined to the company grade. On the contrary, such men have apparently penetrated by now almost up to the point just below general officer rank. It is at this point that we may expect something analogous to the 1938 purge of the Red Army to occur. It might be a mistake to expect it to take the same bloody and violent form. While that is not excluded, it seems likely that the Soviets will be more circumspect and subtle this time. Their objective of getting a professionalized group of officers, who at the same time have no ties to the old professional cadres, seems likely to be realizable without bloodshed in the visible future. Many of the present top-position holders will then undoubtedly lose their jobs and only the Minister and perhaps the Deputy Ministers will remain as representatives of solid party experience in much the same way as the Politburo in Russia has retained its dominance while the other old Bolsheviks have been eliminated in favor of new professional men.[41]

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NOTES

000 1. Protokoll des II. Welt Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale (Hamburg: 1921), p. 390.

1a. "The Role of Brains in the Total State," Commentary, August 1953, pp. 167-173.

2. Quoted in Reuben H. Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke (Boston: Meador Publishing Co., 1949), p. 407.

Cf. also the following statement from the Kosice program of the new Czech government, March 27, 1945: "Commissioning and promoting of officers shall not be based on formal rules only; extraordinary faster advancement (or commissioning) of the ablest . . . shall be supported." Za novou lidovou demokratickou armádu (Prague: Svoboda, 1945), pp. 7-11.

*701 *648 661 3. These were originally one. They were separated in Russia so the satellites followed suit. In 1950 Czechoslovakia, in November 1951 Poland, and September 1952 Romania, for example, separated them. Under the Malenkov regime in Russia, however, they were recombined under Beria. The satellites imitated and recombined them (e.g. the Czechs) in September 1953. After Beria was purged in Russia, they too were purged.

3a. But cf. Hans Speur, "Psychological Warfare Reconsidered" in Daniel Lerner and Harold Lasswell, The Policy Sciences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951) p. 266.

3b. Cf. Morris Janowitz, Working Paper on the Professional Soldier and Political Power (Mimeographed), Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, July 1953.

4. Spencer Wilkinson, War and Policy: Essays (London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1910), p. 361.

5. Edward Shils and Morris J. Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht" in Daniel Lerner, Propaganda — War and Crisis (New York: George W. Stewart, 1951), p. 373.

5a. There is some reason to believe that in Russia itself after the death of Stalin the desired monolithic control was shaken. In the period before the purge of Beria, at least, there was a jockeying for power. Some observers believe that the Russian Army even now retains some potential independent power as against Malenkov and the party.

6. Op. cit.

*701 *648 874 7. The emphasis in the period since 1948 on military training was fully foreshadowed in the plans of the Russians as revealed in the Kosice program of the new Czech government in 1945. This announced that the government "shall request from the Red Army professors and instructors for instruction in the Czechoslovak military schools. It shall endeavor to send the largest possible number of the ablest officers to Soviet military schools, up to the highest military institutes and academies." Za novou lidovou demokratickou armádu pp. 7-11.

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SATELLITE GENERALS

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7a. For example, the New York Times of August 4, 1951 reported that Marshal Govorov had started a course in Moscow for satellite staff officers.

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8. As a control we collected similar data on general officers in pre-Communist periods in those countries and on general officers in four non-Communist countries. The latter included: one democratic country, Sweden, and one country that has not generally been democratic, Japan; one country, Spain, in which the army, like the satellite armies, came into present form through civil war, though a civil war in which the outcome was an anti-Communist victory; and one country with a brand new but non-Communist army, namely India. The data on these control samples have not been as intensively analyzed as those on the satellites and are not reported here. Cf. Some Comparative Data on Military Elites, Hoover Institute, 1953. (Mimeographed.) The following table reports the number of biographies studied:

TABLE 1
TOTAL BIOGRAPHIES

China	129
Czechoslovakia	167
Hungary	173
India	65
Japan	294
Poland	152
Romania	132
Spain	179
Sweden	62
U.S.S.R.	217
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9. The nature of the armed forces of the countries with which we are concerned led to the overwhelming majority of the general officers studied being army officers.

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TABLE 2
SATELLITES

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Police and Security Troops	Combined Service Forces	Total
Czech						
1. 1918-44	85		3	5		93
2. 1945-48	35		2	2		39
3. 1948-	26		2	7		35

TABLE 2 (Continued)

SATELLITES

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Police and Security Troops	Combined Service Forces	Total
Hungary						
1. Pre-1944	95	2	3	4		104
2. 1945-52	33		2	16		51
3. Police				18		18
Poland						
1. 1918-39	56	2				58
2. 1939-45	38	2	2			42
3. 1945-52	36	2	1	13		52
Romania						
1. Pre-1940	7	1		3		11
2. 1940-44	23	2	2	2		29
3. 1944-47	28	1	1	2		32
4. 1948-	44	1	2	13		60
China						
1. Nationalists	50	3	2		6	61
2. Communists	62	4	1	1		68

10. The leading Czechoslovak air force officer in Britain during the war was Brigadier General Karel Janousek, Inspector General of the Czechoslovak Air Force and an honorary Vice-Marshal of the RAF. General Janousek began his military career in the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1914 as a member of the 57th Infantry Regiment. Like Neumann he was a member of the Czechoslovak Legion which fought the Bolsheviks until 1920. There he served as a captain in the First Infantry Regiment. He was at the War College in Prague until 1923, at which time he was briefly assigned to the general staff. The following year, however, he was transferred to the air force. For the next decade and a half he alternated between general staff work and commands of various air force units. When the Germans took over Czechoslovakia, he escaped to France serving first there and then in England.

Another outstanding Czechoslovak officer was General Alois Liska, Commander of the Czechoslovak Brigade and later of the First Czechoslovak Tank Corps during World War II. He too served as first lieutenant in the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia until 1920. In the new Czechoslovak Army his career was largely with the artillery.

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701 *648 He served with the 51st Artillery Regiment and with the Land Artillery Command in Prague. By 1935 he was a colonel and commander of the 51st Artillery Regiment. He became a brigadier general only in exile during World War II, during which he showed unusual capabilities of command.

000 11. We excluded from our sample those generals over sixty in 1945 who were not taken into active positions on the theory that this might conceivably have been due to age rather than political factors.

12. K. M. Smogorzewski, "Soviet Satellite Armies in Europe," The Fortnightly, MXVII N.S., September 1951, p. 602.

12a. Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved: the Story of the Communist Coup d'Etat (London: Victor Gollancz, 1950), p. 30.

13. Op. cit.

14. Lidova Demokracie, July 12, 1950.

15. In addition there are in our sample two who returned and died of natural causes shortly after the war so that it is not possible to classify them as having been either purged or not purged.

16. It will be recalled that we are omitting from our sample of available officers those who were more than sixty on the theory that failure to incorporate them into the new armies might have been simply on the grounds of age.

* 17. "Glos Polski," Toronto, Canada, September, 1951.

701 *648 17a. A glance at the table of organization of the Polish high command makes clear how small a role the career officers ever played and how completely they have been eliminated from leadership now.

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Minister of National Defense: Zymierski (career officer) to 11/6/49; Rokossovski (Russian) since.
Deputy Minister and Chief of Staff: Korczyc (Russian) 1945 on.
Deputy Minister and Commander of Land Forces: Swierczewski (Russian) to 3/28/47; Poplawsky (Russian) since.
Deputy Minister and Chief of the Political Department: Several, all Polish C.P. militants.
Inspector Generals - all now Russian: Artillery, Engineers, Signal troops, Armored troops, etc.
Commander of the Air Force: Romeyko (Russian) to 1951; Turkel (Russian) since.
Commander in Chief of Navy: Steyer (career officer) to 1949; Cherokov (Russian) since.
Commanders of Military Districts
    Warsaw: Paszkiewicz (career officer) to 1948; Rotkevich (Russian) since.
    Bydgoszcz: Szylingowski (Russian) 1945; Poltuzycki (Russian) now.
    Wroclaw: Daniluk (career officer) to 1950; Strazhesky (Russian) since.
    Cracow: Mossor (career officer) 1945; Kieniewicz (Russian now.

17b. These few old officers who remain have been reduced to minor positions. One is a military attaché, one in the general staff academy, one is curator of the state race horses, and the fourth in some unidentifiable minor position. 701* 648 661

18. It is not clear whether the last of these men is still actually in the position to which we are assigning him. He was in that position in 1951, but there is some reason to believe that his position may have changed.

19. Colonel Jozef Jaklicz, "Armia," Kultura, II, special issue, Paris 1952, pp. 62-99. 600

19a. Franciszek Jarecki, "Flights for Freedom Pierce Iron Curtain," Life, April 6, 1953, p. 32. Alexander T. Jordan, "Why Jarecki Flew West," Readers Digest, October 1953, pp. 110-14.

19b. News from Behind the Iron Curtain, Vol. II, No. 7, July 1953, p. 16.

19c. The intelligence school is different from the others in that candidates cannot volunteer for it directly. Intelligence officers are picked from among the other programs during the training period.

19d. Jaklicz, op. cit.

20. Cf. Thomas, William I. and Znaniecki, Florian. The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 192

21. There are two journals of this name; one published in Poland and one in exile.

22. Bellona, 1948, Vol. 30 (1948) 2-3. London: Instytut Historyczny im. Gen. Sikorskiego.

23. Chief of the Governing Board of the Department of Political Education of the Polish Army.

24. Deputy Chairman for War Industry.

24a. It might be noted that the same focus on a limited number of highly political names occurs even in the officers training program. Lieutenant Jazwinski reported that for his political courses he had to learn the names and positions of Marshal Rokossovski and the four vice-ministers of national defense. Besides those he knew about Generals Swierczewski (Walter), Zymiersky, and Radkiewicz, all high-ranking political figures, past or current. In addition, he knew of General Romeyko, Commander of the Air Force at the time that Jazwinski was in school, and of General Turkel, his successor. For the rest he could not identify any of the Polish generals. This is merely one more indication of the severe limitation the Soviets put upon attention to broader political and military problems. Conversation focuses on divisional gossip concerning local people and events. The mass media focus on a few symbolic political figures. In between these two extremes there is a vast area about which communication and knowledge are severely restricted. This illustrates what Mr. Lerner has called the discipline of "limited perspectives."

25. Smogorzewski, op. cit., p. 597.

26. Markham, p. 413.

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27. Markham, op. cit., p. 419.

28. Markham, op. cit., p. 417.

29. Nation Roumaine, March 15, 1952; Ibid., January 1, 1952. That statistic, however, may involve some Communist juggling.

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30. The structural outline of the Ministry of the Armed Forces in 1950 and 1951 was as follows:

I. THE MINISTRY OF THE ARMED FORCES
  1. Minister of the Armed Forces: General of the Army Emil Bodnaras
  2. Deputy Ministers: Lieutenant General Leontin Salajan, Chief of Staff
     Major General Viliam Suder, Inspector General of the Army—since replaced
     Major General Nicolae Ceausescu
     Major General Constantin Doncea (allegedly executed since)
  3. Departments:
     (1) Superior Political Department of the Army
     (2) Department of Education and Instruction
     (3) Department of Organization and Mobilization
     (4) Department of Information and Counterespionage
     (5) Department of Ground Forces
     (6) Department of Air Forces
     (7) Department of Naval Forces
     (8) Department of Partisan Forces
     (9) Department of Mechanized Forces
     (10) Department of Motorized Forces
     (11) Department of Artillery
     (12) Department of Transportation and Communication
     (13) Department of the Secretariat
     (14) Department of Justice
     (15) Department of Administration and Commissariat
     (16) Department of Accounting
     (17) Department of Sanitation

II. THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF
  1. Chief of Staff: Lt. General Leontin Salajan
  2. Deputy Chief of Staff: Maj. General Iacob Teclu

III. THE ACADEMY OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
  1. Commandant: Major General Iosif Butoi

IV. THE ARMY COMMANDS: MILITARY REGIONS
  1. Bucarest: Lt. Genl. Alexander Gavrilescu
  2. Craiova:
  3. Iasi: Lt. Genl. Stere Stefanescu
  4. Cluj:

V. THE ARMY CORPS COMMANDS
  1. First Army Corps: Craiova
  2. Second Army Corps: Bucarest

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3. Third Army Corps: Iasi
4. Fourth Army Corps: Bacu
5. Fifth Army Corps: Brasov
6. Sixth Army Corps: Cluj
7. Seventh Army Corps: Sibiu
8. Mountain Corps: Targu Mures
9. Cavalry Corps: Timisoara
10. Motorized Corps: Bucarest
11. Air Corps: Bucarest
12. Navy: Constanta

The structural outline of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was as follows in 1950-51. In 1952 it must have been drastically changed for it was divided into two ministries, that of Interior and that of State Security. We have no reliable information on the present structure, however.

I. THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS (M.A.I.)

1. Minister of Internal Affairs: Major General Alexandru Draghici (now Minister of State Security)
2. The General Staff of the M.A.I. Troops
    (1) Chief of Staff
    (2) Political Department
    (3) Juridical Department
    (4) Department of the Militia
3. M.A.I. Troops (120,000)
    (1) Frontier Guards
    (2) Internal Security
        a. Information Section
        b. Counter-sabotage Section
        c. Investigation Section
        d. Operation Section
        e. Prosecution Section
        f. Cadres Section
        g. Secretariat
        h. Technical Section
    (3) Fire Troops
    (4) Aviation Units

30a. *Buletinul Militar*, I (1953) 5, p. 17.

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31. "The Recruitment of Cadres in the Army of the Rumanian Popular Republic," *Buletinul Militar*, I (1953) 5.

31a. *Ibid.*

32. *The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), pp. 280ff.

33. Nagy, *op. cit.*, pp. 311-19.

33a. A similar case of the use of a technician not in our sample is that of General Kalman Ternegy pulled out of prison where he was serving an eight-year sentence for collaboration with the Germans and made Inspector General of Artillery. Cf. Andrew Gyorgy's forthcoming publication on the take-over process in Hungary.

860 33b. News from Behind the Iron Curtain, December 1953, Vol. II, No. 12, p. 5.

34. Presumably General Kondrateev.

35. Between 1923 and 1929 they graduated as first lieutenants.

36. Mimeographed, no date.

37. Smogorzewski, op. cit., p. 597.

38. Quoted in Ibid, p. 660.

39. Ibid.

40. News from Behind the Iron Curtain, Supplement, March 1-15, 1951, p. 7.

41. One other special sample which we have for Hungary and not for any of the other satellite countries is that of a group of police officers. It should be re-emphasized that these men have regular army ranks and that the relationship of the security troops under the State Security Authority and the troops under the Ministry of Defense is much closer in the Soviet world than in the West. It might be worthwhile here to give a couple of sample biographies.

Gabor Peter was until February 1953, when he was ousted, the head of the State Security Authority. He was perhaps the most notorious character in the entire Hungarian hierarchy. He was an old GPU man. Between 1919 and 1944 he frequently acted as courier between Budapest and Moscow. He was arrested a number of times. From 1941 to 1944 he lived in Russia. In 1944 he became head of the terror organ of the Hungarian Communist party and as such carried out a number of armed assignments against the Germans during the occupation. Then in the new Hungary he became head of the political department of the Budapest police in 1945. At that time he was a colonel. He rose to be lieutenant general in the Ministry of Interior and then when the Security Authority was separated, the head of the latter.

His father had been a village grocer. He himself became a tailor's assistant. He is of Jewish descent. He is small, flutters, minces, lisps, has a passion for flowers, which fill his office. To speak to him is like talking to "a fluttering maiden lady who has at last achieved a little garden plot of her own." He devised insidious tortures and methods for getting what he wants from his prisoners. He particularly liked to torment intellectual and formerly influential Jews.*

Another of these police characters is Ferenc Muennich. He is a man of about sixty. He went to law school and was a member of the Galilei Circle, a group of leftwing university students, during World War I. He joined the Communist party in 1918 and became chief of a unit known as Red Guards in the Bela Kun period. After the defeat of the Hungarian Communist regime he fled to Vienna.

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*Nicholas Nyaradi, My Ringside Seat in Moscow, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1952.

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[For military organization in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Romania and for the Russian domination of the military in these satellite countries see category 116, pp. 1-117, 147-154]